Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Marshall Collins of trafficking methamphetamine (third offense), and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial judge sentenced Collins to an aggregate twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, Collins filed a timely application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"). After a hearing, the PCR judge issued an order granting Collins a new trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the PCR judge erred in finding trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance and failing to properly handle an expired plea offer. Based on the trial court record, the Supreme Court found trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a continuance, or in his handling of the expired plea offer. Additionally, the Court found Collins failed to establish prejudice resulting from either alleged deficiency. Accordingly, the Court reversed the PCR judge's decision. View "Collins v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

David Ledford was indicted for inflicting great bodily injury upon a child. The jury was sworn, and the case was tried up to the point of the charge conference between the trial court and the attorneys. During the charge conference, the State objected to the trial court's decision to give a jury charge proposed by Ledford. The trial court overruled the objection, and the State appealed. The court of appeals promptly dismissed the State's appeal, finding the issue raised was not immediately appealable. Finding no error in the appellate court's decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the State's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Ledford" on Justia Law

David Ledford was indicted for inflicting great bodily injury upon a child. The jury was sworn, and the case was tried up to the point of the charge conference between the trial court and the attorneys. During the charge conference, the State objected to the trial court's decision to give a jury charge proposed by Ledford. The trial court overruled the objection, and the State appealed. The court of appeals promptly dismissed the State's appeal, finding the issue raised was not immediately appealable. Finding no error in the appellate court's decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the State's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Ledford" on Justia Law

Elias Walker killed his father by repeatedly stabbing him with a sword in a motel room where they were living. Walker was twenty-two years old at the time of the crime. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Walker pled guilty but mentally ill to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. At the plea hearing, Walker presented evidence his father had physically and mentally abused him throughout his life. The circuit court found "there is ample evidence in the record of a history of criminal domestic violence against the defendant at the hands of his father." Based on this finding, Walker argued he was eligible for early parole under South Carolina Code section 16-25-90 (2015). The circuit court found Walker was not eligible for early parole because his father was not his household member as defined in subsection 16- 25-10(3). The question this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court’s review was whether section 16-25- 90 violated the equal protection or due process rights of a defendant who commits an offense against his parent, because the definition of "household member" in subsection 16-25-10(3) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017) does not include parents and children, and thus section 16-25-90 does not provide such a defendant any opportunity for early parole eligibility. The Court found no violation. View "South Carolina v. Walker" on Justia Law

Elias Walker killed his father by repeatedly stabbing him with a sword in a motel room where they were living. Walker was twenty-two years old at the time of the crime. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Walker pled guilty but mentally ill to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. At the plea hearing, Walker presented evidence his father had physically and mentally abused him throughout his life. The circuit court found "there is ample evidence in the record of a history of criminal domestic violence against the defendant at the hands of his father." Based on this finding, Walker argued he was eligible for early parole under South Carolina Code section 16-25-90 (2015). The circuit court found Walker was not eligible for early parole because his father was not his household member as defined in subsection 16- 25-10(3). The question this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court’s review was whether section 16-25- 90 violated the equal protection or due process rights of a defendant who commits an offense against his parent, because the definition of "household member" in subsection 16-25-10(3) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017) does not include parents and children, and thus section 16-25-90 does not provide such a defendant any opportunity for early parole eligibility. The Court found no violation. View "South Carolina v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Smalls was convicted by jury of armed robbery for the 2007 robbery of a Bojangles restaurant in Columbus. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Smalls filed an application for PCR alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court first held a hearing in 2007. The court held the record open to allow PCR counsel time to investigate the circumstances under which the State dismissed a carjacking charge against Smalls’ accomplice on the morning of Smalls' trial. The hearing was not reconvened until 2012. The PCR court described the issue regarding the carjacking charge as not only one of ineffective assistance of counsel, but also whether "the State was deceptive" in representations made to the trial court and trial counsel. The PCR court ultimately denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred Smalls' petition for a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 243(l) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, and the court of appeals granted the petition. The court of appeals then found trial counsel's performance was deficient regarding the carjacking charge and in two other instances. However, the court of appeals found "there was no prejudice resulting from trial counsel's deficient performance because the State presented overwhelming evidence of [Smalls'] guilt." The Supreme Court, in reviewing the appellate court’s judgment, agreed with the finding that trial counsel was deficient, but disagreed that the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt that precluded a finding of prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court found the evidence was not overwhelming, and reversed the court of appeals' finding that counsel's errors resulted in no prejudice. View "Smalls v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Smalls was convicted by jury of armed robbery for the 2007 robbery of a Bojangles restaurant in Columbus. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Smalls filed an application for PCR alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court first held a hearing in 2007. The court held the record open to allow PCR counsel time to investigate the circumstances under which the State dismissed a carjacking charge against Smalls’ accomplice on the morning of Smalls' trial. The hearing was not reconvened until 2012. The PCR court described the issue regarding the carjacking charge as not only one of ineffective assistance of counsel, but also whether "the State was deceptive" in representations made to the trial court and trial counsel. The PCR court ultimately denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred Smalls' petition for a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 243(l) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, and the court of appeals granted the petition. The court of appeals then found trial counsel's performance was deficient regarding the carjacking charge and in two other instances. However, the court of appeals found "there was no prejudice resulting from trial counsel's deficient performance because the State presented overwhelming evidence of [Smalls'] guilt." The Supreme Court, in reviewing the appellate court’s judgment, agreed with the finding that trial counsel was deficient, but disagreed that the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt that precluded a finding of prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court found the evidence was not overwhelming, and reversed the court of appeals' finding that counsel's errors resulted in no prejudice. View "Smalls v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Robinson was indicted in 2013 on charges of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor. The alleged offenses occurred between 1998 and 2000. However, between 2001 and 2012, the CSC statute was amended, increasing the sentencing range for this crime. The State offered "to let" Petitioner plead guilty under the prior sentencing law but insisted that Petitioner would be subject to the increased 2012 sentencing scheme if he rejected the offer and went to trial. Plea counsel, apparently unaware of the inapplicability of the 2012 sentencing enhancement under any circumstances, recommended Petitioner accept the offer. Based on counsel's recommendation, Petitioner pled guilty. The PCR court denied relief, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted review of that decision. The Supreme Court determined Petitioner was not subject to the increased sentence in the 2012 amended statute, because that would have violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States Constitution and South Carolina Constitution. Because the PCR court's decision was controlled by an error of law, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Robinson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Robinson was indicted in 2013 on charges of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor. The alleged offenses occurred between 1998 and 2000. However, between 2001 and 2012, the CSC statute was amended, increasing the sentencing range for this crime. The State offered "to let" Petitioner plead guilty under the prior sentencing law but insisted that Petitioner would be subject to the increased 2012 sentencing scheme if he rejected the offer and went to trial. Plea counsel, apparently unaware of the inapplicability of the 2012 sentencing enhancement under any circumstances, recommended Petitioner accept the offer. Based on counsel's recommendation, Petitioner pled guilty. The PCR court denied relief, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted review of that decision. The Supreme Court determined Petitioner was not subject to the increased sentence in the 2012 amended statute, because that would have violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States Constitution and South Carolina Constitution. Because the PCR court's decision was controlled by an error of law, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Robinson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marion Bowman sought post-conviction relief (PCR) from his sentence of death for the 2001 murder of Kandee Martin. Essentially, petitioner argued his trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the State's cross-examination of prison-adaptability expert James Aiken. Ultimately, the jury found the evidence supported two aggravating factors: the murder was committed during the commission of a kidnapping, and the murder was committed during the commission of a larceny with the use of a deadly weapon. The trial judge sentenced Petitioner to death for murder and ten years for arson. On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the admission of Aiken's testimony regarding general prison conditions. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that because defense counsel failed to contemporaneously object to the solicitor's prison-conditions line of questioning, the issue of its propriety was not preserved for appellate review, and affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. In so holding, however, the Court reminded the bench and the bar that evidence of general prison conditions was irrelevant to the jury's determination of whether a defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment and thus should not be permitted. This application for post-conviction relief (PCR) claimed trial counsel was deficient in not objecting to the State's re-cross examination of Aiken concerning general prison conditions. The PCR judge denied relief. This appeal followed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was evidence to support the PCR court's findings, and again affirmed. View "Bowman v. South Carolina" on Justia Law