Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of murder and armed robbery based largely on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution’s evidence included instant messages allegedly used to lure the victim, text messages about the defendant’s plan, cell phone location data placing him with the victim at key times, firearm evidence linking the defendant’s gun to the crime, and the defendant’s use of the victim’s credit card after the murder. The trial court instructed the jury using a reasonable doubt charge and a circumstantial evidence instruction recommended in an earlier South Carolina Supreme Court case.After his conviction, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant’s direct appeal under the procedures outlined in Anders v. California. Subsequently, the defendant filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a specific circumstantial evidence jury instruction identified in State v. Logan. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel admitted he had not known of Logan at the time of trial. The PCR court found counsel’s performance was not deficient and, even if it was, there was no prejudice.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the PCR court’s denial of relief. In its opinion, the court clarified South Carolina law regarding jury charges on circumstantial evidence, overruling in part its prior decision in Logan. The court held that trial courts must not require the jury to find that circumstantial evidence “point conclusively to guilt” or that “all circumstances be consistent,” as Logan had suggested. Instead, a constitutionally sound reasonable doubt charge, along with an explanation of circumstantial and direct evidence (as recommended in State v. Grippon), suffices. Consequently, the court held that counsel was not ineffective for not requesting the Logan charge and affirmed the PCR court’s decision. View "Heatley v. State" on Justia Law

An employee of a Charleston convenience store fatally shot a customer after a heated confrontation that escalated from a dispute over a cell phone charger. The employee, Suhib Yousef, was previously a victim of armed robbery and displayed signs of trauma. During the incident, after the customer, David Wilson, engaged in aggressive behavior and attempted to disarm Yousef, Yousef shot Wilson, who died from his injuries. Yousef’s uncle, Mahmoud Yousef, owned the store and had hired and armed Suhib after his earlier trauma.Criminal charges for murder were brought against Yousef, but the Circuit Court (Judge R. Markley Dennis) granted him immunity under the South Carolina Protection of Persons and Property Act, finding that Yousef acted lawfully in self-defense and was justified in using deadly force. The State did not appeal this ruling. Wilson’s estate then brought civil claims against the store and its owner for negligence, wrongful death, negligent supervision, and negligent entrustment. The Circuit Court (Judge George M. McFaddin, Jr.) dismissed these claims, ruling that the immunity finding in the criminal case precluded civil liability for Yousef and, by extension, for the store and its owner. The court also found no actionable damages since Yousef’s actions were deemed reasonable.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the dismissal, holding that when an employee is granted statutory immunity for justified use of deadly force, that immunity extends to the employer for claims based on vicarious liability and also bars negligent supervision and negligent entrustment claims, as there was no underlying wrongful act. The court concluded this extension of immunity aligns with legislative intent and public policy. View "Moore v. Green's Grocery" on Justia Law

The case involves Bayan Aleksey, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a South Carolina state trooper during a traffic stop in 1997. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Aleksey filed a post-conviction relief application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, establishing that intellectually disabled persons cannot be executed, Aleksey filed a second post-conviction relief application asserting intellectual disability as a bar to execution.The Orangeburg County post-conviction relief (PCR) court held a hearing to determine Aleksey’s intellectual disability. Aleksey submitted five affidavits, including the Hammock affidavit, as evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning. The PCR court excluded the Hammock affidavit because the affiant was unavailable for cross-examination, leaving only non-expert evidence on adaptive functioning. After reviewing IQ scores, expert testimony, and school records, the PCR court found Aleksey failed to prove intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence, as his developmental-period IQ scores were above the threshold, his adaptive deficits stemmed from ADHD and emotional disturbance rather than intellectual disability, and no intellectual disability diagnosis manifested during his developmental years.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether the PCR court erred in its findings and evidentiary rulings. The Court affirmed the PCR court’s decision, holding that the finding Aleksey is not intellectually disabled was supported by the evidence and not against its preponderance. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the Hammock affidavit, emphasizing the necessity of cross-examination for contested issues. The PCR court’s denial of relief was therefore affirmed. View "Aleksey v. State" on Justia Law

The case involved a former attorney who was tried and convicted in 2023 for the murders of his wife and son, as well as for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial was widely publicized and lasted six weeks. After his conviction and sentencing to life in prison, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the Colleton County Clerk of Court had improperly influenced the jury by making comments that disparaged his credibility and suggested he was guilty, as well as by pressuring the jury to reach a guilty verdict. Affidavits and testimony from several jurors and court staff supported claims that the clerk made these comments, motivated in part by a desire for notoriety and book sales.A post-trial court, presided over by a different judge due to the original judge’s recusal, held a hearing to examine the alleged improper communications. The post-trial court found that the clerk had made improper comments to the jury, but concluded these did not affect any juror’s verdict and denied the motion for a new trial. The defendant appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court certified the appeal and consolidated it with the direct appeal of the convictions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the post-trial court’s denial of a new trial. The court held that the clerk’s comments constituted improper external influence on the jury, triggering a presumption of prejudice under the Remmer v. United States standard. The court found that the State failed to rebut this presumption, and further held that the post-trial court erred by questioning jurors about the effect of the comments in a manner prohibited by evidentiary rules. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial and provided guidance for the admissibility of evidence related to the defendant’s financial crimes on remand. View "The State v. Murdaugh" on Justia Law

Samir Kevin Shank was charged after an incident in which, while trying to evade police in a stolen vehicle, he reversed the car down a narrow street. During the attempt to escape, the car’s open passenger-side door collided with an officer’s open driver-side door, knocking the officer to the ground. The officer suffered a scraped knee, but no serious injuries. Shank was arrested after a further pursuit and indicted for, among other charges, Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature (ABHAN).During his trial in the Greenville County Circuit Court, Shank requested a jury instruction on Third-Degree Assault and Battery, arguing that the evidence—particularly the minor injury and lack of intent to harm—supported conviction for the lesser offense rather than ABHAN. The trial court denied this request, agreeing with the State that the manner in which the vehicle was used was likely to produce death or great bodily injury, as required for ABHAN. Shank was convicted as charged. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense and that this error was not harmless.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals. It held that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested lesser-included offense instruction because the evidence did not support a rational inference that Shank was guilty only of Third-Degree Assault and Battery. The Court found that Shank’s use of the vehicle constituted a means likely to produce death or great bodily injury, thus satisfying all elements of ABHAN and making an instruction on the lesser offense inapplicable. View "The State v. Shank" on Justia Law

After a high school basketball game, a confrontation occurred between two groups of rival fans, leading to the stabbing death of Da'Von Capers. The defendant, Kierin Marcellus Dennis, was indicted for murder. Dennis claimed he acted in self-defense and sought immunity from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. At the pre-trial immunity hearing, witnesses gave conflicting accounts about whether the victim or others had unlawfully and forcefully entered Dennis’s vehicle before the stabbing. The circuit court found that Dennis failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to immunity and denied his request, allowing the prosecution to proceed.Dennis was tried for murder, but the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, resulting in a mistrial. When the State sought to retry him, Dennis requested a second immunity hearing, arguing that the mistrial entitled him to a new hearing or, alternatively, to introduce new evidence discovered since the first hearing. The circuit court allowed him to present new evidence but ultimately denied a second immunity hearing and again denied immunity. Dennis was convicted at the second trial. He appealed, arguing he was entitled to another immunity hearing after the mistrial. The South Carolina Court of Appeals agreed and reversed his conviction, holding that the mistrial required a new immunity hearing.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and held that a mistrial does not entitle a defendant to a second immunity hearing under the Act. The court reasoned that an immunity hearing is an independent proceeding and its result remains binding after a mistrial. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the original denial of immunity. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for consideration of the remaining appellate issues. View "The State v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Kenneth H. Eastwood was convicted of murder after the body of Cara Hodges was found strangled in a wooded area. Eastwood was the last person seen with the victim and, after being interviewed by police, he confessed to the crime both to his employer and later to law enforcement. During the investigation, Eastwood took a polygraph test and was told by police that he had failed. He subsequently confessed to the murder, describing details of the crime and disposal of evidence. At trial, Eastwood did not testify but presented a false confession expert who opined that his confession was consistent with an internalized false confession, citing factors such as alcohol use, sleep deprivation, and being confronted by police with allegedly objective evidence of guilt.The case was tried in the Circuit Court for Orangeburg County. Eastwood sought to introduce evidence through his expert that police told him he failed the polygraph, arguing it was relevant to his false confession defense. The trial court excluded this evidence, relying on Rule 702 and Rule 403 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, finding that polygraph evidence was unreliable and that its admission would confuse the jury and potentially prejudice Eastwood by bolstering the confession’s truthfulness.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether exclusion of the polygraph evidence was error. The court held that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence under Rule 702, as Eastwood was not offering scientific proof of the polygraph’s reliability but rather the fact that police told him he failed. The Supreme Court found the evidence relevant to the defense and not substantially outweighed by confusion or prejudice under Rule 403. However, the court concluded that the error did not affect the jury’s verdict, as the expert was able to present the core theory of false confessions. The conviction was therefore affirmed. View "The State v. Eastwood" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of murdering his estranged wife by shooting her in the back seat of a car outside a police station, in the presence of children. He was arrested the day before the murder for domestic violence, released on bond, and the next day followed his wife and her friend to the police station, where the shooting occurred. The prosecution presented evidence of prior domestic abuse and a previous conviction for a violent offense. The defense focused on the defendant’s troubled upbringing, mental health issues, and cognitive deficits. The jury found him guilty and recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed.After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, the defendant filed for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Circuit Court for Spartanburg County, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly regarding the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The PCR court initially denied relief in an order that was identical to the State’s proposed order. The Supreme Court of South Carolina vacated that order and remanded for a new order with specific findings. On remand, the PCR court again denied relief, issuing an amended order after reviewing the parties’ proposed orders and making some corrections. The defendant’s requests for a new hearing or for the judge’s recusal were denied.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether the PCR court erred by adopting the State’s proposed order and whether trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and presenting mitigation. The court held that the PCR court did not violate the defendant’s rights by adopting the State’s proposed order after adequate review, and that any deficiencies in trial counsel’s mitigation investigation or presentation did not prejudice the defendant. The court found no reasonable probability that additional mitigation evidence would have changed the jury’s recommendation. The decision of the PCR court was affirmed in result. View "Lindsey v. The State" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested and indicted for the murder of an individual named Donald Blake, with the allegation being that the murder was committed by blunt force trauma. At trial, the court instructed the jury on both murder and, over the defendant’s objection, the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. After more than five hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on murder and guilty on voluntary manslaughter. During jury polling, the eleventh juror indicated that the guilty verdict for manslaughter was not her true verdict, explaining she had been pressured by other jurors and maintained a not guilty stance. The trial judge, without instructing the jury to continue deliberations and over the objections of both parties, questioned the dissenting juror individually and then declared a mistrial.Following the mistrial, the State sought to retry the defendant for murder. The defendant moved for habeas corpus and for entry of a verdict of acquittal, arguing that jeopardy had attached to the murder charge because the jury had returned a final not guilty verdict. The Circuit Court denied relief, holding that jeopardy had not attached and that the State could retry the defendant for murder. The defendant’s appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals was dismissed as not immediately appealable, and his petitions for supersedeas and habeas corpus were denied. The Supreme Court of South Carolina then issued a common law writ of certiorari to review whether the State could retry the defendant for murder, and later requested briefing on the voluntary manslaughter charge as well.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that jeopardy attached to both the murder and voluntary manslaughter charges. The Court found the not guilty verdict on murder was final and that the trial court’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, without manifest necessity and without instructing the jury to continue deliberations, barred retrial on both charges under double jeopardy principles. The Court reversed the lower court’s ruling, holding the State may not retry the defendant for either offense. View "The State v. Erb" on Justia Law

Law enforcement arrested the defendant after discovering large quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl in his vehicle. He was indicted for trafficking in methamphetamine and trafficking in illegal drugs under South Carolina law. The defendant entered a deferred plea agreement, agreeing to cooperate as a confidential informant in exchange for deferred sentencing. However, after being re-arrested on new drug charges, he ultimately pled guilty to both trafficking charges. Two years later, he moved to vacate his guilty plea to trafficking in illegal drugs, arguing that the statute under which he was charged did not criminalize trafficking in fentanyl, a synthetic opioid, and thus he had pled guilty to a nonexistent offense.The Circuit Court for Greenville County denied the motion to vacate, reasoning that the defendant had received a benefit by pleading to trafficking rather than a more serious charge and that his conduct was clearly criminal. The court did not specifically address whether fentanyl fell within the statutory language but imposed concurrent sentences for both trafficking convictions. The defendant appealed, contending that the indictment failed to state an offense and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his plea.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that even if the statute did not encompass fentanyl, any defect in the indictment was non-jurisdictional and was waived by the defendant’s guilty plea. The court clarified that subject matter jurisdiction is not implicated by defects in an indictment charging a recognized crime, and that a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional challenges. Therefore, the defendant could not challenge his conviction on the grounds asserted after pleading guilty. View "The State v. Sweet" on Justia Law