Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Applicant filed an amended application for postcoviction relief asserting that his convictions in four prior drug-offenses cases were the result of ineffective assistance of counsel because he had pled nolo contendere in each case rather than pursuing a motion to suppress evidence or going to trial. The hearing justice denied Applicant’s postconviction relief application, concluding that Applicant failed to prove that any of his attorneys’ performances were constitutionally deficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Applicant failed to demonstrate that any of his attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel in his previous cases. View "Lipscomb v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree arson. The trial justice sentenced Defendant to a term of twenty-five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) any error on the part of the trial court in admitting into evidence a video recording of Defendant’s custodial police interrogation, the error was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial; and (2) the trial court did not misconceive or overlook material evidence or otherwise err by denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Gaudreau" on Justia Law

This case involved a shooting that occurred in the City of Woonsocket, which left Ikey Wilson with severe injury to his stomach and required the amputation of his right leg. Defendant Christian Rosado appealed his conviction on two separate counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (firearm). Defendant maintained that the hearing justice erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on what he perceived to have been the state’s discovery violation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rhode Island v. Rosado" on Justia Law

Applicant Robert Dominick appealed the denial of his application for postconviction relief, arguing the trial court erred in finding that he failed to present newly discovered evidence that would have entitled him to a new trial. Applicant was convicted in 2009 for the assault and battery of a person over sixty years old. The victim testified that an altercation arose when she was mowing her lawn, and Applicant yelled at her to get off his lawn. Applicant shoved her against a granite marker pole located on her property, causing scrapes to her arm. The lawn mower was damaged as a result of the altercation. During the hearing and in his filings before the Superior Court, applicant relied on two items he described as "newly discovered": (1) the picture of the lawn mower, coupled with the information that Beltram had disposed of the lawn mower, and (2) an eyewitness' testimony. Applicant claimed that during the civil trial he learned for the first time that the victim had destroyed the lawn mower involved in their altercation but that she had kept a photograph of the lawn mower. He claimed that the photograph could have been used to impeach the victim's testimony at the criminal trial that the lawn mower had been damaged as a result of applicant’s conduct because the photograph did not depict any damage to the lawn. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in finding Applicant failed to present new evidence, and affirmed in all respects. View "Dominick v. Rhode Island" on Justia Law

In 2012, defendant was charged with simple assault, G.L. 1956 11-5-3. On February 15, 2013, a separate criminal information was filed charging defendant with “break[ing] and enter[ing] the dwelling of [defendant’s sister] without the consent of the owner,” G.L. 1956 11-8-2 and 12-29-5. Both charges were tried on a jury-waived basis. Defendant moved to dismiss the breaking and entering charge “based on the fact that [the state had] not presented evidence to establish the crime of breaking and entering.” Defense counsel stated: “I’m suggesting .. that you apply the statutory language for ... willful trespass ...my client is most likely guilty of.” The trial justice found her guilty of simple assault; with respect to breaking and entering, he concluded that it had been established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the misdemeanor offense of willful trespass. The justice sentenced her to a one-year suspended sentence with one year of probation on each count, to run consecutively. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that, concerning the simple assault, defendant’s speedy trial right was violated; that willful trespass is not a lesser-included offense of breaking and entering; and that the trial justice erred in denying her motion to dismiss the breaking and entering charge. View "State v. Connery" on Justia Law

In February 2008, defendant received a seven-year suspended sentence with probation, after he had pled nolo contendere to one count of breaking and entering a dwelling. In June 2012, after defendant was found to be in violation of his probation, he was sentenced to serve six months, leaving 78 months of his suspended sentence remaining. The defendant was still on probation in March 2014, when the state filed a notice of probation violation, alleging that defendant had failed to comply with a condition of his probation by “fail[ing] to keep the peace and be of good behavior” in connection with a domestic disturbance involving his pregnant girlfriend. The court ordered him to serve 72 of the 78 months remaining on the suspended sentence. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation and that the penalty was “excessive.” The lower court adequately considered the “hiatus” in defendant’s criminal conduct. View "State v. Fairweather" on Justia Law

Benoit was working as part of a crew replacing windows at an apartment complex, when a resident found him rifling through a wallet that was on the top of a dresser in the resident’s bedroom. Benoit was convicted of entering an apartment with the intent to commit larceny and received a four-year sentence, with 18 months to serve and 30 months suspended, with 30 months of probation. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence of his intent to commit larceny at the time he entered the apartment and that the jury heard an officer testify that he responded to a call for a “[p]ossible burglary in progress,” the prejudicial effect of which was so severe that a mistrial was warranted. View "State v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Early in the morning of October 25, 2011, as she was leaving for work, Lora, was viciously attacked by a masked assailant in the front hall of her home and was severely cut on her face with a small blade. Lora subsequently identified her attacker as Breton, with whom she had previously had a two-year-long romantic relationship. Breton was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and simple assault on Lora. A third count was for a simple assault against Lora’s daughter, which was alleged to have occurred on May 26, 2010. When the case was reached for trial, Breton was convicted of the two counts of assault against Lora, but acquitted of the third count. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial justice misconstrued the evidence when he found Lora to be a more credible witness than the alibi witnesses produced by Breton, Breton’s mother and a family friend. View "State v. Breton" on Justia Law

Florez was convicted of one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault (sexual contact with a person 14 years of age or under) in violation of G.L. 1956 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4 and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, with eight years to serve and the remaining time suspended with probation. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial; that the trial justice’s jury charge and verdict sheet were flawed in that they permitted the jury to return a non-unanimous guilty verdict; that the trial justice erred by allowing the state to improperly refresh the complainant’s recollection; and that the trial justice committed reversible error by declining to admit parts of the witness statement of the complainant’s father into evidence. View "State v. Florez" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Cranston Police Department filed delinquency petitions alleging that, when B.H. was 13 years old, he committed two offenses that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of first-degree child molestation and one offense that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of second-degree child molestation. The victims were 11-year-old boys.The Family Court found the B.H. delinquent for the violations under G.L. 1956 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2. The Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded, finding that the evidence at the delinquency proceeding was insufficient to establish sexual penetration—an element of both of the charges of first-degree child molestation of which the respondent was adjudged to be delinquent. The court directed the Family Court to enter adjudications of delinquency on the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation sexual assault (second-degree child molestation). View "In the Matter of B.H." on Justia Law