Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The issue in this discretionary appeal was whether a police officer violates the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act ("Wiretap Act" or "Act") when he communicates directly with a suspect via cell phone text messages while pretending to be the suspect's accomplice. "Because an officer who directly communicates with another person by text-messaging is not eavesdropping or listening in on a conversation, but is himself engaging in the communication, and because for purposes of the Wiretap Act, it is irrelevant that an officer intentionally misrepresents his identity to the person with whom he communicates," the Supreme Court held that no violation of the Wiretap Act occurred in this case. View "Pennsylvania v. Cruttenden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed cross-appeals in this opinion, arising from a capital matter from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The lower court granted partial relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), which the Commonwealth appealed insofar as it granted relief on Appellee Jose DeJesus's claim that he was ineligible for the death penalty under "Atkins v. Virginia," (536 U.S. 304 (2002)), because he was mentally retarded. Appellee cross-appealed the PCRA court's concurrent denial of his various other PCRA claims. At trial, before the court issued a decision on Appellee's "Atkins" claim, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reopen the record, asserting that it had recently received information from prison officials that she substantial doubt on appellee's claims of mental retardation. The PCRA Court denied the Commonwealth's motion, offering no further explanation or discussion for the denial. The PCRA court concluded that appellee had met his burden to prove limited intellectual functioning. In the court's view, the Commonwealth's evidence and argument that appellee malingered on his post-Atkins tests, while "compelling," did not "carry the day." The PCRA court also addressed the merits of the claims raised by appellee in his cross-appeal, rejecting them all. The Supreme Court concluded the PCRA Court abused its discretion in not entertaining the Commonwealth's new evidence. "The Commonwealth's proffer specified that this evidence was relevant to the intellectual and adaptive function elements of Atkins because it showed appellee's ability, not only to function within prison, but to use his wits and skills to 'beat the system' in a manner that required forethought, direction and coordination of others." The Supreme Court vacated the PCRA court's decision and accompanying order which found appellee mentally retarded and vacated his death sentences, but otherwise denied relief. This matter was remanded for further Atkins proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a superior court order that reversed an order denying appellee's petition for post conviction relief and for remanding for an evidentiary hearing. Appellee Joseph Abraham was accused of soliciting a former student for sex, and for allegedly sexually assaulting her. When the allegations surfaced, the then 67-year-old Appellee retired from teaching and began receiving pension payments. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, appellee pled guilty to corruption of a minor and indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age. He was sentenced to probation; no direct appeal was filed. Because the crime of indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age is one of the enumerated offenses in the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act (PEPFA), appellee forfeited his pension when he pled guilty to this charge. He filed a motion to withdraw his plea nunc pro tunc, alleging he was not informed of his right to seek withdrawal of his plea or of the possible sentences he faced. The trial court denied the motion. Appellee filed a timely PCRA petition alleging plea counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him he would forfeit his pension upon pleading guilty. The PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed. "Because counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to advise a defendant regarding the collateral consequences of a plea, appellee's ineffectiveness claim fails." Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior Court granting appellee a PCRA hearing on the issue of prejudice, and remanded the case to reinstate the PCRA court's order denying appellee relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Abraham" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition in 2006 to appeal his murder conviction. The Federal Community Defender Office ("FCDO"), Capital Habeas Unit unilaterally entered its appearance.on Appellant's behalf. Federal counsel filed a lengthy amended petition, alleging numerous claims of trial court error and ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing over four separate days. Following the hearing, the court denied relief. Appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court. Appellant's issues on appeal, as summarized by the Court: (1) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present mental health evidence to support claims of diminished mental capacity, imperfect belief of defense of others, and mitigating evidence; (2) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the Commonwealth’s peremptory challenges of potential jurors; (3) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to properly question potential jurors who were excused because they expressed doubts about imposing the death penalty; (4) whether counsel was ineffective in challenging appellant’s inculpatory statements; (5) whether the jury was presented with materially false evidence by the Commonwealth and whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert to dispute this evidence; (6) whether counsel was ineffective in failing to object to victim impact evidence; (7) whether error in the guilt phase jury instructions violated appellant’s due process rights; (8) whether counsel had a conflict of interest; (9) whether appellant’s rights were violated because no transcript existed of portions of his trial; and (10) whether the cumulative effect of the alleged errors warranted relief. After thorough review of Appellant's claims, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court insofar as it dismissed all claims other than that of ineffective assistance of counsel associated with the investigation, development, and presentation of mitigation evidence. With respect to this claim, the PCRA court's order was vacated, and the matter was remanded for further consideration. View "Pennsylvania v. Sepulveda" on Justia Law

In this capital post-conviction matter, Carolyn Ann King appealed an order denying guilt-phase relief but granting a new sentencing hearing. In 1993, Appellant's co-defendant Bradley Martin received a prison visitation pass that allowed him to leave the Lebanon County prison where he was incarcerated. He met Appellant, with whom he was romantically involved, and failed to return to prison as required. Instead, the two traveled to Palmyra, where they visited Guy Goodman, with whom Martin was acquainted. After arriving at Goodman's home, Martin struck Goodman over the head with a vase, and the pair disabled Goodman by tightly binding his wrists, ankles, and neck. They then placed various wrappings around his head, sealing them with duct tape. Finally, they carried Goodman into the basement, tying him even more securely and wrapping him in a bedspread, and then leaving him to suffocate while they stole his checkbook and credit card and fled in his car. During their flight, Appellant and Martin used Goodman's credit card and checks to pay their expenses. Martin and Appellant were eventually apprehended in Arizona. In 2000, Appellant filed a timely, pro se petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Thereafter, she was given permission to file a counseled, amended petition, and her execution was stayed pending final resolution of her claims. New counsel for Appellant filed amended and supplemental petitions, raising numerous claims for collateral relief predicated on trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. The PCRA court ultimately denied Appellant's request for a new trial, finding all her guilt-phase claims meritless. It did grant Appellant a new penalty hearing based on its determination that her trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present any mental-health mitigating evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because none of the issues Appellant raised on appeal entitled her to a new trial, the order of the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. King" on Justia Law

The question presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether a criminal defendant’s right to be present in the courtroom at every critical stage of his or her trial, including during the impaneling of a jury, categorically mandates the defendant’s personal ability to hear each venireperson who is questioned at sidebar during voir dire proceedings conducted by the court, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney as to substantive issues. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not based upon the principle that a defendant’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his or her trial is not absolute, and that under certain circumstances, including where the defendant is physically present in the courtroom and is represented by counsel, the right to be present at every stage of trial is vindicated without the defendant’s being personally able to hear the questioning of each venireperson at sidebar. Because Appellant Christian Hunsberger was physically present in the courtroom during sidebar voir dire proceedings, was represented by counsel, and interacted with counsel during these proceedings, his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he had a right to be present at sidebar was "without arguable merit." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court denying relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Hunsberger" on Justia Law

Appellant Donte Thomas directly appealed his death sentence for first degree murder to the Supreme Court. On appeal, he argued prosecutorial misconduct, errors at trial and ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for reversal. Following a review of the facts and trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded there was no misconduct, no errors by the trial court, and that Appellant received effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Following several evidentiary hearings in this post-conviction capital case, the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (PCRA court) dismissed the petition filed by Appellant Jose Busanet pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. Appellant filed his PCRA petition on September 24, 2004, and amended it on December 14, 2004. Upon Appellant’s motion, the PCRA court judge, who had presided over Appellant’s trial, recused himself from the PCRA proceeding based on general comments the judge had made in an unrelated case, which referenced his frustration with cases involving drug dealing and gun violence in the City of Reading. A new PCRA court judge was assigned to the case. During the next few years, several different counsel withdrew their appearance due to conflicts of interest. Appellant filed amendments to his PCRA petition on September 14, 2007, and January 7, 2009. On February 7, 2011, the PCRA court entered an Order and Opinion, examining thoroughly each of Appellant’s several claims, and denying PCRA relief. In his direct appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, Appellant raised thirteen issues. Upon careful consideration of each of Appellant's issues raised on appeal, the Supreme Court found no error, and affirmed the PCRA Court's dismissal the PCRA petition. View "Pennsylvania v. Busanet" on Justia Law

Appellant Aaron Jones' third petition for PCRA relief was denied as untimely, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death for ordering the murder of a rival gang member. After multiple unsuccessful attempts to get PCRA relief, Appellant filed an unsuccessful petition for the writ of habeas corpus. When that too was denied, Appellant filed a third PCRA petition, alleging that he received newly-discovered evidence and that his untimely petition should be excepted from the PCRA's timeliness requirement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no merit to Appellant's arguments, and ruled that his petition was clearly untimely and properly dismissed by the PCRA court. View "Pennsylvania v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review of this case to address the applicability of Section 9543(b) of the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) to delays in filing amended post-conviction petitions, and the related issue of what obligation (if any) a petitioner had to move the litigation of his petition forward. In 1988, Petitioner filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief. A public defender was appointed to serve as his counsel upon remand to the PCRA court, but no further docket entries appeared in Petitioner's case until 2003 when Petitioner acting pro se filed a document seeking "extension of post-conviction relief petition." The extension was treated as an untimely and successive PCRA petition. On remand, the case was again assigned counsel, and that counsel filed an amended PCRA petition, raising numerous claims regarding Petitioner's trial counsel's ineffective assistance. The PCRA court issued an opinion dismissing the matter with prejudice. The court cited that too much time as passed to be able to mount a defense as fifteen witnesses were no longer available: "the absence of witnesses as well as the likelihood that memories would be poor twenty-four years after trial… would severely prejudice the Commonwealth's ability to retry" Petitioner. Accordingly, the PCRA court dismissed the matter; the Superior Court affirmed. Upon review the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Legislature balanced policy concerns implicated by protracted litigation of PCRA claims and determined that in certain instances of substantial delay, the prejudice suffered by the Commonwealth as a result of that delay, as demonstrated at an evidentiary hearing, justifies dismissal of an original or amended petition. View "Pennsylvania v. Renchenski" on Justia Law