Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A police surveillance operation at a street intersection led to the conviction of defendant, Geornando Vargas, for one count of delivery of a controlled substance. On appeal, defendant argued (1) that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence presented by the state amounted to an improper pyramiding of inferences and therefore was legally insufficient to support defendant's conviction, and (2) the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial because the justice misconceived the testimony of one of the state's witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that rather than deducing guilt from an ambiguous circumstantial fact, the state established a pattern of corroborating circumstances sufficient to justify a reasonable juror in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore affirmed the trial justice's denial of defendant's motion for acquittal; and (2) the trial justice did not misconceive the evidence when ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial, and therefore, the trial justice did not err in denying the motion.

Defendant John Ferreira was convicted for one count of first-degree child molestation and three counts of second-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. In an order to show cause, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the justice did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial because (1) the justice did not overlook or misconceive any material inconsistencies; (2) the justice appropriately reviewed the entire record and sufficiently outlined her reasons for denying defendant's motion; (3) the justice did not clearly err in her credibility determinations or overlook or misconceive relevant and material evidence; and (4) any error committed by the trial justice in referring to portions of matters not in evidence was harmless.

Defendant Viroth Phannavong was convicted of three counts of child molestation against his former girlfriend's daughter. At trial, defendant sought to introduce a map of Woonsocket, Rhode Island, which depicted the defendant's former home. The trial justice sustained the state's objection to the map being admitted as a full exhibit, arguing that it could not be authenticated properly. The defendant also moved for a new trial because the verdict failed to do substantial justice between the parties, a motion the trial justice denied. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred (1) by refusing to admit into evidence a map of Woonsocket, and (2) by denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding no reason to disturb the trial justice's findings as (1) the map was neither properly authenticated nor was its reliability established, and (2) the trial justice clearly conducted a thorough review of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence to support the verdict.

Defendant Nicholas Gianquitti was convicted of second-degree murder and using a firearm while committing a crime of violence. During trial, the trial justice found that there was nothing that would suggest that defendant intended to prevent entry into his home and that, therefore, there was no evidence of a breaking and entering crime in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws 11-8-8. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred (1) by refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with Section 11-8-8 and denying his subsequent motion for a new trial on the same basis; and (2) by excluding expert testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that after reviewing the evidence, there was no reason to disturb the findings of the trial justice regarding defendant's Section 11-8-8 argument; and (2) because defendant failed to renew his objection on the issue of admissibility of expert testimony and did not preserve the issue for appellate review, the admissibility of expert opinion testimony was waived.

Defendant James Enos dated Mary for six months before they separated. After their separation they met at a restaurant where defendant began swearing at Mary. Defendant then hit Mary on the head with drinking glasses and kicked her. Defendant was convicted of domestic assault with a dangerous weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) that the evidence presented by the state was legally insufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that defendant and Mary were in a domestic relationship; and (2) the trial justice erred when she refused to declare a mistrial after a police officer testified that after defendant was informed of his Miranda rights defendant remained silent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence, overall, indicated that defendant and Mary were in a substantive dating relationship and therefore the trial justice correctly denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; and (2) the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial and instead opted to instruct the jury to disregard the officer's unsolicited remark.

In 2006, defendant Edgar Goulet killed his dog by shooting it with a sawed-off shotgun. One year later, the state, by way of criminal information, charged defendant with one count of malicious killing of an animal and one count of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. At trial, among other motions, defendant filed a motion to sever to the two counts of the information. The motion to sever was denied. After a jury trial defendant was convicted on both counts. The defendant appealed. The issues properly before the Supreme Court were (1) defendant's assertion that the trial justice erred when he denied defendant's motion to sever, and (2) the defendant's Fourth Amendment claims relating to the police officers' searches of the defendant's yard and home. The Court affirmed, concluding (1) the defendant did not make a sufficient showing that he would be prejudiced to the extent that he would not receive a fair trial if the two counts were not severed, and thus the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied defendant's motion; and (2) the defendant's Fourth Amendment claims as to the propriety of the warrantless search were without merit.

Defendant Raymond Staffier was charged with four counts of second-degree child molestation. The case was submitted to the jury, and a verdict of not guilty was returned on count one with a finding of guilt on the remaining three counts. Defendant filed a pro se appeal, arguing that the trial justice erred (1) by denying his motion for a new trial because the inconsistent verdicts fail to do substantial justice and that this inconsistency cannot logically be explained, and (2) by allowing one of the state's witnesses to testify in contravention of a sequestration order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because the trial justice considered the evidence and ultimately found that the verdict was strongly supported by the evidence, the justice's inquiry rightfully ended when she agreed with the jury's verdict; and (2) because any violation of the sequestration order was unintentional, the testimony did not undermine the purpose of the sequestration order, and any potential harm to the defendant was addressed by the trial justice, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion when she allowed the testimony.

Shianna Kelly was found guilty by jury of entering a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny. Kelly appealed on the ground that the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice performed the correct analysis in deciding defendant's motion for a new trial and was not clearly wrong in denying the motion; (2) the trial judge did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on the basis that the judge allowed testimony after a discovery violation; and (3) the issue of whether a surveillance DVD and photographs were properly admitted at trial was not properly preserved for appellate review.

Plaintiff Horton appealed from a superior court grant of summary judgment in favor of the police department defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's thirteen-count complaint which alleged, among other complaints, malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, tortious denial of access to public records, violations of civil rights, and failure to destroy records after exoneration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendants possessed probable cause for each instance of prosecution, arrest, and imprisonment, making a grant of summary judgment appropriate; and (2) because Horton failed to provide analysis of the remaining questions in his appeal, those contentions were deemed waived for appellate review.

Defendant Memeh Kizekai appealed the conviction and sentence he received for "uttering and publishing" when he and co-Defendant Sonnah Sampson tried to cash a $7500 counterfeit check at a Pawtucket bank. Defendant argued that he should have received a new trial because the evidence presented against him was not credible or sufficient to support his conviction. Defendant and the State agreed that the case turned on whose testimony was more credible: Sampson's or Defendant's. The trial court acknowledged its role as "the 13th juror," and held that its determination was based on "whether or not the evidence placed before the court was sufficient to substantiate and sustain the verdict that the jury achieved." The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court "did not shirk his super juror duties." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.