Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, a Pennsylvania Game Commission Officer found Appellant Mark Clegg in possession of two rifles during a hunting incident. Appellant had a prior conviction of attempted burglary. In addition to various summary violations under the Game and Wildlife Code, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with violation of the Uniform Firearms Act. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether attempted burglary is a "qualifying offense" that prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm under the Act. Upon review of the plain meaning of the Act, the Supreme Court found that attempted burglary is not one of the enumerated offenses under the Act, and as such, was not a "qualifying" offense for which Appellant could be charged in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Appellant's charge under the Act.

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court in Defendant Omar Johnson's case properly calculated the total weight of heroin for the purpose of imposing a mandatory minimum sentence. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in finding that a single purchase of one bundle of packets of heroin from a third person who retrieved the bundle from a parked car, coupled with Defendant's immediate resale of that bundle to an undercover offer, formed an adequate basis for its conclusion that Defendant was in constructive possession of a second bundle stored in the car which was discovered following a police search. Because the amount of heroin seized from the car was erroneously included by the trial court in the calculation of the total amount of heroin Defendant was found to have possessed with the intent to deliver, the Supreme Court concluded Defendant received an improperly-calculated sentence. The Court reversed the trial court's calculation and remanded the case for resentencing.

Following a bench trial in October 2001, Appellee Jules Jette was found guilty of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, endangering the welfare of a child and corruption of minors charges. Appellee was sentenced to ten to twenty years' imprisonment, with consecutive terms of probation for seven and five years. The post-conviction-relief court (PCRA) found no merit to Appellee's claims for relief. Appellee's counsel strategically chose not to challenge all issues addressed by the PCRA court in its opinion that dismissed the case. Appellee appeared pro se to appeal to the Superior Court. The Superior Court found that Appellee was entitled to new counsel and remanded the case back to the PCRA court. The Commonwealth appealed the Superior Court's order to the Supreme Court. After a careful review of the Superior Court's opinion, the applicable law and the briefs of the parties, the Supreme Court found that the Superior Court misread the applicable legal standard which was the basis of its opinion. As a result, the Commonwealth found itself in the "unusual position" of advocating in defense of the "honor, independence and professionalism of the criminal defense bar" in its appeal of the Superior Court's order. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded the case back to the PCRA for further proceedings.

In 2005, Robert Sample was found face down on a Philadelphia city sidewalk, dead from multiple gunshot wounds to his head and neck. In canvassing the area for witnesses, detectives knocked on the door of a third-floor apartment in a nearby high-rise. Jamilla and Dominique Everett opened the door. After obtaining permission to enter the apartment, detectives found Jamilla's children, Dominique's boyfriend Khalif Alston and Appellee Ernest Cannon asleep inside. Everyone inside the apartment denied any knowledge of the shooting but agreed to accompany the police to the station for further questioning. Later on the day of the murder, the Everetts consented to a search of their apartment. Police recovered a semiautomatic handgun from inside the toilet tank. Everyone inside the apartment that day was questioned again. When detectives interviewed Mr. Alston, he confessed to his role in the crime and implicated Appellee. Following the consolidation of their cases, a jury tried both men. Since Appellee and Mr. Alston were being tried together, the statement that Mr. Alston gave to the police on the day of the murder was redacted by substituting the phrase "the other guy" for any reference to Appellee by name. The prosecution "slipped" and named Appellee in his opening statement as he recounted the events on the date of the murder. At the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening, Appellee objected and moved for a mistrial, claiming that the prosecutor "broke the redaction." The trial court gave the jury an immediate cautionary instruction. The jury returned a verdict against Appellee, convicting him of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy and carrying a firearm. The trial court then sentenced Appellee to life in prison for the murder conviction, with concurrent sentences for the other charges. On appeal to the Superior Court, Appellee successfully argued that he was entitled to a new trial because of the prosecutor's slip up during his opening statement. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial judge's cautionary instruction was sufficient to support Appellee's conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court gave "direct, unequivocal and strong" cautionary instructions, repeatedly detailing the proper manner of weighing the evidence. "The trial court, which is in the best position to assess whether any prejudice can be cured, determined that the prosecutor's comment did not justify a mistrial." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and reinstated the verdict and sentences of the trial court.

Defendant Ralph Birdsong unsuccessfully appealed his sentence for murder, rape and assault. He was sentenced to death. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that the appellate court improperly denied his petition for post conviction relief. Defendant cited multiple errors at trial that entitled him to a reduction in his sentence or complete dismissal of the charges against him. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that Defendant was not entitled to relief. The Court affirmed the order of the lower courts denying Defendant's petition for post conviction relief.

The State appealed a Superior Court order that allowed Defendant Vincent Moto to expunge his criminal record. In 1987, Defendant was convicted of rape, deviate intercourse and conspiracy charges and was sentenced to a maximum twenty-four year sentence. Ten years into his sentence, DNA testing exonerated the Defendant. The State "nolle prossed" his case. In 2007, Defendant petitioned the court to expunge all records of his arrest, trial, conviction and sentence. The attorney who originally prosecuted the case opined that the DNA evidence did not necessarily exculpate Defendant because he was still present at the scene. Furthermore, the State would have retried Defendant except that the victim had moved out of state. The trial court ultimately denied Defendant's request to expunge his record. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was unable to agree with neither Defendant's assertions nor the Superior Court's determinations of trial court error. The trial court denied Defendant's petition to expunge based primarily on the strength of the original 1987 case against him, and the inability of DNA evidence to exonerate him. The Court therefore reversed the Superior Court, and reinstated the trial court's decision.

Pennsylvania's current version of Megan's Law requires individuals convicted of kidnapping, indecent assault, or promoting prostitution to register for ten years following release from jail or probation. Persons convicted of two or more offenses subject to the ten-year registration must register for life. Allegheny County (the County) amended its code to add to the registration requirements: if a registrant moves to a "prohibited area" within the County, s/he will have 45 days to move out. Failure to move within the 45 days would constitute a separate offense. Appellee Charles Fross and several other parties were convicted sex offenders subjected to the County's new rule. They brought suit in federal court to challenge the new ordinance, arguing that the rule was preempted by the state Sentencing and Parole Codes, and asked the court to declare the ordinance invalid. The federal court certified the question of whether the County's ordinance was preempted by the Pennsylvania Prisons and Parole Code and/or by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code to the Supreme Court. The County argued that the ordinance was a permissible exercise of its powers, and was valid. The Supreme Court found that the ordinance "impedes the accomplishments of the full objectives of the General Assembly, as expressed in the Sentencing and Parole Codes, and is . . . invalid pursuant to our conflict preemption doctrine."

Appellee Ronald Gibson challenged his sentence for the shooting deaths of a police officer and a bystander during a failed robbery attempt at a bar in Philadelphia. After multiple remands, Appellee argued to the Supreme Court that he received ineffective assistance of counsel that resulted in prejudice against him at trial. The appellate court concluded that Appelleeâs counsel was âderelictâ by failing to adequately investigate life-history or mental health mitigation evidence. The court concluded, however, that the trial court should have resolved certain questions that arose from evidentiary discrepancies. The Supreme Court performed an exhaustive review of the evidence presented at trial. While not diminishing Appelleeâs troubles, the Court found that the mitigating evidence Appellee sought to enter at trial was not enough to overcome the aggravating factors introduced at trial or to overturn the juryâs verdict. The Court held that Appelleeâs claim for ineffective assistance of counsel to be unfounded, and it affirmed Appelleeâs conviction and sentence.

Appellee Edward Watts was convicted of first-degree murder and numerous other offenses in 2001 and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a timely direct appeal, but the Superior Court dismissed it for failing to include a docketing statement. Defense counsel was directed to certify that he had notified Appellee of the dismissal, but he never filed the required certification saying that he did so. Throughout 2002 and 2003, Appellee sought status updates on his appeal. In August, 2003, the Superior Court advised Appellee that his appeal had been dismissed. Within days of receiving that notice, Appellee filed a pro se Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, seeking reinstatement of his appellate rights. The PCRA Court dismissed his claim, but the Superior Court reversed that decision. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by Appelleeâs argument that because he did not know (and had no way of knowing except through his attorney) that the appeal had been dismissed, he should be afforded an opportunity to have his petition heard. The Court reversed the Superior Courtâs decision, finding Appelleeâs petition was properly dismissed in the lower court for being untimely filed.

Appellant Mark Spotz appealed the denial of his petition for collateral relief under the Commonwealthâs Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). While engaged in a three-day crime spree in early 1995, Appellant killed four people in four counties. He was tried separately for each homicide, and he was ultimately convicted of first-degree murder and given the death sentence. Since his conviction, Appellant has applied for and received judicial review of his convictions and sentence. Each time, Appellant has raised constitutional bases or trial and/or appellate court errors to seek the next review. The string of appeals ends for now with this case. Here, Appellant sought review of an order of the PCRA court that denied his petition for collateral relief relating to the death of Betty Amstutz in February, 1995. During the guilt phase of trial, Appellant appeared pro se and asserted an innocence defense. The jury found him guilty. He was assigned a public defender for the sentencing phase and was sentenced to death. Appellant appealed to the PCRA alleging errors at trial, ineffective assistance of counsel, and a host of other matters, all of which were denied. The Supreme Court engaged in an exhaustive review of Appellantâs case history dating back to the original trial in 1996, and found no errors that warranted the post-conviction relief Appellant sought. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions.