Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order requiring that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her life pursuant to sections 23-3-540(C) and (H) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (Supp. 2011). When she was twenty-six years old, Appellant was indicted for lewd act on a minor in violation of Section 16-15-140 of the South Carolina Code (2006) as a result of her sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old female. Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of three years and five years' probation. Upon her release, Appellant was notified verbally and in writing that pursuant to section 23-3-540(C) she would be placed on satellite monitoring if she were to violate the terms of her probation. Shortly thereafter, Appellant violated her probation. She did not contest any of these violations, though she did offer testimony in mitigation. At her probation revocation hearing, Appellant objected to the constitutionality of mandatory lifetime monitoring. In support of her arguments, Appellant presented expert testimony that she posed a low risk of reoffending and that one's risk of reoffending cannot be determined solely by the offense committed. The State offered no evidence, relying instead on the mandatory, nondiscretionary requirement of the statute. The circuit court found Appellant to be in willful violation of her probation and that she had notice of the potential for satellite monitoring. The court denied Appellant's constitutional challenges and found it was statutorily mandated to impose satellite monitoring without making any findings as to her likelihood of reoffending. The court also revoked Appellant's probation for two years, but it ordered that her probation be terminated upon release. This appeal followed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant asserted that she had a fundamental right to be "let alone." The Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the circuit court. View "South Carolina v. Dykes" on Justia Law

Defendant Myron Samuels was romantically involved with two women, Patricia Speaks and Carla Daniels, among others, but told each woman he was involved with her alone. Eventually, Speaks and Daniels learned of the other's relationship with Samuels. Daniels traveled to Speaks' home in Columbia, suspecting Samuels was there and wanting to confront him. Samuels was there, and after Daniels entered the home, she and Speaks began to discuss their situation. Speaks informed Daniels that Samuels was romantically involved with two additional women and that she had copied their telephone numbers from his phone. They then decided to call the other women in Samuels' presence, presumably to tell the others of "the health dangers inherent in Samuels' duplicity." While Daniels was speaking to one of the other women on the phone, she felt something touch her forehead. She looked up to see Samuels holding the barrel of Speaks' pistol against her forehead. Speaks began screaming, and Samuels then turned to her and threatened her with the gun. Samuels then fled from the home, and when Speaks ran after him to retrieve her pistol, Samuels hit her, knocking her to the ground. The women then called the police. Samuels was indicted for one count of assault with intent to kill. He challenged his conviction and sentence on the grounds the indictment was duplicitous. Because of the distinct risks created by duplicitous indictments, the Supreme Court held that an indictment is defective and entitles a defendant to relief if it is duplicitous, providing it results in prejudice to the defendant. Although the Court agreed the indictment was duplicitous, the Court found that Samuels was not prejudiced and accordingly affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Samuels" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the denial of petitioner Clarence Gibbs's second application for post-conviction relief (PCR). After being convicted by a jury of kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and unsuccessfully pursuing a direct appeal, Petitioner sought PCR on two grounds: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contemporaneously object to the introduction of a lineup, a show-up, and in-court identifications; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury instruction on the law of alibi as part of the defense strategy. Finding that the trial court record did not support petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gibbs v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Brad Keith Sigmon of two counts of murder and burglary in the first degree, and it subsequently sentenced him to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's dismissal of Sigmon's application for post-conviction relief (PCR). Sigmon contended he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Sigmon did not present evidence that trial counsel was deficient. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PCR court's dismissal of Sigmon's application for post-conviction relief. View "Sigmon v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant John Herndon appealed a circuit court's order imposing lifetime sex offender registration for his failure to complete sex abuse counseling required by the terms of his probation. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[t]he Record demonstrate[d] that Appellant maintained his innocence, but made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent Alford plea to conclude the proceedings and place the matter behind him. Appellant simply failed to satisfy a condition of his probation, and the circuit court properly ordered him to register as sex offender for life as would have been appropriate for a defendant sentenced pursuant to a standard guilty plea. . . . the defendant entering an Alford plea is still treated as guilty for the purposes of punishment, and simply put, is not owed anything merely because the State and the court have agreed to deviate from the standard guilty plea." Appellant received notice that he would need to admit guilt through his participation in the program, and the circuit court re-ordered Appellant to complete the counseling prior to the probation revocation. However, Appellant failed to comply. View "South Carolina v. Herndon" on Justia Law

In 2004, petitioner was adjudicated delinquent on charges of first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and disturbing the schools,1 and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for an indeterminate period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals which held that trial court did not err in permitting a witness to give an opinion. The Court agreed with petitioner and found that the lay witness was improperly allowed to offer expert opinion testimony and that this error was not harmless. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Thomas S." on Justia Law

In October 2009, Appellant Serria Dawson was observed making false refunds to an accomplice while working as a cashier at Walmart. Appellant later confessed to making false refunds on multiple occasions, and with the assistance of two accomplices, defrauding Walmart of approximately $5,000. Appellant pled guilty to breach of trust with fraudulent intent (valued at more than $1,000 but less than $5,000). She was sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act to a term not to exceed six years, suspended upon five years' probation and payment of restitution. Appellant appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in denying her motion to be sentenced under the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act of 2010, which became effective after Appellant committed the crime but before she was sentenced. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Appellant filed a motion to be sentenced pursuant to the Act, which lowered the penalties for breach of trust. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion. Finding no error in the circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Dawson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Brad Sigmon of two counts of murder and burglary in the first degree, and it subsequently sentenced him to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Upon review of his application for post-conviction relief (PCR), the Supreme Court found that defendant did not present evidence that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of this conclusion, it was not necessary for the Court to reach the second prong of prejudice in analyzing Defendant's entitlement to PCR. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PCR court's dismissal of defendant's application for post-conviction relief. View "Sigmon v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven Barnes was convicted of throwing urine on a jailor and received a fifteen-year sentence consecutive to the sentence he was then serving. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the trial court's decision to have a twice deadlocked jury continue to deliberate in petitioner's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the trial court's decision violated the mandate of S.C. Code Ann. 14-7-1330 (1976) and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his direct appeal. Accordingly, the Court reversed lower courts and remanded the case for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Appellant Lawrence Brown challenged his conviction for grand larceny of two motor vehicles. On appeal, he argued: (1) whether the amendment to section 16-13-30 of the South Carolina Code should be applied retroactively to Appellant's case; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the amendment to the applicable statute in this case, 16-13-30, should not be applied retroactively: "Appellant's argument regarding the absence of a savings clause is merely an attempt to confuse the issues. . . Appellant clearly incurred liability for grand larceny at the time he committed the crime." Furthermore, the Court found that the stolen vehicles met the statutory monetary threshold for grand larceny. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law