Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Chris Anthony Liverman was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner sought certiorari with respect to the claim that the trial court refused to conduct a "full" in camera hearing pursuant to "Neil v. Biggers," (409 U.S. 188 (1972)). Petitioner contended the eyewitness's identification of him as the shooter at a police-orchestrated show-up was unduly suggestive and therefore tainted the in-court identification. The trial court, relying on "McLeod v. State," (196 S.E.2d 645 (1973)), did conduct an in camera hearing and found the pretrial identification was reliable, based primarily on the witness's previous knowledge of Petitioner. Following the court of appeals' decision, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Perry v. New Hampshire," (565 U.S. ___ (2012)). The issue in this case for the Supreme Court concerned "the intersection of a suggestive police show-up identification procedure and an eyewitness who knows the accused." The Court concluded that "McLeod" could not stand in light of "Perry" and overruled "McLeod" insofar as it created a bright-line rule excusing a "Neil v. Biggers" hearing where the eyewitness knows the accused. The Court nevertheless affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence because any error in failing to conduct a "Neil v. Biggers" hearing was harmless.

Respondent Jarod Wayne Tapp was convicted of murdering and sexually assaulting his upstairs neighbor, Julie Jett (victim), and of burglarizing her apartment. Respondent received a life sentence for murder and two thirty-year sentences for the first degree criminal sexual conduct and burglary charges. The Supreme Court granted the State's request for certiorari to review the appellate court's decision to overturn and remand Respondent's convictions and sentences for a new trial. The court of appeals found that the record in this case was insufficient for determining whether the circuit judge properly considered the reliability of a special agent's testimony prior to introducing that testimony to the jury. The Supreme Court agreed that its decision in "State v. White,"(676 S.E.2d684 (2009) governed Respondent's case, but took the opportunity to clarify "White" in light of the court of appeals' misreading of "White" in the opinion below. The Supreme Court's reading of the record convinced the Court that the circuit judge stopped short of determining the reliability of the agent's testimony prior to admitting it into evidence, and therefore the trial court erred. However, the Court found that the error in admitting the testimony at issue was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Respondent's convictions.

Appellant Joey Ellis appealed a circuit court order that revoked and terminated his probation. He argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the probation violation warrant was not issued during the term of his probation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant's sentence of probation for his attempted burglary in the second degree conviction began after his parole concluded for his conviction for burglary in the second degree, and not following his release from incarceration. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation.

Petitioner Michael Goins pled guilty to a second possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine within the proximity of a school. He received a negotiated ten-year sentence for both convictions, to run concurrently.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief (PCR).  Petitioner argued the PCR court erred in failing to find plea counsel ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty when the drugs obtained were found pursuant to an illegal search.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction. Although counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to properly advise Petitioner on the law regarding whether a motel owner can freely admit police into a rented room, Petitioner failed to prove this advice was his reason for electing not to go to trial and has thus failed to establish prejudice.

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her natural life pursuant to Section 23-3-540(C) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2010). She raised five constitutional challenges to this statute: (1) it violates her substantive due process rights; (2) violates her right to procedural due process; (3) violates the Ex Post Facto clause; (4) violates the Equal Protection Clause; and (5) violates her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory imposition of lifetime satellite monitoring indeed violates Appellant's substantive due process rights and reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Zeb Eron Binnarr was convicted by a jury for failing to timely register as a sex offender. He appealed his conviction primarily on the ground that he did not receive actioal notice of a change of the law regarding sex offender registration. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction, and Petitioner again appealed. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in "South Carolina v. Latimore" (Op. 27102, Mar. 14, 2012), the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to find that actual notice of the re-registration requirement was necessary to sustain a conviction. Because the State failed to provide any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence from which a jury could determine that Petitioner had actual notice of the change in the law, the Court found the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal. Accordingly, the Court reversed Petitioner's conviction.

Respondent Robert Bayly was issued a uniform traffic ticket for simple possession of marijuana. Prior to trial, Respondent paid the required fine and did not appear in court on the trial date. Respondent did not appeal his conviction but, instead, filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application in which he alleged the magistrate court was without subject matter jurisdiction to convict him as no arrest warrant had been issued. The PCR judge granted the petition and vacated Respondent's conviction. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR judge's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the PCR judge erred in relying on "Town of Honea Path v. Wright," (9 S.E.2d 924 (1940)), and reversed the PCR judge's order because it was controlled by an error of law. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant Benjamin P. Green appealed his convictions for criminal solicitation of a minor and attempted criminal sexual conduct ("CSC") with a minor in the second-degree. In challenging his convictions, Appellant contended the trial judge erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the charge of criminal solicitation of a minor on the ground the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague; (2) denying his motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict on the charge of attempted CSC with a minor in the second-degree; (3) admitting certain photographs; and (4) denying his request for a jury charge on attempted assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature ("ABHAN"). Finding no merit to Appellant's issues on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions.

After a bench trial, Appellant Robert Whitesides was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of the crime of trafficking in marijuana. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erroneously convicted him without finding that a nexus existed between his possession of firearms and his drug trafficking. While the Supreme Court agreed that a nexus between the possession of the firearm and the underlying violent crime must be established, the Court found that the trial judge made a factual finding that such a nexus existed in this case and that the finding was supported by evidence in the record.

In 2004, Petitioner Reginald Latimore pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child. He was released from prison in 2005, and was required to register as a sex offender by the Sex Offender Registry Act. In 2006, the General Assembly revised the sex offender registry statute to require offenders to re-register twice a year, once in their birth month and again six months later. Petitioner did not re-register before September 2006, when he was originally informed he must re-register, nor did he re-register in December 2006, as required by the amended statute. Petitioner was charged under the amended act with failing to register in December 2006. At trial, the State relied on both the forms Petitioner had executed in August 2005 requiring he register and upon the testimony of the sex offender registry coordinator that Petitioner had no contact with the office during 2006. After the State rested, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict on due process grounds because he had not received actual notice of the change in the registration statute. The trial judge denied the motion. Petitioner testified that he called the sex offender registry coordinator in February 2006 to obtain approval to move into a new house, and he was under the belief that this phone call satisfied his re-registration requirement. At the close of the defense case, Petitioner renewed his directed verdict motion, which was again denied. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Petitioner's argument that the court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's directed verdict motion, and after review, affirmed that decision as modified.