Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) appealed the circuit court order relieving Respondent Jeremy Lane Edwards from registering as a sex offender registration. In 1998, Respondent pled guilty to two counts of being a "Peeping Tom." Respondent served a probationary sentence including one hundred hours of community service. In 2004, Respondent received a pardon from the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS). In 2009, Respondent filed petitions requesting that the circuit court issue an order mandating that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. The Attorney General opposed the petition, and asserted that Respondent's pardon did not relieve him from the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The Attorney General argued that the amendments to the applicable statute were remedial and procedural in nature, and thus applied retroactively to Respondent's case. The circuit court disagreed, and ruled that the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent from the registration requirements of the statute, and that the 2005 and 2008 amendments did not apply retroactively. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent's 2004 pardon relieved him of all consequences of his conviction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order relieving Respondent of his duty to report.

Appellant Jerry Inman pled guilty to murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and kidnapping of a Clemson University student. The judge sentenced Appellant to death for murder and two consecutive thirty-year sentences for first-degree burglary and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Appellant challenged the judge's acceptance of his guilty plea because he maintained it was conditional and that he was entitled to be sentenced by a jury despite his plea of guilty. Furthermore, Appellant contended the trial court erred in (1) refusing to recuse the Solicitor's Office from any further involvement in the case; (2) declining defense counsel's request to question the Solicitor on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) declining to grant a mistrial despite a finding of prosecutorial misconduct. Finding that Appellant entered a valid guilty plea that was not conditioned on the preservation or outcome of the jury sentencing issue, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. Moreover, even if Appellant properly preserved this issue, the Court concluded Appellant abandoned it on appeal. As to the propriety of the sentencing proceedings, the Court concluded the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant's requests to recuse the Solicitor's office as advocates and to question members of the office. Although Court found the Solicitor committed prosecutorial misconduct in his treatment of Appellant's expert witness, the Court concluded that Appellant was not sufficiently prejudiced to warrant the grant of a mistrial.

Petitioner Kevin Odems appealed the Court of Appeals' decision that affirmed his 2005 convictions for first degree burglary, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and malicious injury. The State's case against Petitioner consisted solely of circumstantial evidence. Petitioner argued on appeal the Supreme Court that the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of his involvement in any of the crimes charged, and thus the circuit court should have directed a verdict on all four counts. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed.

A jury convicted Defendant William Dickerson of first degree murder, kidnapping, and criminal sexual conduct, for which he was sentenced to death.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued the circuit court erred: (1) in not excusing a juror for cause; (2) in limiting the cross-examination of the pathologist called by the State; (3) in not charging the jury on the law of accessory after the fact; and (4) in limiting the testimony of Dickerson's cousin during the penalty phase of his trial.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed and further found that Defendant's sentence was proportional, supported by the evidence, and not the result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.

Petitioner Jason Dickey appealed a court of appeals' decision that affirmed his conviction of voluntary manslaughter.  Petitioner worked as a security guard at an apartment building when on the night of April 29, 2004, an intoxicated water balloon toss among residents turned into a heated argument. The prank so angered visitor Joshua Boot that he threatened to physically assault the person who splashed him. Boot began banging on neighbors' doors, which prompted his resident-host to go to the security desk to ask Petitioner to evict her guest.  Petitioner testified he pulled the gun to discourage Boot and another guest from attacking him. Petitioner testified he saw Boot reach under his shirt as he came towards him, and Petitioner feared he was reaching for a weapon. Without warning, Petitioner fired three shots striking Boot. Subsequently, a Richland County grand jury indicted Petitioner for murder. Petitioner's counsel twice moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that Petitioner was acting in self-defense when he shot Boot. The circuit judge denied both motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State failed to disprove the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that Petitioner shot and killed Boot in self-defense.  Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals and overturned Petitioner's conviction.

Appellant Thomas Jennings was convicted of two counts of committing a lewd act upon a minor and was sentenced to fifty-five months' imprisonment for the first charge and fifteen years, suspended upon the service of fifty months and three years' probation for the second charge, with the sentences to run consecutively.  Appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the written reports of a forensic interviewer.  Appellant admitted he developed a friendly relationship with the victims and that he had engaged in incidental physical contact with them from time to time.  He vehemently denied, however, touching any of them inappropriately. The forensic interviewer interviewed each of the children.  The State called her as its first witness and asked her to briefly summarize what each of the victims told her during the interviews.  Appellant objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.  The State then moved to admit the forensic interviewer's written reports into evidence.  Over Appellant's objection, the trial court allowed the written reports into evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found portions of the written reports constituted inadmissible hearsay as they were out-of-court statements offered to prove that appellant did in fact inappropriately touch the children in the way that they claimed. The Court also found the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce this evidence, which was not harmless: "[the] trial hinged on the children's credibility, and the written reports were cumulative to the children's testimony." Accordingly, the Court reversed appellant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Gary DuBose Terry was sentenced to death for murder, life imprisonment for first-degree burglary, thirty years' imprisonment for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and ten years' imprisonment for malicious injury to a telephone system. Petitioner argued in his application for post-conviction relief (PCR) that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to argue during the hearing on the State's in limine motion that certain statements should have been introduced because of the State's misconduct and trial counsels' detrimental reliance on the State's "apparent intent" to offer those statements into evidence. Furthermore, Petitioner contended trial counsel were ineffective in failing to adjust their defense strategy in the guilt phase of trial in order to maintain credibility with the jury during sentencing. Specifically, petitioner argued trial counsel had a duty, after stating during the opening statement that petitioner "confessed," to adjust their trial strategy and not continue to pursue a reasonable doubt defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the PCR courtâs dismissal of Petitionerâs application, and affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Petitioner Roy Tennant challenged the trial court's rulings on several evidentiary issues in his trial for first degree kidnapping, and assault and battery.  In particular, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a forensic psychologist, erred in excluding a note written by Petitioner addressed to the victim, and erred in excluding proffered statements regarding the sexual history between the victim and the defendant. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to uphold the trial court, finding that Petitioner's proffered evidence was irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, and therefore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the trial court's exclusion.

The State alleged Defendant Sammyeil Barber and three others (Blake Kimbrell, Kenneth Walker, and Marcus Kiser) conspired to rob a drug dealer, Alan Heintz. The men gathered together and discussed the plans for the robbery, procured a semi-automatic handgun and then drove to Heintz's house. Upon discovering more people than expected at the house, they left to procure a second firearm. The men returned to Heintz's house and Kimbrell waited in the car while Barber, Walker, and Kiser went inside. Heintz was dragged from his bedroom and ultimately drew a shotgun on the robbers. One of the suspects armed with a semi-automatic handgun shot and killed Heintz and shot and wounded another man who was sleeping on the couch. The three men fled the premises, stealing only $30 and leaving the second firearm behind. Kimbrell, Walker, and Kiser all implicated Barber in the planning and execution of the robbery and said he was the gunman who shot Heintz. They pled guilty and testified against Barber, each receiving 15â30 years. At Barber's trial, Kimbrell, Walker, and Kiser all testified Barber was armed with the semi-automatic handgun and had shot both victims. On appeal, Barber argued the accomplice liability charge against him was improper because it was unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the charge was properly supported by the evidence presented at trial. The Court affirmed Barber's conviction and sentence.

Defendant James Miller appealed the circuit court's order committing him to the custody of the Department of Mental Health under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), asserting that the State failed to try the case within sixty days of the probable cause hearing as mandated by the SVPA. In September 2001, Miller pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child under the age of sixteen years and criminal domestic violence. In May 2005, prior to his scheduled release date of December 1, 2005, the Department of Corrections referred Miller's case to the multidisciplinary team to assess whether Miller constituted a "Sexually Violent Predator" (SVP) as defined by the SVPA. Having determined that Miller satisfied the statutory definition of an SVP, the multidisciplinary team referred the case to the prosecutor's review committee. While the State assembled its case for committing Miller, it asked for several continuances. In January 2006, Miller filed a motion to dismiss the commitment hearing, arguing that the State's petition "should be dismissed with prejudice due to the State's failure to pursue the prosecution of this matter in a reasonably timely manner." Specifically, counsel claimed that the "case should have been tried on or before January 4, 2006 because [Miller's] continued incarceration beyond December 1, 2005 [was] certainly prejudicial." In opposition, the State claimed it had "good cause" for a continuance as the forensic psychiatrist, who conducted all of the state's SVP evaluations, was unable to complete the evaluation within the sixty-day time period. The circuit court conducted a hearing the same day the motion to dismiss was filed; however, the court did not rule on the motion but instead took it under advisement. The court issued an order denying Miller's motion to dismiss in July. Although the court expressed its displeasure with the State's routine delay in initiating the SVP process, it found the State's interest in proceeding with the SVP trial outweighed the prejudice to Miller. Additionally, the court found there was no substantial prejudice to Miller. The Court of Appeals affirmed Miller's civil commitment. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, the Court used this case as an opportunity to clarify certain procedural aspects of the SVPA. Specifically, Court considered the appropriate remedy when the State fails to timely conduct a civil commitment trial within the time provisions mandated by the SVPA. The Court held that if an inmate is granted a dismissal the proceedings should be dismissed without prejudice to the State. If the motion to dismiss is granted, the inmate may be released from custody while the State re-files its petition to the circuit court provided that the inmate has completed his sentence as determined by the Department of Corrections.