Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Guadalupe Guzman Morales was convicted in 2017 of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first and second degree. On appeal, he contended evidence he sexually assaulted the victim's sister should have been excluded under Rule 404(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. He argued the trial court erred in admitting the evidence pursuant to the "common scheme or plan" exception, both under the "substantial similarities" test from South Carolina v. Wallace, 683 S.E.2d 275 (2009), and under the "logical connection" standard later articulated in South Carolina v. Perry, 842 S.E.2d 654 (2020). The court of appeals agreed as to Perry and reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found both the Wallace and Perry issues were unpreserved for appellate review. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Morales' convictions. View "South Carolina v. Morales" on Justia Law

Ontavious Plumer shot and wounded Oshamar Wells during an aborted drug deal. Plumer was convicted of attempted murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for attempted murder and to a concurrent five-year term on the weapon charge. The court of appeals affirmed Plumer's convictions but vacated the five-year weapon sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted cross-petitions for certiorari and address two issues: (1) Plumer's contention that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self- defense; and (2) the State's contention that even though the five-year weapon sentence was prohibited by statute, that issue was not raised to the trial court and was thus not preserved for appellate review. As was the case in South Carolina v. Williams, 830 S.E.2d 904 (2019), Plumer unlawfully possessed the firearm he employed during this illegal drug transaction. Plumer argued there was evidence he was not aware the gathering in the kitchen was for an illegal drug deal. The Supreme Court found the only reasonable inference to be derived from the record was that Plumer intentionally took a loaded firearm to what he knew would be an illegal drug transaction. "It matters not who drew his weapon first or who fired first." With regard to the State's argument, the Supreme Court occasionally encountered illegal sentences to which no objection was taken in the trial court. "In such cases, it is inefficient and a waste of judicial resources to delay the inevitable by requiring the appellant to file a post-conviction relief action or petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Therefore, the Court modified South Carolina v. Johnston, 510 S.E.2d 423 (1999) and held that when a trial court imposes what the State concedes is an illegal sentence, the appellate court may correct that sentence on direct appeal or remand the issue to the trial court even if the defendant did not object to the sentence at trial and even if there is no real threat of incarceration beyond the limits of a legal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals as modified on both issues. View "South Carolina v. Plumer" on Justia Law

Respondent Russell Johnson was indicted on charges of kidnapping and criminal domestic violence in the first degree. The events leading to the indictment began in Marion County and progressed over the course of approximately thirteen hours into Dillon and Marlboro Counties, then back to Marion County. The trial court admitted evidence of Johnson's alleged acts of domestic violence in Dillon and Marlboro Counties and denied Johnson's request for a limiting instruction. Johnson was acquitted of kidnapping but was convicted of criminal domestic violence. The court of appeals reversed Johnson's conviction, holding the trial court erred in failing to issue a limiting instruction. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that though Johnson preserved the issue of a limiting instruction, he was not entitled to one. Therefore, it reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Johnson's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary Ann German was convicted of felony driving under the influence ("DUI") resulting in death and sentenced to eleven years' incarceration. Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress evidence of her blood alcohol content ("BAC") obtained through a warrantless blood draw, which was taken pursuant to section 56-5-2946 of the South Carolina Code while she was hospitalized after an automobile accident. Finding that section 56-5-2946 was constitutional as applied and unchanged by the holdings of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to suspect Appellant of felony DUI and properly obtained the blood draw pursuant to section 56-5-2946. Appellant appealed her conviction based on the denial of her motion, and the court of appeals requested certification pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the warrantless blood draw based on section 56-5-2946 violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights or her rights under the South Carolina Constitution and, in effect, whether section 56-5-2946 was constitutional. The Court concluded section 56-5-2946 was facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied in Appellant's case. However, the Court found the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress because law enforcement acted in good faith based on existing precedent at the time of the blood draw. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "South Carolina v. German" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Jones, Jr. admitted to killing his five young children and was indicted for five counts of murder. He was convicted by jury and sentenced to death. In a direct appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Jones raised eight issues centering on three points: juror qualification, requested voir dire and a related jury instruction, and evidentiary rulings made during the guilt and sentencing phases. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the juror qualification, voir dire, and jury instruction rulings. The Court held the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings; however, the Court found the errors were harmless and affirmed Jones's conviction and death sentence. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law

At Stewart Middleton's trial for third-degree criminal sexual conduct, the State introduced a police detective's testimony that Middleton was evasive in response to her attempts to get Middleton to come in for an interview. The trial court admitted this testimony over Middleton's relevance objection. The jury found Middleton guilty and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in finding the testimony relevant because the State did not establish a nexus between Middleton's conduct and a consciousness of his guilt. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Craig Busse appealed his conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, claiming the deputy solicitor improperly vouched for the victim's credibility in a statement he made during closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the deputy solicitor's statement was technically in error and the trial court should have sustained Busse's objection. However, the statement did not amount to vouching. Therefore, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Busse" on Justia Law

Four prisoners filed a declaratory judgment action challenging two of the execution methods set forth in South Carolina's death penalty statute: electrocution and firing squad. The prisoners contend the methods violate the South Carolina Constitution's article I, section 15 prohibition against cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment. The circuit court concluded electrocution and the firing squad were unconstitutional under state law, and the parties filed cross-appeals with the South Carolina Supreme Court. The primary appeal concerned the merits of the ruling, and the prisoners' cross-appeal challenged the partial denial of their pretrial discovery request for information on the availability of a third statutory method of execution, lethal injection. At this time, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's discovery ruling (which was the subject of the cross-appeal), and remanded the discovery issue to the circuit court for further proceedings to be completed in accordance with time limits set forth in this opinion. The Supreme Court held the remainder of the appeal in abeyance pending the circuit court's resolution of the discovery issue. View "Owens, et al. v. Stirling, et al." on Justia Law

Respondent Maunwell Ervin was granted post-conviction relief (PCR) for being twice tried for multiple offenses stemming from a search if his rented residence. Ervin was charged on firearms and drug trafficking charges; the first trial ended in an acquittal of the firearm charge, and a mistrial on the trafficking charge. The second trial resulted in another mistrial on the trafficking charge. Ervin and the State reached a plea agreement by reducing the charge to a lesser offense and imposing the minimum sentence. Ervin then applied for PCR on the negotiated plea. The PCR court granted relief on Ervin’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, premised on counsel’s failure to raise a double jeopardy objection based on the rule established in Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110(2009). The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the PCR court misapplied Yeager, thereby erring in granting PCR relief. Accordingly, relief was reversed and the negotiated guilty plea and sentence were reinstated. View "Ervin v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Jaron Gibbs was convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in (1) allowing Detective Michael Arflin to present lay testimony about single and double action revolvers and (2) allowing the State to reference Arflin's testimony in its closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed Gibbs's convictions. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that because the court of appeals held Arflin's personal knowledge rendered the lay testimony proper, it did not squarely address whether the trial court erred in finding this subject matter was not outside the ordinary knowledge of most jurors. In any event, the Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the testimony did not have to be given by an expert. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals as modified and hedld the trial court did not err in admitting Arflin's lay testimony. Likewise, the Court found the solicitor's closing was "certainly proper" when viewed as a reply to Gibbs's theory of the case. "Under the invited reply doctrine, conduct that would be improper otherwise may be appropriate if made in response to statements or arguments made by the defense." The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' analysis and held the trial court did not err with respect to the solicitor's closing argument. View "South Carolina v. Gibbs" on Justia Law