Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Justin B. challenged the active electronic monitoring requirements of section 23-3-540 of the South Carolina Code. Appellant argued that because he was a juvenile, the imposition of lifetime monitoring under the statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The Supreme Court found that electronic monitoring was not a punishment, and rejected Appellant's claim. However, the Court concluded Appellant must be granted periodic judicial review to determine the necessity of continued monitoring. View "In the Interest of Justin B." on Justia Law

Appellant Greg Issac appealed a trial court ruling that denied his request for a hearing to determine whether he was immune from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. Appellant was indicted for murder, first degree burglary, attempted armed robbery and criminal conspiracy. Appellant contended that he was not afforded a hearing on his immunity issue. The trial court determined the Act did not apply to this case as a matter of law, specifically, that the intent of the Act was not to protect intruders and afford immunity to them or those who might enter the dwelling of another to commit a criminal act. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court's order was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed Appellant's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Isaac" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals opinion that affirmed the convictions and sentence of Karriem Provet for trafficking cocaine and resisting arrest. Petitioner argued the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion existed to justify extension of a traffic stop and that petitioner voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Provet" on Justia Law

Clarence Logan appealed his conviction of attempted criminal sexual misconduct in the first degree. He argued that the trial court erred in providing the circumstantial evidence charge the Supreme Court articulated in "South Carolina v. Grippon" (489 S.E.2d 462 (1997)). The question, the Supreme Court observed, was not whether the circumstantial evidence carried the same probative weight as direct evidence in this case (concluding that it did), but the proper means for evaluating the evidence and how to instruct the jury as to the jury's analytical responsibility. "Trial courts should not be constrained from providing a jury charge encompassing the determinations critical for analyzing circumstantial evidence as it appears in some cases. Additionally, defendants should not be restricted from requesting a jury charge that reflects the requisite connection of collateral facts necessary for a conviction." Thus, the Court articulated language to be used by trial courts pertaining to circumstantial evidence, in addition to a proper reasonable doubt instruction, when so requested by a defendant. View "South Carolina v. Logan" on Justia Law

Defendant-Applicant Gregory McHam appealed the denial of his application for post-conviction relief. He contended that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to renew a motion to suppress drug evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the PCR judge erred in finding defendant's trial counsel was not deficient, but that counsel's failure to renew the objection to drug evidence was not deficient performance such that defendant's constitutional rights were violated. However, the Court agreed with the PCR judge's ultimate findings that defendant did not establish prejudice and did not prove his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as his Fourth Amendment claim failed on its merits. Consequently, the decision of the PCR judge was affirmed as modified. View "McHam v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant Thalma Barton appealed an Administrative Law Court's order that affirmed the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services' (DPPPS) decision to deny her parole. Although two-thirds of the members of the Parole Board voted in favor, the Board ultimately denied parole, citing the seriousness of Appellant's offense. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Administrative Law Court erred in interpreting the two-thirds provision requiring Appellant to obtain five Parole Board votes instead of four, and that retroactive application of that provision constituted an ex post facto violation. Because Appellant received the necessary number of votes, she should have been granted parole. The Court therefore reversed the Administrative Law Court's decision. View "Barton v. SCDPPP" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Taylor appealed the post-conviction relief court's denial of relief on the grounds that he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel though his plea counsel failed to advise him of the consequences of a guilty plea. He also argued that counsel failed to fully investigate one of the charges prior to his plea. Finding that Petitioner did not demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 2001, Petitioner James Miller pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child under sixteen, and criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature. He was sentenced for the lewd act to fifteen years in prison, suspended upon ten years of service and five years' probation. Petitioner was also to undergo counseling and have no contact with children while on probation. Probation began in 2005; however Petitioner was not immediately released, but referred for review as to whether he should be deemed a sexually violent predator (SVP) and subjected to civil commitment. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the question of whether Petitioner's probation for a criminal offense should have been tolled during his civil commitment as a SVP. The lower courts affirmed the tolling, but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. View "South Carolina v. Miller" on Justia Law

This case was one of two heard by the Court that presented the question of whether a pre-breath test videotape recording was required upon an arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) if the arrestee refused the breath test. At both trials, the trial court dismissed the DUI charges, finding that the arresting officers did not comply with section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d) of the South Carolina Code by failing to videotape a twenty-minute pre-test waiting period. The same panel of the court of appeals affirmed defendant Ryan Hercheck's dismissal, but reversed defendant Justin Elwell's dismissal seven months later. Elwell appealed the reversal of the dismissal in his case, and the State appealed the dismissal of Hercheck's case. With respect to Elwell's case, the Supreme Court affirmed. The State argued that section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d) does not require a law enforcement officer to videotape the entire twenty-minute pre-test waiting period once the arrestee refuses a breath test. Elwell argued that his case was simple, in that the videotape was produced, it was incomplete and therefore the statute was violated. Moreover, Elwell interpreted the statute's repeated reference to "conduct" to mean that the State was required to videotape all conduct, not just pre-test conduct, for the full twenty minutes. Here the Court disagreed and concluded that the court of appeals correctly and reasonably interpreted the applicable statute, concluding that only when the waiting period is required can the videotape recording also be required. On the other hand, if no test is administered, then the waiting period is rendered unnecessary, and so then is the videotape recording of that waiting period. View "South Carolina v. Elwell" on Justia Law

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order requiring that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her life pursuant to sections 23-3-540(C) and (H) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (Supp. 2011). When she was twenty-six years old, Appellant was indicted for lewd act on a minor in violation of Section 16-15-140 of the South Carolina Code (2006) as a result of her sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old female. Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of three years and five years' probation. Upon her release, Appellant was notified verbally and in writing that pursuant to section 23-3-540(C) she would be placed on satellite monitoring if she were to violate the terms of her probation. Shortly thereafter, Appellant violated her probation. She did not contest any of these violations, though she did offer testimony in mitigation. At her probation revocation hearing, Appellant objected to the constitutionality of mandatory lifetime monitoring. In support of her arguments, Appellant presented expert testimony that she posed a low risk of reoffending and that one's risk of reoffending cannot be determined solely by the offense committed. The State offered no evidence, relying instead on the mandatory, nondiscretionary requirement of the statute. The circuit court found Appellant to be in willful violation of her probation and that she had notice of the potential for satellite monitoring. The court denied Appellant's constitutional challenges and found it was statutorily mandated to impose satellite monitoring without making any findings as to her likelihood of reoffending. The court also revoked Appellant's probation for two years, but it ordered that her probation be terminated upon release. This appeal followed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant asserted that she had a fundamental right to be "let alone." The Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the circuit court. View "South Carolina v. Dykes" on Justia Law