Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant John Lomba was charged with three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of simple assault. After a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of the three felony counts but convicted of simple assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of simple assault where there were ample facts from which a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with malice or wantonness; and (2) did not improperly exclude evidence relating to Defendant's claim of self-defense or unfairly limit his cross-examination of both complaining witnesses.

Defendant Heriberto Rosario was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in failing to grant his motion for a new trial because the evidence was too contradictory and incredible to sufficiently support the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for a new trial because the record showed that the justice did not overlook or misconceive any material and relevant evidence, nor was he clearly mistaken in choosing which testimony to accept and reject.

George Bouffard pled nolo contendere to breaking and entering associated for an incident occurring in 2000 and was adjudged a violator of his suspended and probationary sentences associated with two earlier cases, in 1991 and 1997. After Bouffard was released from incarceration, he faced another breaking-and-entering charge in 2006. The superior court determined that Bouffard violated his probation imposed in the 1997 and the 2000 case. Meanwhile, the State dismissed the underlying breaking-and-entering charge set forth in the 2006 case. Two days later, Bouffard filed a motion to correct what he alleged to be an illegal sentence imposed in the 1997 case. After a hearing, the hearing justice (1) deemed the challenged sentence as illegal or illegally imposed; but (2) restructured Bouffard's sentencing package to maintain the sentence levied for the 2006 violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing justice appropriately modified the original sentence despite any dispute about its illegality or illegal imposition; and (2) Bouffard's modified sentence fit "both crime and criminal" as required by State v. Goncalves at the time of re-bundling given the state's ultimate dismissal of the underlying breaking-and-entering charge in the 2006 case.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Gilbert Delestre was found guilty of second-degree murder and of conspiracy to commit the offense of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) instructing the jury concerning the concept of aiding and abetting, as the instruction considered in its entirety did not relieve the State of its burden and did not violate Defendant's due process rights; and (2) declining to give a unanimity instruction to the jury with respect to the murder charge, as the jury was not required to unanimously agree as to whether Defendant was guilty of second-degree murder as a principal, as an aider or abettor, or as a coconspirator.

Defendant Giulio Lancellotta pled nolo contendere to second-degree robbery and was sentenced to twelve years in prison, which sentence was suspended, and twelve years probation. A magistrate later found that Defendant had violated his probation and sentenced him to serve seven years of his twelve-year suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the magistrate did not abuse his discretion when he denied Defendant's motion for new counsel; (2) the magistrate did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he found that the evidence presented at the probation-violation hearing was sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant had violated his probation; and (3) the magistrate acted within his discretion in imposing the sentence.

Defendant Adrian Shepard pled nolo contendere to conspiracy to commit a felony, for which he was sentenced to ten years at the adult correctional institutions, consisting of two years to serve and eight years suspended, with probation. The superior court subsequently declared Shepard to be in violation of the terms of his probation and revoked three years of Shepard's suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to meet the burden of reasonable satisfaction to find that Shepard violated his probation; and (2) the revocation of three years of Shepard's suspended sentence was a sustainable exercise of the hearing justice's broad discretion.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of domestic first-degree sexual assault and domestic assault with intent to commit sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by refusing to pass the case after the complainant testified that the police issued to her a no-contact order against Defendant where the testimony was not sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from calmly and dispassionately considering the evidence and the cautionary instructions provided by the trial justice alleviated any prejudicial impact of the testimony; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by denying a second motion to pass the case when a police officer, while testifying, improperly bolstered the complainant's credibility where the improper bolstering was not sufficiently prejudicial to Defendant.

After a jury trial, Defendant Miguel Navarro was convicted of first-degree child molestation sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in (1) denying Defendant's motion for a sixty-day continuance prior to trial, after considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the motion; (2) denying Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal, where the evidence was sufficient to withstand the motion; and (3) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, where the trial justice provided sufficient reasoning in support of her ruling and the evidence was sufficient to withstand the motion.

After a jury trial, Defendant Carlos Jimenez was convicted on two counts of first-degree sexual assault after being accused by his sister-in-law of sexually assaulting her while she was too intoxicated to resist. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress a statement he gave to an officer while at his mother-in-law's apartment because he was not in custody at the time; (2) the trial justice did not err in admitting statements Defendant made while in custody at the police statement because Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights in making the statement; and (3) the trial justice did not clearly err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial.

After a jury trial, Defendant Raquel Figuereo was found guilty of shoplifting. As her sole argument on appeal, Defendant contended that the trial justice erred in declining to instruct the jury that eyewitness certainty is not a reliable indicator of eyewitness accuracy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) because the instruction that on appeal Defendant contended should have been given differed in wording and in meaning from the language which Defendant at trial requested the trial justice to include in his instructions, Defendant waived her right to argue to the Court in favor of her proposed instruction; and (2) even if Defendant had properly raised her argument before the Court, her appeal would still be unavailing because the jury was, in essence, instructed in accordance with Defendant's expressed wishes, although not in the precise words that she requested.