Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Roy Diefenderfer was convicted of first-degree robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, kidnapping, and assault of a person over sixty years of age. Defendant thereafter moved for a reduced sentence, arguing that his sentence be reduced because of, inter alia, his good behavior at the adult correctional institutions and the extreme hardship his family endured during his incarceration. The hearing justice - a different justice from the one who originally sentenced Defendant - denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court, holding that the hearing justice applied an incorrect standard in denying Defendant's sentence-reduction motion, as, specifically, the justice erroneously applied the appellate standard of review.

A jury convicted Defendant Ronald Barkmeyer of first-degree child molestation. The trial justice sentenced Defendant to fifty years incarceration, with thirty years to serve and the remaining twenty years suspended, with probation. Thereafter, Defendant moved for a reduced sentence. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court, holding that the trial justice (1) did not abuse his discretion in failing to afford much, if any, weight to defendant's prison behavior or rehabilitative efforts, and (2) properly exercised his discretion in not bestowing upon Defendant the leniency he requested and confirming Defendant's sentence.

When he was fifteen years old, Craig Price admitted committing four brutal murders. Price was committed to the custody of a training school, and the family court directed the school to provide intensive psychiatric treatment for Price. Later, Craig Price was convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to cooperate in psychiatric treatment, after previously having been adjudicated to be in civil contempt for the same offense. Price was sentenced by the family court to twenty-five years at the adult correctional institutions, with ten years to serve and the balance suspended, with probation. The Supreme Court affirmed. Price subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, which the family court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) res judicata barred the Court from considering Price's double jeopardy claim; (2) because Price's double jeopardy claim had no merit, Price's counsel was not ineffective by failing to raise it; (3) the trial justice acted within his discretion in imposing the sentence, and the sentence was not excessive; and (4) Price's claim that he was denied due process because he was declared a violator and ordered to serve a portion of the suspended sentence, which had not yet begun, was barred by res judicata.

After a jury trial, Applicant Theodore Chapdelaine was found guilty of second-degree child molestation. Defendant later filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of his trial defense counsel. The trial justice denied Applicant's application, finding his claims to be without merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion where (1) counsel's conduct during plea negotiations was not so deficient as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) Applicant affirmatively waived any claim of error arising out of an alleged conflict of interest; (3) counsel's strategy of excluding any mention of drug or alcohol use at the trial to protect Applicant constituted professionally reasonable judgment; and (4) counsel's representation was not ineffective because he failed to explore the use of expert testimony to establish the significance of Applicant's possible psychological issues.

After a jury trial, Gerald Brown was convicted of sexual assault and child molestation. The superior court dismissed his second application for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice (1) properly concluded that Brown's application could be summarily decided without an evidentiary hearing after providing Brown sufficient opportunity to respond to the proposed dismissal of his application; (2) appropriately deemed Brown's claim of newly discovered evidence as waived; (3) properly dismissed Brown's claim of unlawful incarceration; and (4) correctly dismissed Brown's assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel based on prior counsels' failure to raise a statute-of-limitations defense.

Defendant was convicted of domestic first-degree sexual assault and domestic assault with intent to commit sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by (1) refusing to pass the case after the complainant testified that the police issued to her a no-contact order against Defendant because (i) the testimony was not sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from calmly and dispassionately considering the evidence, (ii) the trial justice's cautionary instructions alleviated any prejudicial impact of the testimony, and (iii) the jury's final verdict suggested that the testimony did not inflame the passions of the jurors to the point where they were unable to pass impartially upon the issues in the case; and (2) denying a second motion to pass the case when a police officer, while testifying, improperly bolstered the complainant's credibility because the improper bolstering was not sufficiently prejudicial to Defendant.

Defendant Paul Grieder assaulted plaintiff Michael Trainor and pled nolo contendere to one count of simple assault and battery and one count of felony assault. Plaintiff sued defendant in superior court, seeking damages for his injuries. Judgment was entered in plaintiff's favor in the amount of $1.5 million, but defendant refused to render payment in full to plaintiff. In the current case, plaintiff filed suit against defendant in superior court, attempting to recover his due. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the fact that there had been no return of the execution on the judgment. The hearing justice ruled that since defendant had not raised the jurisdictional issue before the court on prior occasions, he had waived it, and therefore, the defendant's motion was dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) defendant waived the requirement that there be a return of the execution on the judgment.

After a violation report was filed against defendant Ramondo Howard alleging defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, defendant filed a pro se motion indicating that he wished to release his attorney and wanted new counsel to be appointed, confirming on the record he had filed a complaint against his attorney with the court's disciplinary board. The hearing justice excused defendant's attorney. Defendant then filed motions to recuse and change venues, both of which the hearing justice denied. At the violation hearing, the hearing justice found defendant to be a violator of the terms and conditions of his probation. Before the hearing began, however, the hearing justice expressed his belief that defendant needed to be "warehoused" and was "beyond rehabilitation." Defendant appealed, arguing the hearing justice erred by failing to recuse himself from the case because the justice lacked the objectivity and impartiality to fairly hear and render judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the hearing justice chose to express his opinions prior to the commencement of the violation hearing, the justice displayed a clear inability to render fair judgment and erred by declining to recuse under the circumstances. Remanded.

Defendants Norman Cipriano, Jr. and Jamie Bryant were convicted of receiving stolen goods with a value in excess of $500 and for conspiring to commit larceny. On appeal, defendants argued that the trial justice erred in (1) denying their motions for acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the elements of each crime, and (2) refusing to instruct the jury about impermissible pyramiding of inferences and in the judge's charge concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cipriano additionally argued that the trial justice erred in (1) refusing to pass the case after a witness testified to seeing Cipriano on a prison bus, leaving the jury to infer that Cipriano had a general criminal disposition; and (2) in denying Cipriano's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient for denying the motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the requested jury instructions were unnecessary and the trial justice adequately instructed the jury concerning reasonable doubt; (3) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by refusing to pass the case or err by not giving a curative instruction; and (4) the trial justice did not err in declining to grant a new trial.

Defendant Michael English pled nolo contendere to four counts of first-degree child molestation, one count of second-degree molestation, and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arising out of his relationship with victim, M.B. More than a decade later, the state filed a probation-violation notice, alleging that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to adhere to the terms of the no-contact order after M.B. complained that defendant had come into contact with her. The hearing justice concluded that defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the superior court adjudicated defendant a violator of probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that his contact with M.B. was merely coincidental and therefore insufficient to constitute a violation of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice's determination that the state's evidence supported an adjudication of probation violation was neither arbitrary nor capricious.