Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On the night of April 10, 2010, Shannon Scott and his fiancé Rosalyn were asleep at Scott's home. Scott's daughter Shade and three of Rosalyn's daughters were at a party at a teen nightclub with friends. Shade had a history of problems with a girl named Teesha and her friends. Shade and her group left in one vehicle and Teesha and her group followed in an SUV. A third vehicle, a Honda, driven by the deceased, Darrell Niles, followed behind Teesha. As Shade's group was driving away from the club, they stopped at a red traffic light. Shade and two other passengers in the vehicle testified that when Teesha's group stopped at the light, someone got out of Teesha's vehicle and approached their vehicle with a gun. Shade's group ran the red light and Teesha's group pursued them. Shade's group attempted to pull into a police station but the station was closed. One of the girls called her mother Rosalyn and explained they were being chased by Teesha. When Shade's group arrived, they pulled around to the back of the house. Two of Rosalyn's daughters testified they heard a gunshot as they were entering the house. After Scott heard the gunshot, he retrieved his roommate's gun and "ran" toward his front door. Scott fired a "warning shot" at the car, shooting two, possibly three times. Police arriving at the scene found Niles dead from a gunshot. The State indicted Scott for murder. The circuit court granted Scott's motion for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded there was evidence in the record to support Scott's use of deadly force against Niles under the doctrine of self-defense, therefore he was entitled to immunity pursuant to the Act. View "South Carolina v. Scott" on Justia Law

A municipal police officer responded to a 911 call received through his dispatch center regarding a report of a disabled vehicle. After arriving on the scene, the officer found the vehicle slightly off the roadway in a ditch. While the road was in the city limits, the officer learned the shoulder area of the roadway was beyond the city boundary. While checking that the driver, Respondent Jennifer Alexander, was not in immediate distress, the officer confirmed with dispatch that the disabled vehicle had come to rest a few feet outside of the city limits. Dispatch was informed of the need for a state trooper, as the officer suspected Respondent was intoxicated. The officer remained on the scene, and although Respondent was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, it is acknowledged that Respondent was not free to leave the scene, as she was detained by the officer. The state trooper arrived quickly and conducted field sobriety tests on Respondent. Respondent was charged by the state trooper with Driving Under the Influence (DUI). The magistrate court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss the case, finding the officer lacked authority to detain Respondent because the vehicle came to rest outside the municipality's limits. On appeal, the State argued the municipal officer had the authority to detain Respondent pursuant to section 17-13-45 because it extended an officer's authority when he is responding "to a distress call or a request for assistance in an adjacent jurisdiction." The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision, which held the statute did not apply to this case. The Court concluded section 17- 13-45 provided the officer with authority to detain Respondent, and therefore reversed the appellate court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Tyrone King was convicted of murder, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, third-degree assault and battery, and pointing and presenting a firearm. The trial court sentenced King to life imprisonment for murder, a consecutive five year term for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, and thirty days for third-degree assault and battery. King appealed his murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime convictions, and the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a full Rule 404(b), SCRE, analysis regarding the trial court's admission of certain other bad act evidence. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court found the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the unrelated murder charge, and the Supreme Court held this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court vacated the court appeals' decision to remand to the trial court for proper analysis of the admissibility of the unrelated murder charge, as a remand would be pointless. The Court held King was entitled to a new trial on the charges of murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. King's unappealed convictions for third-degree assault and battery and pointing and presenting a firearm were not affected by the Supreme Court's holding. View "South Carolina v. King" on Justia Law

Petitioner Roy Jones appealed his convictions for first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, second-degree CSC with a minor, and two counts of committing a lewd act on a minor. The issues Jones raised on appeal all concerned the admission of testimony from an expert witness qualified in child sexual abuse dynamics. The court of appeals affirmed Jones's convictions. Finding no reversible error, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, but took the opportunity to clarify the proper inquiry for determining whether a particular subject area falls outside the realm of lay knowledge, thus requiring expert testimony. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Simmons Jr. was convicted of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving two minors. The minors were Petitioner's twin sons. A key feature of the State's case was the challenged testimony of a pediatrician admitted pursuant to Rule 803(4), SCRE, which provided a hearsay exception for statements made in connection with medical diagnosis or treatment. The court of appeals affirmed, first questioning whether Petitioner's challenge was preserved, and then concluding the pediatrician's testimony was properly admitted. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a new trial: Petitioner preserved his objection to the pediatrician's purported Rule 803(4), SCRE, testimony, and the admission of the hearsay statements in this case was blatantly improper. "This improper testimony was nothing more than hearsay shrouded in a doctor's white coat, in violation of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence." View "South Carolina v. Simmons" on Justia Law

James Dill Jr. was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, and the trial court sentenced him to a prison term of ten years. Dill appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals affirmed. Sheriff's deputies searched Dill's residence. Including Dill, five or six individuals were inside the residence at the time of the search. Neither an active methamphetamine lab nor methamphetamine was discovered in Dill's residence. Law enforcement seized five one-pound containers of salt (some full and some partially empty), two bottles of Coleman brand camping fuel, a sixteen-ounce bottle of hydrogen peroxide, a bottle of unknown fluid, and a roll of aluminum foil. Law enforcement did not discover any ephedrine-based medications (or empty blister packs of ephedrine-based medications), lithium strips or batteries, drain cleaners, cold packs, sulfuric acid, or toluene, all of which are commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. At the conclusion of the search, law enforcement placed the seized items in buckets, took four photographs, and immediately destroyed the items without testing for methamphetamine or fingerprints. The items were destroyed without being tested because methamphetamine is highly volatile and may present a danger if placed in storage or tested for methamphetamine. Dill was arrested and indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine. Dill moved pretrial to suppress the evidence found during the execution of the search warrant for lack of probable cause or, in the alternative, for the trial court to require the State to reveal the identity of the confidential informant. The South Carolina Supreme Court conceded it must give "great deference" to a magistrate's finding of probable cause. However, given the totality of the circumstances, the Court found the magistrate lacked a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed for a search of Dill's residence. Under the narrow facts of this case, the search warrant was therefore invalid, and Dill's conviction was reversed. View "South Carolina v. Dill" on Justia Law

David Ross pled guilty in 1979 to lewd act upon a child. Thirty-two years later, he was convicted in magistrate's court of misdemeanor failure to register as a sex offender. Ross argued the automatic imposition of lifetime electronic monitoring required by subsection 23-3-540(E) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017) as a result of his failure to register was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Addressing only this particular subsection of 23-3- 540, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed, and reversed the circuit court's order automatically imposing electronic monitoring. The case was remanded for an individualized inquiry into whether the imposition of monitoring in Ross's circumstances was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. View "South Carolina v. Ross" on Justia Law

At issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court was whether the digital information stored on a cell phone may be abandoned such that its privacy is no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment. The victim contacted police after discovering her condominium had been burglarized. The window was broken in one of the bedrooms; a television, laptop computers and some jewelry was taken. The phone was found at the scene of the break-in. A responding police officer took the cell phone at issue in this appeal to the police station and secured it. Days later, the detective retrieving the phone from the locker saw the background picture of a black male with dreadlocks. Considering the phone to be "abandoned property," he guessed the code to unlock the screen—1-2-3-4—and opened the phone without a warrant. The detective looked through the "contacts" stored on the phone and found a person listed as "Grandma." He entered "Grandma's" phone number into a database called Accurint and identified a list of her relatives, which included a man matching the age of the person pictured on the background screen of the cell phone—defendant Lamar Brown. The detective entered Brown's name into the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles database and looked at Brown's driver's license photograph. After comparing the photographs, the detective determined Brown was the man pictured on the screen of the cell phone. Brown was questioned; Brown admitted the phone belonged to him, but that it was lost. Brown admitted that no one else could have had his cell phone on the night of the burglary. Brown was ultimately charged with first degree burglary. The trial court determined the information on the cell phone in this case had been abandoned, and admitted it into evidence. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law

Timothy Pulley appealed after he was convicted for trafficking cocaine base (cocaine) of ten grams or more, but less than twenty-eight grams in violation of section 44-53-375(C)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2018). Pulley argued the trial court erred in: (1) charging a permissive inference that knowledge and possession of a substance may be inferred when the substance is found on the property under the defendant's control; (2) failing to charge the jury that the State must prove a complete chain of custody; (3) failing to suppress the cocaine due to an incomplete chain of custody; (4) failing to suppress the cocaine due to an invalid inventory search; (5) finding the cocaine was seized pursuant to a valid search incident to arrest; and (6) failing to require the State to open fully on the law and the facts of the case in closing argument and reply only to arguments of Pulley's defense counsel. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court found the trial court erred in concluding the State established a complete chain of custody. Accordingly, the Court reversed Pulley's conviction and sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Pulley" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted cross-petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision in South Carolina v. Perez, Op. No. 2015-UP-217 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 8, 2015), wherein the court determined: (1) the trial court's refusal to admit testimony of a witness' U-visa application was harmless error; (2) the trial court properly admitted evidence of prior bad acts Venancio Diaz Perez committed against another minor; and (3) Perez's sentence was vindictive and a violation of due process. Perez was indicted on charges of criminal sexual conduct with a minor and lewd act on a minor for acts committed on a child ("Minor 1") whom his wife babysat in their residence. Prior to trial, the judge held an in camera hearing to determine whether to allow another child ("Minor 2"), who Perez's wife also babysat, to testify at trial regarding acts of sexual abuse Perez allegedly committed against Minor 2. After hearing testimony from both children, the trial court decided to allow Minor 2 to testify pursuant to South Carolina v. Wallace, 683 S.E.2d 275 (2009). The Supreme Court found that although the failure to admit evidence of a witness' U-visa did not automatically equate to reversible error, it found the trial court's failure to admit evidence of Mother 2's U-visa application particularly significant in this case given: (1) the lack of physical evidence of the alleged abuse; and (2) Minor 1's conflicting testimony. Further, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals' credibility analysis inappropriate for appellate review; because there was no physical evidence of the alleged abuse, the case rested solely on credibility determinations. Thus, Perez's opportunity to elicit testimony from the State's witnesses regarding any potential bias was critical to his defense. Therefore, the Court found the Confrontation Clause violation here was not harmless. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Perez" on Justia Law