Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy after a jury trial.On appeal, Defendant requested a new trial on the grounds that the trial justice erred in admitting into evidence identification testimony and a photograph identification. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting the contested identification testimony because the testimony was not impermissible hearsay; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting a single photograph of Defendant into evidence because the use of a single photograph was not unduly suggestive and did not implicate Defendant’s right to due process. View "State v. Alves" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault, holding that the trial justice did not err in granting the State’s motion in limine and in admitting the testimony of three witnesses about alleged incidents of Defendant’s prior sexual misconduct under R.I. R. Evid. 404(b).On appeal, Defendant argued that the alleged prior sexual misconduct was too remote and dissimilar to the charged acts to be admissible. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the challenged testimony satisfied the “nonremote” and “similar” requirements of Rule 404(b) jurisprudence; (2) the evidence was relevant to the crime charged and reasonably necessary; (3) the risk of prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the allegations of prior sexual misconduct; and (4) there was no error in the trial justice’s analysis under Rule 29(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. View "State v. Perry" on Justia Law

Contrary to the conclusions of the magistrate and the hearing justice, Defendant did not have a lifetime duty to register, but rather, his duty to register expired ten years from the expiration of his sentence for the offense of second-degree child molestation sexual assault, in accordance with R. I. Gen. Stat. 11-37.1-18 and 11.37.1-4(a). Further, Defendant’s three prior failure-to-notify convictions did not run afoul of the ex post facto clause.Defendant filed a motion to dismiss a 2012 charge for failing to notify law enforcement of a change in residence. The magistrate denied the motion, determining that Defendant had a lifetime duty to register. Defendant then filed an application for postconviction relief from his three prior failure-to-notify convictions in 2007, 2009, and 2010. A justice of the superior court denied relief, concluding that Defendant had a lifetime duty to register and that his three failure-no-notify convictions did not violate the ex post facto clause. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the part of the magistrate’s decision denying the motion to dismiss but reversed the magistrate’s ruling that Defendant had a lifetime duty to register as a sex offender; and (2) affirmed the judgment denying postconviction relief but reversed the hearing justice’s ruling that Defendant’s obligation to register was for the remainder of his life. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and one count of the sale or distribution of photographs of a minor suggesting that the minor engaged in, or is about to engage in, a sexual act. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the complaining witness regarding her allegations against her biological father. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in precluding the admission of this evidence. View "State v. Danis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the superior court granting Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to a Massachusetts Department of Children and Families investigator on grounds that the investigator’s failure to advise Defendant of his right to counsel rendered the statements involuntary.Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on four counts of child molestation. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the hearing justice granting Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s statements were voluntary, and the motion to suppress should have been denied. View "State v. Gouin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Petitioner’s application for postconviction relief, in which Petitioner claimed that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court held (1) Petitioner’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to utilize an expert witness on false confessions; (2) the trial justice did not clearly err in refusing to approve funding for the hiring of an expert witness on false confessions in this postconviction relief action; and (3) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to recuse the justice during the trial, and the trial justice did not err in not recusing himself from hearing the instant application for postconviction relief. View "Barros v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment convicting Defendant of second-degree murder, discharging a weapon while committing a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm, having previously been convicted of a felony. The Court held (1) the trial justice properly denied Defendant’s Watson claims as to two prospective jurors; (2) the trial justice did not improperly restrict the cross-examination of a witness about a firearm the witness saw two days before the homicide; (3) the trial justice did not err when she denied Defendant’s motion to pass the case after a spectator’s emotional outburst during the defense’s opening statement; and (4) the trial justice did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Porter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment convicting Defendant of second-degree murder, discharging a weapon while committing a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm, having previously been convicted of a felony. The Court held (1) the trial justice properly denied Defendant’s Watson claims as to two prospective jurors; (2) the trial justice did not improperly restrict the cross-examination of a witness about a firearm the witness saw two days before the homicide; (3) the trial justice did not err when she denied Defendant’s motion to pass the case after a spectator’s emotional outburst during the defense’s opening statement; and (4) the trial justice did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Porter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of two counts of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation. The court held (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by failing to exclude certain testimony as a result of the State’s violation of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; (2) the trial judge did not err by admitting the testimony at issue pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; (3) even if the testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial judge did not err in admitting the testimony under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; (4) the trial judge did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in analyzing Defendant’s motion for new trial; and (5) the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. View "State v. Rainey" on Justia Law

Collateral estoppel is not applicable to issues determined in the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal when the issues are “only a small part of a larger, ongoing criminal investigation.”Defendant in this case was cited in the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal with the civil violation of reasonable and prudent speeds. Defendant was also charged criminally in Superior Court with driving under the influence, serious bodily injury resulting and reckless driving. Defendant sought to dismiss his criminal charges, arguing that the Traffic Tribunal magistrate determined that he was not operating the vehicle, and therefore, the issue could not be relitigated based on collateral estoppel. The Superior Court magistrate granted the motion to dismiss. A Superior Court justice reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in matters that are only a small part of a larger, ongoing criminal investigation, the Traffic Tribunal’s process is insufficient to estop a later criminal proceeding. View "State v. Minior" on Justia Law