Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in South Carolina Supreme Court
by
Charles Dent was accused of sexually abusing his granddaughter, J.M., when she was eight or nine years old. The alleged abuse occurred during periods when Dent visited his daughter’s family in South Carolina. The victim disclosed various acts of abuse, including being forced to perform fellatio, digital penetration, cunnilingus, and being shown obscene material. The State indicted Dent on two counts of disseminating obscene material to a minor and two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor (CSCM) in the first degree, specifically alleging fellatio as the sexual battery in both CSCM indictments.At trial in the Circuit Court for Beaufort County, the State presented evidence through forensic interviews and the victim’s testimony. The victim described only one instance of fellatio, which she located at House 1, not House 2. Dent moved for a directed verdict on the CSCM charge related to House 2, arguing there was no evidence of fellatio at that location. The trial court denied the motion and, over Dent’s objection, instructed the jury on the full statutory definition of sexual battery, including acts not charged in the indictment. The jury convicted Dent of the CSCM charge for House 2 and both dissemination charges, but acquitted him of the CSCM charge for House 1. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions after remand.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the trial court erred by denying Dent’s motion for a directed verdict on the CSCM charge for House 2, as there was no evidence of fellatio at that location, and by instructing the jury on unindicted acts of sexual battery. The Court reversed Dent’s CSCM conviction but affirmed his convictions for dissemination of obscene material to a minor. The Court also rejected Dent’s procedural challenge regarding the composition of the appellate panel. View "State v. Dent" on Justia Law

by
Meredith Logan Whitehurst was cited for violating the Town of Sullivan's Island's Disorderly Conduct Ordinance after loudly berating her Uber driver with profanity and racial and xenophobic epithets at nearly 2:00 a.m. The driver, an Egyptian-born immigrant, testified that Whitehurst's loud phone conversation disturbed his driving, and when he asked her to be quiet, she began mocking and cursing him. After stopping the car and asking Whitehurst and her friend to exit, Whitehurst continued to yell offensive remarks at the driver. The police were called, and Whitehurst was cited for public disorderly conduct.Whitehurst was tried by a jury in the Town's Municipal Court, which found her guilty and fined her $1,040. She moved for a new trial, which was denied, and then appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the conviction. Whitehurst then appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the Ordinance violated her First Amendment rights, was unconstitutionally vague, and that the trial court erred in various procedural rulings, including denying her motion to suppress the Uber video.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the Ordinance was content-neutral and served the Town's significant interest in controlling noise levels, thus not infringing on Whitehurst's First Amendment rights. The Court also found that the Ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague, as it provided fair notice of the prohibited conduct and included a scienter requirement. Additionally, the Court deemed Whitehurst's arguments regarding the multiple subsections of the Ordinance and the motion to suppress the Uber video as conclusory and abandoned due to lack of supporting authority. View "Whitehurst v. Town of Sullivan's Island" on Justia Law

by
Mitchell Rivers was convicted of Homicide by Child Abuse (HCA) following the death of his four-month-old adoptive child, who died from asphyxiation. During the trial, the State introduced evidence of the child's prior injuries, which were unrelated to the cause of death. Rivers' trial attorney objected to this evidence pretrial but failed to renew the objection during the trial, leaving the issue unpreserved for appeal. Rivers subsequently filed for post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.The PCR court denied relief, finding that Rivers was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to renew the objection. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that Rivers was prejudiced by his attorney's errors, as there was no nexus between the collateral injury evidence and the circumstances surrounding the child's death.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court found that even if the collateral injury evidence had been excluded, there was no reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different. The court noted that Rivers' actions, including his failure to seek medical assistance after the child resumed wheezing and his inability to perform CPR, demonstrated a conscious disregard for the risk of the child's death, thus establishing extreme indifference beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, Rivers failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed. View "Rivers v. State" on Justia Law

by
In 2004, Jason McSwain, a former teacher, pled guilty to two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After serving his prison sentence, he registered as a sex offender as required by South Carolina's Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA). Initially, SORA mandated lifetime registration for all sex offenders. In 2022, the General Assembly amended SORA to implement a three-tier system based on the severity of the offense, with tier II offenders, like McSwain, required to register for 25 years before seeking removal.McSwain applied for removal from the registry in 2022, but the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) denied his application as premature. He then filed a motion in the circuit court, arguing that the tier system and mandatory wait times violated his right to substantive due process. The circuit court denied his motion, finding that the amendments to SORA were rationally related to the government's interest in public safety and law enforcement.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the circuit court's decision. The Court found that the tiered-registration system and corresponding mandatory-minimum time periods for registration were rationally related to SORA's legislative purposes of protecting the public and aiding law enforcement. The Court emphasized that the amendments brought SORA in line with federal law and the approach taken by a majority of states. Consequently, the Court held that McSwain failed to establish that SORA violated his right to substantive due process and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "The State v. McSwain" on Justia Law

by
Rashawn Vertez Carter was involved in a violent home invasion and robbery in Aiken, South Carolina, on May 9, 2015. After the crime, law enforcement officers used Carter's real-time cell-site location information from his cell-service provider, T-Mobile, to track him down without obtaining a search warrant. Carter was subsequently arrested and made incriminating statements during interviews with the police.At trial, Carter moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his real-time cell-site location information, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and the South Carolina Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the information gathered did not constitute a search under either constitution. The jury convicted Carter of burglary, armed robbery, kidnapping, and illegal possession of a weapon, but acquitted him of the alleged sexual assault. Carter appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule also justified the officers' actions.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed Carter's convictions. The court did not address whether a search occurred or if the exigent circumstances exception applied. Instead, it focused on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, concluding that the officers acted in good faith reliance on the federal Stored Communications Act, which allowed the disclosure of customer records in emergencies. The court held that the good-faith exception precluded the suppression of evidence obtained through Carter's real-time cell-site location information, as the officers reasonably believed their actions were lawful under the statute. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

by
In the early morning of March 7, 2015, Robert Xavier Geter and James Lewis engaged in a fight at Culler's Bar in Columbia, South Carolina. The altercation moved outside, where Geter stabbed Lewis, who later died from his injuries. During the incident, Geter also stabbed Clarence Stone, causing permanent blindness in one eye. Geter claimed self-defense, stating he was attacked by multiple people and only used his knife to defend himself.The State indicted Geter for murder and attempted murder, arguing that Geter intended to kill Lewis and that this intent transferred to Stone when he was stabbed. The trial court instructed the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent, and Geter was convicted of both charges. Geter appealed, arguing that transferred intent should not apply to attempted murder and that certain testimony constituted improper bolstering.The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed Geter's attempted murder conviction, holding that the State needed to prove Geter specifically intended to kill Stone, which was not the State's theory. The court also found that some testimony constituted improper bolstering but deemed it harmless, affirming the murder conviction. Judge Geathers dissented on the transferred intent issue.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse Geter's attempted murder conviction and upheld the murder conviction, agreeing that the error in admitting the bolstering testimony was harmless. View "State v. Geter" on Justia Law

by
Jason Edwin Stoots was convicted of second-degree domestic violence following an altercation with his wife, Kimberly, in a Taco Bell drive-thru. Stoots claimed that Kimberly attacked him first, and he accidentally struck her while trying to defend himself. Kimberly testified that Stoots punched her without provocation. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on self-defense and accident, leading to Stoots's conviction.The Circuit Court Judge denied Stoots's request for jury instructions on self-defense and accident, reasoning that Stoots could have left the altercation and that the size difference between him and Kimberly made self-defense inapplicable. The jury was instructed that the State must prove Stoots acted with criminal intent. The jury found Stoots guilty of second-degree domestic violence. Stoots appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on self-defense. The court held that if there is any evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude the defendant acted in self-defense, it is reversible error not to instruct the jury on that point. The court disagreed with the State's argument that self-defense was inapplicable due to Stoots's claim of unintentional action. The court also found that the proportionality of Stoots's response to Kimberly's attack was a question for the jury. However, the court found no reversible error in the trial court's refusal to charge the law of accident, as the jury was adequately instructed on the requirement of criminal intent. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "The State v. Stoots" on Justia Law

by
In March 2017, a five-year-old child, A.G., reported to her father that she had been sexually abused by her mother's boyfriend, Brandon Clark. A forensic interview was conducted, and Clark was subsequently charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor. During the trial, Clark sought to cross-examine the forensic interviewer about the techniques used during the interview, arguing that they may have influenced A.G.'s responses. The trial court prohibited this line of questioning, and Clark was convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.Clark appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, interpreting previous case law to mean that any testimony regarding interview techniques was prohibited to avoid improper bolstering of the child victim's credibility. The court also held that challenges to the forensic interviewer's techniques should be vetted in front of the judge, not the jury.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts misinterpreted the case law, which only prohibited the State from eliciting such testimony on direct examination, not the defense on cross-examination. The Supreme Court emphasized that denying Clark the opportunity to cross-examine the forensic interviewer violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The case was remanded for a new trial, allowing Clark to challenge the forensic interview techniques used in A.G.'s interview. View "The State v. Clark" on Justia Law

by
Devin Jamel Johnson was convicted of murdering Akeem Smalls. The incident stemmed from a dispute over a debt Smalls owed Johnson for stolen marijuana. On the night of the murder, surveillance footage showed Johnson and an unidentified man, referred to as "Creep," arriving at the scene. Johnson initially denied involvement but later admitted to driving the car seen in the footage. Evidence included Johnson's fingerprints on a bullet cartridge found at the scene and cell phone records indicating his presence near the crime scene.The case was tried three times. In the first trial, Johnson was convicted after the trial court gave an accomplice liability instruction following a jury question. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed this conviction, citing fundamental unfairness due to the trial court's change in instructions. A second trial ended in a mistrial. In the third trial, Johnson was again convicted, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on accomplice liability, as there was no evidence that Johnson acted in concert with another person.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the evidence supported the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on accomplice liability. The court found that Johnson's actions and communications indicated a mutual plan to murder Smalls, and the presence of "Creep" at the scene supported the inference that they acted together. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Johnson's murder conviction. View "The State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

by
Adam Rowell was convicted by a jury of two felony driving under the influence charges. After the trial, Rowell discovered that Juror 164 had failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been recently arrested for several charges, including possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Rowell included this information in his motion for a new trial. Although the State consented to a second hearing to examine Juror 164, the circuit court denied the motion without holding the hearing.The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, stating that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing with Juror 164. The appellate court agreed with the circuit court's finding that Juror 164's failure to disclose his arrest was unintentional and that no further inquiry was necessary.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the distinction between intentional and unintentional concealment of information during voir dire should be abandoned. Instead, the focus should be on whether the concealed information suggests bias and whether it would have been material to the use of a peremptory strike or a challenge for cause. The court emphasized the importance of a hearing to determine if the juror's nondisclosure indicated potential bias.The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to examine Juror 164. The circuit court is instructed to determine if the concealed information suggests bias and if it would have been material to Rowell's use of peremptory strikes or a challenge for cause. The standard for materiality is whether a reasonable party would have exercised a strike had the information been disclosed. View "The State v. Rowell" on Justia Law