Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in South Carolina Supreme Court
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Petitioner Beulah Butler appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm her convictions for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm or a knife during the commission of a violent crime. She claimed appellate court erred in affirming the denial of her motion for a directed verdict on self-defense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Butler" on Justia Law

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Appellant Quashon Middleton was convicted on two counts of attempted murder and one count of possession of a weapon while committing a violent crime. Appellant pulled alongside his victims' stopped car one day in 2010 on his moped. He fired 5-7 times into the car, but none struck the car's occupants. But for the driver's hitting appellant as he sped away, the driver and passenger would have been killed. On appeal, appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree, and this error required reversal. The Supreme Court agreed the trial court's failing to include the lesser-included charge was made in error, however, the Court concluded this error was harmless. View "South Carolina v. Middleton" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Clarence Robinson appealed his conviction for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. He claimed the trial court erred in finding the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and search the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's convictions. View "Robinson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the admission of appellant Davontay Henson's codefendant's redacted confession during a joint trial violated appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the admission of the redacted confession indeed violated the Confrontation Clause because the jury could infer from the face of the confession that it referred to and incriminated Henson. View "South Carolina v. Henson" on Justia Law

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Petitioner James Giles was convicted of first-degree burglary, strong arm robbery, and kidnapping. He was sentenced to thirty years', thirty years', and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively, to be served concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued the appellate court erred in affirming his convictions and sentences on the basis that the trial court improperly sustained the solicitor's "Batson" motion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolinav. Giles" on Justia Law

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Appellant Steven Barnes was convicted of kidnapping and murdering Samuel Sturrup, for which he received the death sentence. The judge sentenced appellant to death for the murder, but imposed no sentence for kidnapping. On appeal, appellant contended the trial court erred: (1) in permitting his attorney to call a defense psychiatrist to testify regarding his right to represent himself and in denying his "Faretta" request; (2) in limiting voir dire and in qualifying Juror #203; and (3) in refusing to dismiss the indictments because of the State's failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) Act. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the trial judge applied the incorrect competency standard in denying appellant's Faretta request. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

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The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court to review two municipal courts' rulings addressing whether the Attorney General has the authority to prosecute criminal cases in magistrate and municipal courts. The first case involved Defendant Paul Gwinn who was charged with Criminal Domestic Violence (CDV). When the case was called for trial, Gwinn made a motion that the Attorney General could not prosecute the case because the municipal court was not a court of record, citing S.C. Const. art. V, sec. 24 (2009). The municipal court found that the Attorney General could prosecute the case. The second case involved the prosecution of Defendant Michael Long, also charged with CDV. Long moved to disqualify the Attorney General's office from prosecuting the case, arguing that the Attorney General is authorized to prosecute cases only in courts of record. The court granted the motion, ruling that the Attorney General did not have the authority to prosecute the case under art. V, sec. 24. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that art. V, sec. 24 does not prevent the Attorney General from prosecuting cases in summary courts. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court in Gwinn's case, and reversed the trial court in Long's case. View "South Carolina v. Gwinn" on Justia Law

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The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles suspended Petitioner Phillip Brown's driver's license following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The Hearing Officer for the South Carolina Office of Motor Vehicles Hearings ("OMVH") rescinded the suspension on the ground that the arresting officer failed to present reliable evidence that the breathalyzer test was administered and the sample obtained in accordance with the provisions of section 56-5-2950. Specifically, the OMVH found that the required "simulator test" was not conducted prior to the actual test. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) reversed and reinstated Petitioner's license suspension. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the ALC's order, finding Petitioner's failure to contemporaneously object to the arresting officer's testimony with respect to the functioning of the breathalyzer precluded the review of the issue on appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's driver's license suspension. View "SCDMV v. Brown" on Justia Law

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Appellant Ashley Hepburn appealed her conviction for homicide by child abuse. Sixteen-month-old Audrina Hepburn became unresponsive and was admitted to the hospital one evening in 2009. No one (including appellant) disputed the child died from child abuse. Only two people could have killed the child: appellant or her then-boyfriend, co-defendant Brandon Lewis. The jury found Appellant guilty of homicide by child abuse and Lewis guilty of aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 45 years' imprisonment and Lewis to ten years' imprisonment suspended upon the service of seven years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying her mid-trial motion for directed verdict. After its review, the Supreme Court found the trial court should have granted appellant's motion, and directed a verdict of acquittal. View "South Carolina v. Hepburn" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Richard Jordan appealed the denial of his application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was arrested and later indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine. At the suggestion of his girlfriend Cynthia Summers, petitioner retained attorney Harry DePew to represent him on the methamphetamine charges. DePew was then representing Summers on an unrelated charge. DePew did not inform the trial court at any time that he represented both petitioner and Summers. At trial, evidence was introduced pointing to Summers' involvement with the methamphetamine lab operation. The trial court invited Petitioner to present evidence as to Summers' third-party guilt. DePew, however, did not present any evidence to incriminate Summers, though Petitioner testified at the PCR hearing that he had several witnesses that were prepared to testify as to Summers' guilt. Petitioner was convicted on both charges and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Petitioner later sought PCR alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because DePew's dual representation of petitioner and Summers constituted an actual conflict of interest. During the PCR hearing, petitioner testified that he was not informed of the conflict of interest, did not waive the conflict of interest, and wanted to present a third-party guilt defense as to Summers. View "Jordan v. South Carolina" on Justia Law