Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent Michael Milledge was arrested and convicted of multiple drug-related offenses in Greenville County following a traffic stop. Milledge applied for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing his defense counsel was deficient for failing to object at trial to the introduction of contraband found pursuant to an illegal search. The PCR court agreed and granted Milledge a new trial. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court held the PCR court erred in finding Milledge met his burden of proof to establish prejudice. “The motivation of the deputies in this case is highly probative. While the protections of the Fourth Amendment may have been triggered had the deputies prolonged the detention and engaged in a search of Milledge and his vehicle for the purpose of finding evidence, the limited pat down performed by Deputy Lanning was solely for officer safety. To reach a different conclusion would prevent officers operating in similar high-crime areas from conducting a protective frisk when their specialized training indicates the person may be armed and would subject officers to the ‘unnecessary risks’ in performing their duties the Terry court warned against.” View "Milledge v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Stepheno Alston was tried in absentia and convicted by a jury of trafficking in cocaine. The trial judge sentenced Alston to twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Alston's conviction and sentence, upholding the trial judge's denial of Alston's motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle following a traffic stop. Specifically, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial judge that: (1) the arresting officer had (a) probable cause to stop Alston's vehicle for a violation of South Carolina's failure to maintain a lane statute and (b) reasonable suspicion to support a brief investigatory detention; (2) the officer had reasonable suspicion that illegal activity was occurring to justify extending the duration of the traffic stop; and (3) Alston voluntarily gave his consent to the officer to search his vehicle. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Alston's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Based on South Carolina rules of statutory construction, the Supreme Court held the offense of failure to maintain a lane was not a strict liability offense. As a result, an officer must consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether to stop a vehicle for a violation of this statute. Applying this interpretation to the facts of the instant case, we conclude there is evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the initial traffic stop was valid. Further, the Court found evidence to support the trial judge's determination that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to extend the scope of the stop beyond its initial purpose and that Alston voluntarily consented to the warrantless search. Therefore, while the Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, it modified its analysis regarding the interpretation of section 56-5-1900 and the basis for which the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Alston" on Justia Law

Stepheno Alston was tried in absentia and convicted by a jury of trafficking in cocaine. The trial judge sentenced Alston to twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Alston's conviction and sentence, upholding the trial judge's denial of Alston's motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle following a traffic stop. Specifically, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial judge that: (1) the arresting officer had (a) probable cause to stop Alston's vehicle for a violation of South Carolina's failure to maintain a lane statute and (b) reasonable suspicion to support a brief investigatory detention; (2) the officer had reasonable suspicion that illegal activity was occurring to justify extending the duration of the traffic stop; and (3) Alston voluntarily gave his consent to the officer to search his vehicle. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Alston's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Based on South Carolina rules of statutory construction, the Supreme Court held the offense of failure to maintain a lane was not a strict liability offense. As a result, an officer must consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether to stop a vehicle for a violation of this statute. Applying this interpretation to the facts of the instant case, we conclude there is evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the initial traffic stop was valid. Further, the Court found evidence to support the trial judge's determination that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to extend the scope of the stop beyond its initial purpose and that Alston voluntarily consented to the warrantless search. Therefore, while the Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, it modified its analysis regarding the interpretation of section 56-5-1900 and the basis for which the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Alston" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hilton appealed the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming the PCR court did not obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel before allowing him to represent himself at his PCR trial. Hilton pled guilty to kidnapping and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. When asked at the PCR trial about the quality of the State's evidence, plea counsel explained, "We had the actual recording of what went on, and when you listen to it, there is no defense to these charges." The plea court sentenced him to forty-five years in prison. He did not appeal. Hilton filed a PCR application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The State requested a hearing, and the court appointed counsel to represent him. Hilton then moved to "dismiss" his appointed attorney. A few weeks later, after learning his motion was set for a hearing, Hilton filed another motion, again seeking "dismissal of PCR Court Appointed Attorney." At the hearing on Hilton's motion, the PCR court informed him of his right to counsel but did not warn him of the dangers of proceeding without an attorney. After the hearing, the PCR court entered an order granting the motion to relieve counsel. Almost a year later, Hilton appeared without an attorney before a second PCR court for trial. The PCR court began by inquiring into Hilton's waiver of his right to counsel. Both sides presented testimony. As a part of its presentation, the State informed the PCR court of Hilton's seven prior convictions for criminal sexual conduct. The PCR court took the case under advisement, and later issued a written order denying relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court found Hilton declined to have the PCR court explain "the kinds of things that an attorney might do to be of service. ... the record here is clear Hilton was already aware of several of the specific advantages of having an attorney." Finding a valid waiver of his right to counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. View "Hilton v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hilton appealed the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming the PCR court did not obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel before allowing him to represent himself at his PCR trial. Hilton pled guilty to kidnapping and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. When asked at the PCR trial about the quality of the State's evidence, plea counsel explained, "We had the actual recording of what went on, and when you listen to it, there is no defense to these charges." The plea court sentenced him to forty-five years in prison. He did not appeal. Hilton filed a PCR application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The State requested a hearing, and the court appointed counsel to represent him. Hilton then moved to "dismiss" his appointed attorney. A few weeks later, after learning his motion was set for a hearing, Hilton filed another motion, again seeking "dismissal of PCR Court Appointed Attorney." At the hearing on Hilton's motion, the PCR court informed him of his right to counsel but did not warn him of the dangers of proceeding without an attorney. After the hearing, the PCR court entered an order granting the motion to relieve counsel. Almost a year later, Hilton appeared without an attorney before a second PCR court for trial. The PCR court began by inquiring into Hilton's waiver of his right to counsel. Both sides presented testimony. As a part of its presentation, the State informed the PCR court of Hilton's seven prior convictions for criminal sexual conduct. The PCR court took the case under advisement, and later issued a written order denying relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court found Hilton declined to have the PCR court explain "the kinds of things that an attorney might do to be of service. ... the record here is clear Hilton was already aware of several of the specific advantages of having an attorney." Finding a valid waiver of his right to counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. View "Hilton v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the proper scope of a circuit judge's inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), when a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel and requests to proceed pro se. Lamont Samuel was indicted for the murder of his cousin, Taneris Hamilton. On the day his case was called to trial, Samuel indicated he was dissatisfied with defense counsel and made a Faretta motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Rather than concluding the Faretta colloquy, the circuit judge continued to caution Samuel against representing himself, stating she did not believe he was sufficiently familiar with the law, procedure, or rules of evidence to adequately represent himself. Despite the judge's warnings and in light of the potential penalties he faced, Samuel voluntarily reaffirmed his desire to dispense with the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. The circuit judge summoned the attorney Samuel alleged he had been coached by in order to proceed pro se, to question the attorney on his relationship with Samuel. The attorney's testimony conflicted with Samuel's asserted "coaching." The circuit judge interpreted Samuel's and the attorney's conflicting testimony to mean Samuel was lying to her and attempting to manipulate the proceedings. Samuel proceeded to trial with his counsel and was found guilty and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. He appealed his conviction, asserting the circuit judge erred in denying his right to self-representation, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding Samuel made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary request to proceed pro se as required by Faretta, and he should have been given the opportunity to represent himself. View "South Carolina v. Samuel" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the proper scope of a circuit judge's inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), when a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel and requests to proceed pro se. Lamont Samuel was indicted for the murder of his cousin, Taneris Hamilton. On the day his case was called to trial, Samuel indicated he was dissatisfied with defense counsel and made a Faretta motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Rather than concluding the Faretta colloquy, the circuit judge continued to caution Samuel against representing himself, stating she did not believe he was sufficiently familiar with the law, procedure, or rules of evidence to adequately represent himself. Despite the judge's warnings and in light of the potential penalties he faced, Samuel voluntarily reaffirmed his desire to dispense with the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. The circuit judge summoned the attorney Samuel alleged he had been coached by in order to proceed pro se, to question the attorney on his relationship with Samuel. The attorney's testimony conflicted with Samuel's asserted "coaching." The circuit judge interpreted Samuel's and the attorney's conflicting testimony to mean Samuel was lying to her and attempting to manipulate the proceedings. Samuel proceeded to trial with his counsel and was found guilty and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. He appealed his conviction, asserting the circuit judge erred in denying his right to self-representation, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding Samuel made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary request to proceed pro se as required by Faretta, and he should have been given the opportunity to represent himself. View "South Carolina v. Samuel" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Marshall Collins of trafficking methamphetamine (third offense), and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial judge sentenced Collins to an aggregate twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, Collins filed a timely application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"). After a hearing, the PCR judge issued an order granting Collins a new trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the PCR judge erred in finding trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance and failing to properly handle an expired plea offer. Based on the trial court record, the Supreme Court found trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a continuance, or in his handling of the expired plea offer. Additionally, the Court found Collins failed to establish prejudice resulting from either alleged deficiency. Accordingly, the Court reversed the PCR judge's decision. View "Collins v. South Carolina" on Justia Law