Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's suppression of respondent Philip Sawyer's breath test results and video in a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI). In 2007, respondent was taken to the Spartanburg County Jail following a traffic stop made by a certified Data Master operator. Respondent was placed in the "subject test area" which is a room that adjoins the Data Master room. A deputy retrieved some forms from the Data Master room and then appeared to read respondent his Miranda rights and the implied consent information. Both respondent and the deputy signed the forms. There were separate audio and video recording devices in both the subject test area and in the breathalyzer room. In this case, the audio device in the subject test area did not function. Respondent moved to suppress the evidence relating to the breath test site alleging the videotape did not meet the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-5-2953(A), which required that a person charged with DUI have his conduct at both the incident site and the breath test site videotaped. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a videotape from the breath test site that lacked the audio portion of the reading of Miranda rights and the informed consent law did not satisfy the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-52953(A)(2) (2006). View "South Carolina v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Following his conviction for one count of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), one count of possession of a dangerous animal, and multiple counts of animal fighting, David Tant was remanded to the Department of Corrections. Upon receipt of his sentencing sheets, the Department recorded his sentence as fifteen years' imprisonment. However, the Department later determined the judge intended to sentence Tant to forty years' imprisonment and changed its records without notifying Tant. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Department of Corrections had the authority to alter its initial determination as to the length of an inmate's sentence. The Court held that when the Department decides its original recordation of a sentence was erroneous, it must afford the inmate formal notice of the amended sentence and advise him of his opportunity to be heard through the grievance procedure. Furthermore, "the Department is generally confined to the face of the sentencing sheets in determining the length of a sentence, but may refer to the sentencing transcript if there is an ambiguity in the sentencing sheets." Because the Court found that the sentencing sheets and the transcript in this case were ambiguous, it held Tant's sentences ran concurrently for a total of fifteen years' imprisonment. View "Tant v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

This case involves the payment of attorney's fees and expenses to attorneys, Appellant Tara Dawn Shurling and co-counsel, who were court-appointed to represent an indigent charged with multiple criminal offenses. Shurling was appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution for murder, assault with intent to kill, criminal conspiracy, possession of a weapon during a violent crime, and possession of marijuana. Shurling sought approval for her fees and expenses to exceed the statutory caps provided by the South Carolina Indigent Defense Act. The trial court determined that the initial funding order precluded an award for the fees and expenses sought by appointed counsel, which total $46,388.66. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Hackshaw" on Justia Law

The circuit court granted petitioner Joseph Walker's request for post-conviction relief on the ground that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to investigate a potential alibi witness. The court of appeals reversed, holding that while trial counsel's representation was deficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by it. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court and reversed its holding. View "Walker v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Beulah Butler appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm her convictions for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm or a knife during the commission of a violent crime. She claimed appellate court erred in affirming the denial of her motion for a directed verdict on self-defense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Butler" on Justia Law

Appellant Quashon Middleton was convicted on two counts of attempted murder and one count of possession of a weapon while committing a violent crime. Appellant pulled alongside his victims' stopped car one day in 2010 on his moped. He fired 5-7 times into the car, but none struck the car's occupants. But for the driver's hitting appellant as he sped away, the driver and passenger would have been killed. On appeal, appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree, and this error required reversal. The Supreme Court agreed the trial court's failing to include the lesser-included charge was made in error, however, the Court concluded this error was harmless. View "South Carolina v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Petitioner Clarence Robinson appealed his conviction for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. He claimed the trial court erred in finding the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and search the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's convictions. View "Robinson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the admission of appellant Davontay Henson's codefendant's redacted confession during a joint trial violated appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the admission of the redacted confession indeed violated the Confrontation Clause because the jury could infer from the face of the confession that it referred to and incriminated Henson. View "South Carolina v. Henson" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Giles was convicted of first-degree burglary, strong arm robbery, and kidnapping. He was sentenced to thirty years', thirty years', and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively, to be served concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued the appellate court erred in affirming his convictions and sentences on the basis that the trial court improperly sustained the solicitor's "Batson" motion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolinav. Giles" on Justia Law

Appellant Steven Barnes was convicted of kidnapping and murdering Samuel Sturrup, for which he received the death sentence. The judge sentenced appellant to death for the murder, but imposed no sentence for kidnapping. On appeal, appellant contended the trial court erred: (1) in permitting his attorney to call a defense psychiatrist to testify regarding his right to represent himself and in denying his "Faretta" request; (2) in limiting voir dire and in qualifying Juror #203; and (3) in refusing to dismiss the indictments because of the State's failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) Act. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the trial judge applied the incorrect competency standard in denying appellant's Faretta request. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law