Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1990, Defendant pled nolo contendere to twenty-six offenses, including arson and a number of robberies. Defendant was sentenced to forty years' incarceration with twenty-eight years suspended, with probation, on the one arson and eight robbery charges. In 2011, a probation violation hearing was held based upon allegations of sexual assault. Thirteen witnesses testified during the hearing regarding the allegations. The superior court subsequently found Defendant to be in violation of the terms of his probation and sentenced him to serve the previously imposed suspended sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice's credibility findings were not arbitrary or capricious. View "State v. Raso" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation and five counts of second-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial justice erred in admitting evidence that Defendant also allegedly molested the complainant's sister. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant's other sexual misconduct; (2) the trial justice did not clearly err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial; and (3) the trial justice correctly denied Defendant's request for new counsel prior to sentencing. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping of a minor and reckless driving. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in admitting testimony about the alleged sexual assault of the kidnapping victim and in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the trial justice considered the potential effects of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues and acted accordingly by issuing limiting instructions to the jury during the trial, the justice did not abuse her discretion in admitting the evidence of the sexual assault; and (2) the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence and was not otherwise clearly wrong in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Clay" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and entering a dwelling with the intent to commit a larceny therein. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that newly discovered evidence revealed a cooperation agreement between the police and a prominent state's witness in Defendant's murder trial and that the prosecution violated Defendant's due process rights by failing to disclose the full extent of the agreement. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that the alleged newly discovered evidence failed the first prong of the test to be applied for motions based on newly discovered evidence; and (2) Defendant's due process rights were not violated because the state did not fail to disclose information regarding the cooperation agreement. View "State v. Drew" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation and two counts of first-degree child abuse on a child under the age of five. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent life sentences on the child molestation counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, as that the trial justice conducted the appropriate analysis and reached the same result as the jury after considering the evidence and independently assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. View "State v. Baptista" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several criminal offenses, including murder, robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, and other firearm-related counts. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err when she denied Defendant's motion for new trial and did not misconceive material evidence relating to a critical trial issue; (2) did not give confusing or unwarranted instructions to the jury; (3) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury that Defendant was in custody; and (5) did not permit the excessive use of leading questions during the direct examination of the State's witnesses. Lastly, Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because certain bench conferences were not placed on the record. View "State v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

In 1999, Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to first-degree robbery. While he was on parole from that sentence, Defendant was charged with and subsequently pleaded nolo contendere to two counts of second-degree child molestation. In 2006, Defendant filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging that the attorney who had represented him in the child molestation case had rendered ineffective assistance because he had erroneously advised Defendant. The trial justice denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in determining that Defendant had failed to demonstrate he had received the advice he claimed was constitutionally deficient; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice from the alleged erroneous advice. View "Perkins v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of nine felony counts, including second-degree murder and related firearms offenses. The trial court imposed a mandatory consecutive life sentence for use of a firearm in the commission of a homicide. After unsuccessfully filing two applications for postconviction relief, Defendant filed this third petition for postconviction relief, which the district court also denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's mandatory consecutive life sentence for discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; (2) Defendant's conviction and sentence for second-degree murder and discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence did not violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and (3) defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "Linde v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder that involved aggravated robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting that the root cause of his troubles was alcoholism and that he was now sober. The hearing justice denied the motion, noting that Defendant had not accepted responsibility for the murder of the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion, fail to properly consider the trial justice's findings, or deficiently consider the arguments before him. View "State v. Mlyniec" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of breaking and entering and felony assault with a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial because the the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence; (2) did not abuse his discretion by deciding not to permit defense counsel to question prospective jurors about eyewitness testimony during voir dire; and (3) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon because the evidence was sufficient to prove that the intruder's hands, by choking the complainant, were used as a dangerous weapon as statutorily required. View "State v. Lopez" on Justia Law