Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Applicant David Higham appealed a superior court judgment that denied his second application for postconviction relief. In 2000, a jury found that Applicant committed two acts of first-degree child molestation against the seven-year-old daughter of his step son. Applicant was sentenced to concurrent terms of forty years on each count with twenty years to serve and twenty suspended with probation. In 2006, Applicant filed a pro se application for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed to represent him, but counsel later withdrew, noting in his motion that Applicant's application was "wholly frivolous" and without merit. Even though the motion to withdraw was pending, counsel appeared with applicant at a hearing in Superior Court. At the conclusion of the hearing, a stipulation, signed by both applicant and his attorney was entered on December 5, 2008. The stipulation provided that the motion for postconviction relief would be dismissed with prejudice in exchange for a reduction in sentence approved by the hearing justice. In 2009, Applicatn appeared before the parole board seeking early release. The board denied his but because he refused to acknowledge his crime or complete a sex-offender-treatment program. Applicant then filed another pro se application for postconviction relief, alleging that parole had been unlawfully denied; jury misconduct, and that he was actually innocent. Finding that none of the issues raised on appeal had merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's denial of Applicant's application for postconviction relief.

Applicant Randy Anderson appealed a Superior Court judgment that dismissed his application for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Applicant contended that the hearing justice erred by (1) deeming his claim of prosecutorial misconduct to be procedurally barred; (2) finding no discovery violation on the part of the state for failing to produce certain medical records; and (3) determining that the medical records would have been “of little or no value to the factfinder in the context of [Anderson’s] trial.” This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on January 24, 2012, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After carefully considering the written and oral submissions of the parties, we are satisfied that this appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument. Finding no error with the hearing justice's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

On October 31, 2004, three-year-old Thomas J. Wright died as a result of extensive injuries that tragically had been inflicted upon him by his aunt and her boyfriend after they returned home from a night of drinking. Defendant Katherine Bunnell was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and of conspiracy to commit the offense of murder. As a result, she was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) for the murder conviction and ten years to serve at the ACI for the conspiracy conviction. Defendant appealed her conviction on two grounds: (1) that the trial justice erred by excluding from evidence certain portions of an interview given by her boyfriend, Gilbert Delestre, at the Woonsocket Police Department the day before TJ died; and (2) the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial. Finding no error in the trial justice's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Jeffrey Alston (alias John Doe) appealed his conviction for conspiracy to break and enter, breaking and entering of a dwelling, and assault with a dangerous weapon. He also appealed the denial of his motions for a new trial. On appeal, Defendant contended that his right to confrontation under the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions was violated by the evidentiary rulings of the trial justice, that his right to cross-examine one of the state’s witnesses was unduly restricted, and that the trial justice erred in refusing to pass the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

Defendant Hamlet M. Lopez appealed a Superior Court judgment of conviction for first-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred by (1) allowing DNA evidence to be introduced against him through the testimony of a laboratory supervisor and the admission of an allele table documenting the DNA profiles of the defendant and the decedent; (2) admitting evidence of his prior instances of violence; (3) failing to instruct the jury adequately about prior inconsistent statements; and (4) imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

On August 27, 2007, an eighty-seven-year-old woman's purse was stolen in a supermarket parking lot. As a result, Defendant Nelson Rolon was charged with and ultimately convicted of first-degree robbery. Rolon appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence produced at trial was legally insufficient to prove the element of force. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant used force to take the victim's purse; and (2) therefore, sufficient evidence existed that would justify a reasonable juror in finding that Defendant robbed the victim on August 27, 2007.

Plaintiff Nicola Tarzia was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine. After Tarzia successfully completed a diversion program, the State dismissed the charge. Tarzia later filed a motion to expunge the charge, which the district court granted. Later, however, Tarzia's past criminal activity was subsequently published. Tarzia filed a fifteen-count civil action against several State and City actors, alleging, inter alia, unlawful dissemination of expunged records, negligence, and failure to seal Plaintiff's records. The circuit court dismissed two counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and after a jury trial, granted judgment as a matter of law to the State and City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the remedy of civil liability did not apply to Tarzia's case; (2) there was no reason for the Court to recognize other causes of action based in common law for alleged violations of the sealing statute; (3) the information allegedly provided to a newspaper reporter did not amount to a violation of the state's right-to-privacy statute; and (4) Tarzia waived his right to challenge on appeal the district court's finding that all of the named defendants were sued in their official capacity.

After a jury trial, Defendant Emmanuel Barbosa was found guilty of felony assault, carrying a pistol without a license, and possession of a firearm after previous conviction of a crime of violence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. Defendant subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that his counsel was ineffective. The superior court denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice made adequate findings of fact and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in finding that Defendant failed to prove to a reasonable probability that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's purported deficiencies.

Defendant Jeffrey Murray was charged by criminal information with a felony pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 12-29-5 for violating a no-contact order. Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charges and was sentenced under the terms of section 12-29-5. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct sentence, arguing that the sentence imposed on him was illegal because, in his view, the provisions of section 12-29-5 applied only to individuals with two prior misdemeanor convictions, and one of his predicate offenses was a felony. The superior court denied Defendant's motion, ruling that the provisions of section 12-29-5 did apply because Defendant had been convicted of two prior domestic violence offenses, and the statute did not distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's argument was not an attack on the legality of his sentence, but rather on the propriety of his conviction, and Defendant unequivocally waived all nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal information by virtue of his decision to enter a plea of nolo contendere; and (2) the sentence in this case was not illegal because it was within the prescribed statutory limits.

Gary Tassone was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Tassone subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging that his constitutional rights had been adversely impacted by the ineffective assistance of counsel and by witness perjury. The superior court denied the application without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that, from this point forward, an evidentiary hearing is required in the first application for postconviction relief in all cases involving applicants sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing.