Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the proper scope of a circuit judge's inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), when a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel and requests to proceed pro se. Lamont Samuel was indicted for the murder of his cousin, Taneris Hamilton. On the day his case was called to trial, Samuel indicated he was dissatisfied with defense counsel and made a Faretta motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Rather than concluding the Faretta colloquy, the circuit judge continued to caution Samuel against representing himself, stating she did not believe he was sufficiently familiar with the law, procedure, or rules of evidence to adequately represent himself. Despite the judge's warnings and in light of the potential penalties he faced, Samuel voluntarily reaffirmed his desire to dispense with the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. The circuit judge summoned the attorney Samuel alleged he had been coached by in order to proceed pro se, to question the attorney on his relationship with Samuel. The attorney's testimony conflicted with Samuel's asserted "coaching." The circuit judge interpreted Samuel's and the attorney's conflicting testimony to mean Samuel was lying to her and attempting to manipulate the proceedings. Samuel proceeded to trial with his counsel and was found guilty and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. He appealed his conviction, asserting the circuit judge erred in denying his right to self-representation, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding Samuel made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary request to proceed pro se as required by Faretta, and he should have been given the opportunity to represent himself. View "South Carolina v. Samuel" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the proper scope of a circuit judge's inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), when a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel and requests to proceed pro se. Lamont Samuel was indicted for the murder of his cousin, Taneris Hamilton. On the day his case was called to trial, Samuel indicated he was dissatisfied with defense counsel and made a Faretta motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Rather than concluding the Faretta colloquy, the circuit judge continued to caution Samuel against representing himself, stating she did not believe he was sufficiently familiar with the law, procedure, or rules of evidence to adequately represent himself. Despite the judge's warnings and in light of the potential penalties he faced, Samuel voluntarily reaffirmed his desire to dispense with the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. The circuit judge summoned the attorney Samuel alleged he had been coached by in order to proceed pro se, to question the attorney on his relationship with Samuel. The attorney's testimony conflicted with Samuel's asserted "coaching." The circuit judge interpreted Samuel's and the attorney's conflicting testimony to mean Samuel was lying to her and attempting to manipulate the proceedings. Samuel proceeded to trial with his counsel and was found guilty and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. He appealed his conviction, asserting the circuit judge erred in denying his right to self-representation, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding Samuel made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary request to proceed pro se as required by Faretta, and he should have been given the opportunity to represent himself. View "South Carolina v. Samuel" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Marshall Collins of trafficking methamphetamine (third offense), and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial judge sentenced Collins to an aggregate twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, Collins filed a timely application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"). After a hearing, the PCR judge issued an order granting Collins a new trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the PCR judge erred in finding trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance and failing to properly handle an expired plea offer. Based on the trial court record, the Supreme Court found trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a continuance, or in his handling of the expired plea offer. Additionally, the Court found Collins failed to establish prejudice resulting from either alleged deficiency. Accordingly, the Court reversed the PCR judge's decision. View "Collins v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Marshall Collins of trafficking methamphetamine (third offense), and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial judge sentenced Collins to an aggregate twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, Collins filed a timely application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"). After a hearing, the PCR judge issued an order granting Collins a new trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the PCR judge erred in finding trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance and failing to properly handle an expired plea offer. Based on the trial court record, the Supreme Court found trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a continuance, or in his handling of the expired plea offer. Additionally, the Court found Collins failed to establish prejudice resulting from either alleged deficiency. Accordingly, the Court reversed the PCR judge's decision. View "Collins v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

David Ledford was indicted for inflicting great bodily injury upon a child. The jury was sworn, and the case was tried up to the point of the charge conference between the trial court and the attorneys. During the charge conference, the State objected to the trial court's decision to give a jury charge proposed by Ledford. The trial court overruled the objection, and the State appealed. The court of appeals promptly dismissed the State's appeal, finding the issue raised was not immediately appealable. Finding no error in the appellate court's decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the State's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Ledford" on Justia Law

David Ledford was indicted for inflicting great bodily injury upon a child. The jury was sworn, and the case was tried up to the point of the charge conference between the trial court and the attorneys. During the charge conference, the State objected to the trial court's decision to give a jury charge proposed by Ledford. The trial court overruled the objection, and the State appealed. The court of appeals promptly dismissed the State's appeal, finding the issue raised was not immediately appealable. Finding no error in the appellate court's decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the State's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Ledford" on Justia Law

Elias Walker killed his father by repeatedly stabbing him with a sword in a motel room where they were living. Walker was twenty-two years old at the time of the crime. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Walker pled guilty but mentally ill to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. At the plea hearing, Walker presented evidence his father had physically and mentally abused him throughout his life. The circuit court found "there is ample evidence in the record of a history of criminal domestic violence against the defendant at the hands of his father." Based on this finding, Walker argued he was eligible for early parole under South Carolina Code section 16-25-90 (2015). The circuit court found Walker was not eligible for early parole because his father was not his household member as defined in subsection 16- 25-10(3). The question this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court’s review was whether section 16-25- 90 violated the equal protection or due process rights of a defendant who commits an offense against his parent, because the definition of "household member" in subsection 16-25-10(3) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017) does not include parents and children, and thus section 16-25-90 does not provide such a defendant any opportunity for early parole eligibility. The Court found no violation. View "South Carolina v. Walker" on Justia Law

Elias Walker killed his father by repeatedly stabbing him with a sword in a motel room where they were living. Walker was twenty-two years old at the time of the crime. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Walker pled guilty but mentally ill to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. At the plea hearing, Walker presented evidence his father had physically and mentally abused him throughout his life. The circuit court found "there is ample evidence in the record of a history of criminal domestic violence against the defendant at the hands of his father." Based on this finding, Walker argued he was eligible for early parole under South Carolina Code section 16-25-90 (2015). The circuit court found Walker was not eligible for early parole because his father was not his household member as defined in subsection 16- 25-10(3). The question this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court’s review was whether section 16-25- 90 violated the equal protection or due process rights of a defendant who commits an offense against his parent, because the definition of "household member" in subsection 16-25-10(3) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017) does not include parents and children, and thus section 16-25-90 does not provide such a defendant any opportunity for early parole eligibility. The Court found no violation. View "South Carolina v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Smalls was convicted by jury of armed robbery for the 2007 robbery of a Bojangles restaurant in Columbus. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Smalls filed an application for PCR alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court first held a hearing in 2007. The court held the record open to allow PCR counsel time to investigate the circumstances under which the State dismissed a carjacking charge against Smalls’ accomplice on the morning of Smalls' trial. The hearing was not reconvened until 2012. The PCR court described the issue regarding the carjacking charge as not only one of ineffective assistance of counsel, but also whether "the State was deceptive" in representations made to the trial court and trial counsel. The PCR court ultimately denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred Smalls' petition for a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 243(l) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, and the court of appeals granted the petition. The court of appeals then found trial counsel's performance was deficient regarding the carjacking charge and in two other instances. However, the court of appeals found "there was no prejudice resulting from trial counsel's deficient performance because the State presented overwhelming evidence of [Smalls'] guilt." The Supreme Court, in reviewing the appellate court’s judgment, agreed with the finding that trial counsel was deficient, but disagreed that the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt that precluded a finding of prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court found the evidence was not overwhelming, and reversed the court of appeals' finding that counsel's errors resulted in no prejudice. View "Smalls v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Smalls was convicted by jury of armed robbery for the 2007 robbery of a Bojangles restaurant in Columbus. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Smalls filed an application for PCR alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court first held a hearing in 2007. The court held the record open to allow PCR counsel time to investigate the circumstances under which the State dismissed a carjacking charge against Smalls’ accomplice on the morning of Smalls' trial. The hearing was not reconvened until 2012. The PCR court described the issue regarding the carjacking charge as not only one of ineffective assistance of counsel, but also whether "the State was deceptive" in representations made to the trial court and trial counsel. The PCR court ultimately denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred Smalls' petition for a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 243(l) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, and the court of appeals granted the petition. The court of appeals then found trial counsel's performance was deficient regarding the carjacking charge and in two other instances. However, the court of appeals found "there was no prejudice resulting from trial counsel's deficient performance because the State presented overwhelming evidence of [Smalls'] guilt." The Supreme Court, in reviewing the appellate court’s judgment, agreed with the finding that trial counsel was deficient, but disagreed that the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt that precluded a finding of prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court found the evidence was not overwhelming, and reversed the court of appeals' finding that counsel's errors resulted in no prejudice. View "Smalls v. South Carolina" on Justia Law