Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from a conviction of two felony counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) his statement to police should have been suppressed as the tainted fruit of an unlawful arrest; and (2) the trial justice deprived him of his right to confrontation by prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining two police witnesses concerning his statements to police. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding, (1) the issue concerning the trial justice's denial of the motion to suppress was not a proper subject on appeal because at no point during Defendant's trial did the state introduce into evidence the statement he gave to the police, and moreover, Defendant's contention was without merit; and (2) Defendant did not properly preserve for the Court's review any challenge to the trial justice's limitations on his cross-examination, but nonetheless, the contention lacked merit. View "State v. Chum" on Justia Law

After a consolidated trial, a Providence County Superior Court jury found Defendant John Kluth guilty of thirty counts of obtaining money by false pretenses. Thereafter, the trial justice sentenced Defendant to a total of thirty-five years, with sixteen years to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions and the remainder suspended, with probation. On appeal, he contended: (1) that the then presiding justice of the Superior Court exceeded his authority in granting the prosecutor's request to change venue; (2) that the charges filed against him were improperly joined as a matter of law, in view of the provisions of Rule 8(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (3) that, even if the charges had been properly joined, the trial justice's failure to sever the cases infringed upon his right to a fair trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court.

Defendant Juan Diaz appealed his conviction on second-degree murder and one count of using a firearm while committing a crime of violence. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred in failing to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the second-degree murder charge because the state failed to provide legally sufficient evidence for a jury to find that he acted with malice in connection with the death of the victim. Furthermore, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred in omitting the phrase "criminal negligence" from his instruction to the jury concerning involuntary manslaughter and instead used "confusing language," which made it difficult for the jury to distinguish the crime of involuntary manslaughter from the crime of murder in the second degree. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "in order to have properly weighed the charges brought against the defendant, it was crucially important that the jury in this case receive an involuntary manslaughter instruction that included the concept of criminal negligence, thereby creating a distinct and separate charge from that which was given for murder in the second degree." The Court held that the trial justice erred in declining to include that concept in his instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's judgment of conviction.

Defendant Julie Robat appealed her conviction on one count of second-degree murder. The victim was Defendant's newborn daughter. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial justice erred in failing to grant her motion for a judgment of acquittal and her later motion for a new trial on a second-degree murder charge; the basis for that contention was Defendant's underlying assertion that the state failed to provide legally sufficient evidence for a jury to find that she acted with malice in connection with the death of her baby. Furthermore, Defendant contended that the trial justice erred in failing to grant her motion for a new trial because of what she alleged were improper comments made by the prosecutor during her closing argument. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no merit to Defendant's contentions on appeal, and affirmed her conviction.

Defendant James S. Richardson appealed his conviction by jury of first degree murder and burglary charges for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argued that his conviction should have been vacated because the trial justice impermissibly allowed an expert witness called by the state to bolster the testimony of another of the state's expert witnesses. He also argued that the trial justice erred when he denied his motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Applicant Eddy Guerrero appealed the denial of his application for postconviction relief. His sole contention on appeal was that the hearing justice erred in holding that his trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel prior to and during Applicant's plea of nolo contendere. Specifically, Applicant contended: (1) that his counsel failed to obtain an interpreter for him at the time of the hearing on his motion to suppress certain evidence and at the time of his eventual plea; (2) that, prior to his execution of the plea form, his counsel failed to properly explain to him the essential elements of the offense to which he ultimately pled nolo contendere; (3) that his trial counsel failed to meet with him in a setting conducive to meaningful attorney-client communications; (4) that, by not conducting a sufficient investigation, his counsel failed to properly prepare for the suppression hearing; and (5) that the hearing justice erred in failing to address the prejudice component of the analysis relative to ineffective assistance of counsel allegations that is described in "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Upon review, the Supreme Court found none of Applicant's arguments on appeal to have merit, and affirmed the superior court's judgment.

At the end of a trial held in Kent County Superior Court, a jury found the defendant, James Cook guilty of twenty-two counts ranging from first-degree sexual assault to identity fraud. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial justice committed reversible error in denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard testimony that he had been on probation and also in admitting evidence of other prior sexual misconduct. Finding no error nor abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Defendant, Kenneth Viveiros appealed his conviction on four counts of simple assault against three inmates at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), occurring while the defendant was employed as a lieutenant at the ACI. On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial justice: (1) abused his discretion in denying defendant's motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant, Captain Gualtar Botas; (2) abused his discretion in granting the state's motion in limine, precluding defense testimony from an inmate; (3) erred by giving improper jury instructions; and (4) erred in denying defendant's motion for a new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Upon thorough review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions.

Defendant Raymond McWilliams was found guilty on one count of first-degree robbery and one count of assault with a dangerous weapon. In light of his "impressive" criminal history, the trial justice sentenced him to life in prison for first-degree robbery, to be served consecutively to eleven-and-one-half years that previously had been executed because he violated probation on a previously imposed sentence on a prior second-degree murder conviction. Defendant was also sentenced to life in prison for the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon, to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed for the robbery and the previously imposed probation-violation sentence. Because he qualified as a habitual offender the trial justice imposed an additional ten years imprisonment to run consecutively to the previously imposed sentences. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant asserted that the trial justice erred by: (1) providing a supplemental jury instruction that contradicted Rhode Island law; (2) refusing to recuse from presiding as the trial justice because of comments he had made during a joint probation-violation hearing and bail hearing; (3) admitting into evidence defendant's prior conviction for second-degree murder; (4) denying his motion for acquittal; and (5) denying his motion for a new trial. After review, the Court concluded that Defendant's arguments were without merit, and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

In early 2008, over the course of a lengthy jury trial, the state presented approximately thirty witnesses, including known criminals, against Defendant Michael Ciresi who was once a decorated North Providence police officer. Defendant was charged with multiple counts ranging from the receipt of stolen goods to burglary. Ultimately Defendant was convicted on all but one of the counts with which he was charged. Defendant appealed his convictions, contending that the trial justice abused his discretion by admitting numerous instances of Defendant's uncharged misconduct under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Defendant also challenges the trial justice's decision to allow the joinder of two separate indictments against him, as well as the trial justice's subsequent denial of his motion to sever the indictments for trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court: "[b]ased on the defendant's failure to demonstrate any basis upon which [the Court] might conclude that he suffered prejudice arising from the consolidation of the indictments against him for trial," the Court held that the trial justice's joinder and denial of Defendant's motion to sever did not prejudice his constitutional right to a fair trial. The Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial justice and affirmed his rulings.