Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Andrew Lee Harrison contended on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to find that the penalty portion of section 56-5-1210 violated the Eighth Amendment. In 2009, appellant was traveling along the highway in the same direction as victim Gary Tims and Daniel Gantt. The victim and Gantt were both riding motorcycles. Gantt rode approximately one "bike length" behind the Victim. Appellant entered the highway, but instead of utilizing the right lane, pulled his vehicle into the left lane. The victim lost temporary control of his motorcycle and shifted to the right lane to avoid appellant's vehicle. However, Appellant simultaneously switched to the right lane and the victim struck the rear of appellant's truck. The victim's motorcycle "flipped over" and landed in the highway. Appellant did not stop, but continued driving. Gantt followed appellant until appellant pulled over approximately one-half mile from the accident. Gantt informed appellant that the victim was "laying [sic] down in the highway," and that Gantt did not know whether the victim was "dead or alive." Appellant inspected the damage to the truck and stated that he did not possess a valid driver's license, because his driver's license had been suspended. Appellant agreed to return to the scene of the accident. However, once Gantt departed to return to the scene, appellant travelled in the opposite direction. He was ultimately charged with driving under suspension and leaving the scene with death, a violation of section 56-5-1210. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years' imprisonment for leaving the scene with death, and a concurrent sentence of six months' imprisonment for driving under suspension. "When the proportionality principle jurisprudence is applied to section 56-51210 it is not evident that its repugnance to the constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that section 56-5-1210 of the South Carolina Code was constitutional. View "South Carolina v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Respondent James Farmer operated a retail store in Florence County. In 2007, Petitioner Florence County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant and seized the store's inventory, consisting of clothing, shoes, movie DVDs, and music CDs. Respondent was subsequently indicted in January 2008 for one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods and one count of illegal distribution of recordings. He pled guilty to illegally distributing not more than 25 audiotapes or more than 10 videos and the counterfeit goods indictment was dismissed. In early February 2008, respondent's attorney wrote a letter to petitioner seeking return of the allegedly counterfeit goods. In March 2008, counsel sent a second letter. Respondent sued petitioner on May 30, 2008, approximately nine months after the goods were seized and approximately four months after respondent pled guilty to piracy and the counterfeit goods charge was dismissed. The trial court dismissed respondent's suit, and he appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that respondent's remedy under these circumstances was found in South Carolina Code section 39-15-1195(H). Instead of exercising that option, he chose instead to bring this replevin action, a remedy specifically forbidden by section 39-15-1195(D). The circuit court erred in not dismissing respondent's suit, and the Court of Appeals compounded the error. The Court was informed that petitioner no longer had custody of the seized property, and it expressed its "disappointment" that the property was not safeguarded during the pendency of this matter. Since respondent's attorney acknowledged at oral argument that respondent could not establish that the seized goods were not counterfeit within the meaning of 39-15-1190, the Court did not address whether he would otherwise have a remedy against petitioner. The decision of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the decision of the circuit court reversed. View "Farmer v. Florence County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Appellant Raymondeze Rivera directly appealed his death sentence to the Supreme Court. Although Appellant raised multiple challenges, the Court was "constrained to reverse and grant a new trial based on one - the trial court's error in refusing to allow Appellant to testify during the guilt phase of his trial." View "South Carolina v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Curtis McCoy appealed the summary dismissal of his second post-conviction relief (PCR) application on the grounds it was successive, untimely, and failed to prove a newly discovered evidence claim. Further, Petitioner alleged recently discovered juror misconduct in his petition. As to the timeliness issue, the Supreme Court concluded the PCR judge misconstrued section 17-2745(A) in finding Petitioner was required to file his claim within one year after his trial, rather than one year after the remittitur was sent from his direct appeal. Furthermore, the Court found a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether Petitioner's claim was successive under section 17-27-90. The Court reversed and remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing. In addition, the Court took the opportunity in this opinion to clarify the proper legal standard for claims involving juror misconduct. View "McCoy v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Defendant Miama Kromah was convicted of: (1) infliction of great bodily injury upon a child; and (2) unlawful neglect of a child. She appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in permitting two of the State's witnesses to testify about actions they took after hearsay conversations they had with the three-year-old victim who did not testify at trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the issue was not preserved for review. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Upon review, the Court concluded that Defendant's issue on appeal was preserved. The Court addressed it in this opinion "in the interest of judicial economy." On the merits, Defendant did not show an abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of certain testimony or forensic evidence. Consequently, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision in result. View "South Carolina v. Kromah" on Justia Law

Appellant Jarmel Rice was charged as a juvenile when he was fifteen years old for a series of violent crimes. Following a contested waiver from family court to general sessions court, Appellant pled guilty to three counts of armed robbery and one count of assault with intent to kill and received a sentence of eleven years in prison, with many other charges dismissed. In pleading guilty, Appellant raised no objection to the family court waiver. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant sought to resurrect his family court constitutional challenge to the waiver as violative of "Apprendi v. New Jersey," (530 U.S. 466 (2000)). Because South Carolina permits only unconditional guilty pleas and no jurisdictional claim was presented, the Supreme Court concluded Appellant waived his right to assert a claim based on "Apprendi.": "[b]eyond Appellant's failure to assert a jurisdictional argument on appeal . . . Appellant's Apprendi challenge fails on the merits." The Court held that Apprendi is not applicable to a family court juvenile waiver hearing, for a decision whether to waive a juvenile to general sessions court in no manner determines the juvenile's guilt, innocence, or punishment - it merely determines the forum in which the case is to be tried. View "South Carolina v. Rice" on Justia Law

Appellant Derrick Cheeks was convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine in excess of 400 grams and possession of crack with intent to distribute within proximity to a school and received concurrent sentences of twenty-five years (trafficking) and ten years (proximity). On appeal, he contended the trial court erred in failing to find a search warrant fatally defective, and in giving an improper jury instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no merit in the warrant issue, but agreed the instruction was improper. Because the Court found appellant was not prejudiced by the erroneous charge, the Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. View "South Carolina v. Cheeks" on Justia Law

The State appealed the court of appeals' decision which held that the police search and seizure of Respondent Sylvester Taylor was improper under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Respondent was indicted for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The case proceeded to trial, and the sheriff's deputy that conducted the search testified in camera regarding the discovery of the crack cocaine. Respondent was found guilty and sentenced, as a third-time drug offender, to thirty years' imprisonment. The court of appeals overturned the conviction, finding that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Respondent. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in finding that police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of Respondent. View "South Carolina v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant Danny Cortez Brown was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine, which was seized from a duffel bag after his arrest for an open container violation during an automobile stop. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis the search was improper under "Arizona v. Gant," (556 U.S. 332 (2009)). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly applied "Gant" and found the warrantless police search conducted incident to Defendant's arrest for an open container violation was illegal. Furthermore, the Court held that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's subsequent pronouncement in "United States v. Davis," (131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011)) that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to this case because the officer relied upon existing appellate precedent at the time he conducted his search. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Section 1-7-330 of the South Carolina Code (2005), which vested control of the criminal docket in the circuit solicitor, violated the separation of powers principle embodied in Article 1, Section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution. In 1980, the Court recognized that "[t]he authority of the court to grant continuances and to determine the order in which cases shall be heard is derived from its power to hear and decide cases. . . .This adjudicative power of the court carries with it the inherent power to control the order of its business to safeguard the rights of litigants." The Court concluded that section 1-7-330 was at odds with "this intrinsically judicial power." The Court therefore held that section 1-7-330 violated the separation of powers and therefore was unconstitutional. However, because Appellant K.C. Langford, III suffered no prejudice as a result of section 1-7-330, the Court affirmed his convictions. View "South Carolina v. Langford" on Justia Law