Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In December 2014, the petitioner and his son met Charles Brown to sell a motorcycle. The transaction failed, and the petitioner and his son allegedly robbed and killed Brown. Both were indicted for murder and armed robbery and proceeded to a joint jury trial. The jury was instructed to consider each charge separately for each defendant. After deliberations, the jury convicted the petitioner's son of armed robbery but acquitted him of murder. The jury then reported being deadlocked on the petitioner's charges, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.After the jury was dismissed, a bailiff found documents indicating the jury had reached a guilty verdict for the petitioner's armed robbery charge. The trial court recalled the jury, which confirmed it had reached a verdict on the armed robbery charge before being discharged. The jury was polled individually, and all jurors affirmed the guilty verdict. The trial court then entered the guilty verdict and sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment without parole.The petitioner appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in recalling the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on procedural grounds. The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to recall the jury. The Supreme Court emphasized that the jury was recalled shortly after discharge, remained on the courthouse premises, and was not subjected to outside influences. The recall served only to confirm the verdict reached before discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction and sentence for armed robbery. View "The State v. Mills" on Justia Law

In 2018, Montrelle Campbell was convicted of one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. The case involved a shooting at an apartment in Charleston, where Campbell allegedly fired fourteen rifle rounds, resulting in one death and two injuries. The key issues on appeal were the trial court's instruction on malice inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, the requirement of expressed malice for attempted murder, and the accomplice liability instruction.The Court of Appeals reversed Campbell's convictions, citing errors in the trial court's instructions. It held that the instruction on inferred malice from a deadly weapon was erroneous and not harmless, that expressed malice was required for attempted murder under State v. King, and that the accomplice liability instruction was improper. The court remanded the case for a new trial.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that the erroneous instruction on inferred malice was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of malice. The court clarified that attempted murder can be proven by either expressed or implied malice. Additionally, it found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the accomplice liability instruction, noting that the evidence allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that Campbell and another individual were acting together during the shooting. The Supreme Court's decision reinstated Campbell's convictions. View "The State v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Phillip Wayne Lowery was convicted of second offense driving under the influence (DUI). He admitted to being under the influence but contested that the only evidence of him driving came from statements he made to a patrol trooper, which he argued were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona. Additionally, Lowery argued that the charge should be dismissed because field sobriety tests and Miranda warnings from another trooper's dash camera video were not shown to the jury.The Circuit Court in Greenville County admitted Lowery's statements and denied his motion for a directed verdict. The court found that the State had substantially complied with the statutory requirements for videotaping field sobriety tests and Miranda warnings. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, agreeing with Lowery that his statements were inadmissible and remanded for a new trial. However, it held that dismissal of the charge was not required despite the video deficiencies.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reversed the Court of Appeals' decision regarding the admissibility of Lowery's statements, holding that even if the initial statements were inadmissible, subsequent volunteered statements were admissible and created a jury issue on whether Lowery was driving. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the absence of the sobriety tests and Miranda warnings on the video did not warrant dismissal of the charge. The Supreme Court reinstated Lowery's conviction, emphasizing that the statute does not require the State to offer any portion of the incident site video into evidence. View "The State v. Lowery" on Justia Law

Adam Rowell was convicted of two felony driving under the influence charges. After the trial, Rowell discovered that Juror 164, who served on his jury, had failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been recently arrested for several charges, including possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Rowell included this information in his motion for a new trial. Juror 164 was not present at the hearing for the new trial motion, and although the State consented to a second hearing to examine Juror 164, the circuit court denied the motion without holding the additional hearing.The circuit court found that Juror 164's failure to disclose his arrest was unintentional, attributing it to the structure of the voir dire questions, which could have confused the average juror. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that there was no need for further examination of Juror 164 since the concealment was deemed unintentional.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided to abandon the distinction between intentional and unintentional concealment. The court held that the focus should be on whether the juror's nondisclosure suggests bias and whether this bias caused prejudice to the moving party. The court ruled that a new trial may be ordered only when prejudice is proven by showing that the concealed information reveals a potential for bias and would have influenced the use of a peremptory strike or a challenge for cause.The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine if Juror 164's nondisclosure suggested bias and if it prejudiced Rowell's defense. The circuit court is instructed to assess whether the withheld information would have been material to Rowell's use of peremptory strikes or supported a challenge for cause. View "The State v. Rowell" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Gabrielle Davis-Kocsis, who was convicted of murder, two counts of kidnapping, first-degree burglary, and criminal conspiracy, all stemming from a dispute between drug dealers. Davis-Kocsis had offered methamphetamine as a reward for information about Mark Connor, who had stolen cash and a motorcycle from her. After learning of Connor's location, Davis-Kocsis and her accomplices broke into the house, sprayed bear mace, and held the occupants at gunpoint. During the confrontation, one of Davis-Kocsis's accomplices shot and killed Connor.The case was initially tried in a lower court where Davis-Kocsis was found guilty on all charges. She appealed the decision, arguing that the South Carolina Code prohibits sentencing a defendant for both kidnapping and murder when the victims are different. She also contested the trial court's decision to admit a 911 call recording as evidence, claiming it was more prejudicial than probative.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a defendant could be sentenced for both murder and kidnapping when the victims are different, overruling Davis-Kocsis's interpretation of the South Carolina Code. The court also found no error in the trial court's decision to admit the 911 call recording, stating that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court dismissed Davis-Kocsis's other arguments regarding the recording as they were not raised at the trial court level and were therefore unpreserved for appellate review. View "The State v. Gabrielle Oliva Lashane Davis-Kocsis" on Justia Law

Eric English was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, his biological daughter. The victim, who was six or seven years old at the time of the abuse, tested positive for gonorrhea. English and Jamie Stroman, the victim's mother's boyfriend, also underwent STD testing. English tested positive for gonorrhea, while Stroman tested negative. The trial court admitted the STD test reports as evidence under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay, despite English's objections.The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, arguing that the test reports were admissible under the business records exception and were not testimonial under the United States Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. Washington. English appealed, arguing that the test reports were inadmissible without the testimony of the individuals who performed the tests, citing State v. James.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the lower courts' decisions in part and vacated in part. The court overruled James, stating that it had been abrogated by subsequent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. The court held that the STD test reports were nontestimonial and did not implicate English's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the reports without requiring the testimony of the individuals who authored the reports. However, the court vacated the court of appeals' holding that the requirements of Rule 803(6) were satisfied, as English did not argue that the reports did not meet these requirements. View "The State v. English" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Travis Hines, who was indicted for the distribution of heroin after selling the drug to a confidential informant. Hines initially had a public defender, then hired a private attorney, Christopher Wellborn. The State offered Hines a plea deal of ten years, which was later withdrawn and replaced with an eighteen-year offer. Wellborn requested the video of the drug buy, which the State refused to provide unless Hines rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial. After viewing the video, Wellborn advised Hines to accept a fifteen-year plea deal. However, Hines discharged Wellborn and began negotiating directly with the State. He eventually pleaded guilty in exchange for a fourteen-year sentence, representing himself in the process.The lower courts dismissed Hines' post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, where he sought to set aside his guilty plea on the grounds that he was not adequately warned about the dangers of self-representation and that the State violated discovery rules by refusing to let him watch the video. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, ruling that the warnings Hines received about self-representation satisfied the Sixth Amendment and that there was no discovery violation.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Hines had competently and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court found that Hines, a twenty-nine-year-old college student with previous experience in the criminal justice system, understood the nuances of having legal representation. The court also noted that Hines had been advised by Wellborn to plead guilty, and the nature of the charges and the scope of the punishments he faced were clear to him. The court concluded that Hines had not met his burden of proving his waiver was involuntary. View "Hines v. State" on Justia Law

In July 2018, Thomas Jones was observing a traffic stop conducted by two deputies outside his home. Jones interacted with the deputies, asking questions about the stop. The deputies responded by arresting Jones, using a taser in the process. Jones was convicted under a Greenville County ordinance for interfering with a county law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to thirty days in jail and a $1,000 fine, which was suspended upon ten days in jail over weekends and a $500 fine. Jones appealed his conviction, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied to him and that the ordinance itself was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.Jones's case was transferred to the Supreme Court of South Carolina due to the constitutional challenges he raised. The State conceded that the ordinance was improperly applied to Jones under the specific facts of the case and asked the court to reverse his conviction and sentence. The State also requested that the court not address Jones's broader challenges to the ordinance.The Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed with the State's position. The court noted that it generally declines to rule on constitutional issues unless necessary and that facial challenges to statutes are disfavored. The court found that Jones's actions of observing and asking questions were constitutionally protected conduct and could not support a conviction under the ordinance. The court was deeply disturbed by the deputies' behavior in this case but declined to go further than necessary in its ruling. The court reversed Jones's conviction on the narrow grounds that the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied to him and reserved judgment on the broader challenges to the ordinance for another case. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Patrick Clemons, a convicted felon, was found guilty of possessing a firearm. He had two prior convictions for Criminal Domestic Violence of a High and Aggravated Nature (CDVHAN) and one for Assault and Battery Second Degree (AB2d) in South Carolina. Due to these prior convictions, Clemons was classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), leading to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years. Clemons appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that both CDVHAN and AB2d could be committed through reckless or negligent conduct, and therefore, neither should qualify as a predicate offense for enhanced sentencing under the ACCA's "elements clause."Clemons' appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified two questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The questions sought to clarify the mental state required to commit AB2d and CDVHAN in South Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court rephrased the questions to ask whether a defendant could be convicted of these offenses with a mens rea of recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code.The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the answer to both questions was "yes." The court explained that the South Carolina Legislature had chosen to criminalize multiple types of conduct under the statutes for AB2d and CDVHAN. Therefore, there was not a single mens rea required for a conviction under either statute. Instead, the required mens rea depended on the actus reus of the crime being prosecuted. The court concluded that under some circumstances, a person could be convicted of AB2d and CDVHAN with a mens rea of recklessness. View "United States of America v. Clemons" on Justia Law

Randy Collins was tried and convicted for first-degree arson and criminal conspiracy, following a fire that resulted in the death of a 12-year-old boy. The conviction was based, in part, on Collins' statement to law enforcement, which was obtained during an interview where the officers assured Collins that his statements would remain confidential. Collins appealed his conviction, arguing that his statement to law enforcement was involuntary due to the officers' false assurance of confidentiality.The Supreme Court of South Carolina, reviewing the case on certiorari, agreed with Collins. The court held that when law enforcement gave Collins Miranda warnings, but then negated them by falsely advising him that his statements would remain confidential, his statement became involuntary. The court noted that such a false assurance of confidentiality is inherently coercive because it interferes with an individual's ability to make a fully informed decision on whether to engage in an interview.Moreover, the court found that the false assurance of confidentiality was not harmless error. Collins' statement was key evidence linking him to the arson scheme and placing him at the scene of the fire. His situation was distinguishable from cases where the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative to other properly admitted evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, albeit with modification, and held that Collins' statement was inadmissible and he was entitled to a new trial. The court also took the opportunity to unequivocally condemn the interviewing technique employed in this case. View "The State v. Collins" on Justia Law