Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Roy Tennant challenged the trial court's rulings on several evidentiary issues in his trial for first degree kidnapping, and assault and battery.  In particular, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a forensic psychologist, erred in excluding a note written by Petitioner addressed to the victim, and erred in excluding proffered statements regarding the sexual history between the victim and the defendant. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to uphold the trial court, finding that Petitioner's proffered evidence was irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, and therefore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the trial court's exclusion.

The State alleged Defendant Sammyeil Barber and three others (Blake Kimbrell, Kenneth Walker, and Marcus Kiser) conspired to rob a drug dealer, Alan Heintz. The men gathered together and discussed the plans for the robbery, procured a semi-automatic handgun and then drove to Heintz's house. Upon discovering more people than expected at the house, they left to procure a second firearm. The men returned to Heintz's house and Kimbrell waited in the car while Barber, Walker, and Kiser went inside. Heintz was dragged from his bedroom and ultimately drew a shotgun on the robbers. One of the suspects armed with a semi-automatic handgun shot and killed Heintz and shot and wounded another man who was sleeping on the couch. The three men fled the premises, stealing only $30 and leaving the second firearm behind. Kimbrell, Walker, and Kiser all implicated Barber in the planning and execution of the robbery and said he was the gunman who shot Heintz. They pled guilty and testified against Barber, each receiving 15â30 years. At Barber's trial, Kimbrell, Walker, and Kiser all testified Barber was armed with the semi-automatic handgun and had shot both victims. On appeal, Barber argued the accomplice liability charge against him was improper because it was unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the charge was properly supported by the evidence presented at trial. The Court affirmed Barber's conviction and sentence.

Defendant James Miller appealed the circuit court's order committing him to the custody of the Department of Mental Health under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), asserting that the State failed to try the case within sixty days of the probable cause hearing as mandated by the SVPA. In September 2001, Miller pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child under the age of sixteen years and criminal domestic violence. In May 2005, prior to his scheduled release date of December 1, 2005, the Department of Corrections referred Miller's case to the multidisciplinary team to assess whether Miller constituted a "Sexually Violent Predator" (SVP) as defined by the SVPA. Having determined that Miller satisfied the statutory definition of an SVP, the multidisciplinary team referred the case to the prosecutor's review committee. While the State assembled its case for committing Miller, it asked for several continuances. In January 2006, Miller filed a motion to dismiss the commitment hearing, arguing that the State's petition "should be dismissed with prejudice due to the State's failure to pursue the prosecution of this matter in a reasonably timely manner." Specifically, counsel claimed that the "case should have been tried on or before January 4, 2006 because [Miller's] continued incarceration beyond December 1, 2005 [was] certainly prejudicial." In opposition, the State claimed it had "good cause" for a continuance as the forensic psychiatrist, who conducted all of the state's SVP evaluations, was unable to complete the evaluation within the sixty-day time period. The circuit court conducted a hearing the same day the motion to dismiss was filed; however, the court did not rule on the motion but instead took it under advisement. The court issued an order denying Miller's motion to dismiss in July. Although the court expressed its displeasure with the State's routine delay in initiating the SVP process, it found the State's interest in proceeding with the SVP trial outweighed the prejudice to Miller. Additionally, the court found there was no substantial prejudice to Miller. The Court of Appeals affirmed Miller's civil commitment. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, the Court used this case as an opportunity to clarify certain procedural aspects of the SVPA. Specifically, Court considered the appropriate remedy when the State fails to timely conduct a civil commitment trial within the time provisions mandated by the SVPA. The Court held that if an inmate is granted a dismissal the proceedings should be dismissed without prejudice to the State. If the motion to dismiss is granted, the inmate may be released from custody while the State re-files its petition to the circuit court provided that the inmate has completed his sentence as determined by the Department of Corrections.

In 2007, Appellant-Attorney James Brown was appointed to represent Alfonzo Howard. Mr. Howard was charged with multiple crimes, including first degree criminal sexual conduct, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime. From the beginning, Appellant complained about the appointment, first to the circuit's chief administrative judge, and then to the trial judge. The charges against Howard proceeded to trial.  During the trial, Appellant's belligerent unwillingness to comply with the court's order continued. The trial court, "displaying remarkable patience," only threatened Appellant with contempt and instructed Appellant to proceed.  Appellant then invoked his right to counsel.  The trial against Howard was briefly continued to allow Appellant's attorney to appear.  After consulting with his attorney, Appellant finally decided to continue with representation of the indigent defendant. The trial judge awarded costs for investigative work and expert fees, which was substantially in excess of the statutory cap of $500. However, the court denied Appellant's motion to award attorney's fees in excess of the $3,500 statutory amount. The sole basis for denying Appellant an award of fees in excess of the statutory cap was his unprofessional conduct.  During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court accepted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the South Carolina Bar concerning the potential constitutional implications arising from the court appointment of attorneys to represent indigent clients.  The Supreme Court elected to address this matter of significant public interest.  The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is implicated when an attorney is appointed by the court to represent an indigent litigant.  In such circumstances, the attorney's services constitute property entitling the attorney to just compensation. However in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion for denying Appellant fees in excess of the statutory cap for his behavior at trial. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

After his conviction for homicide, Petitioner Lucas Bailey filed an unsuccessful application for post conviction relief. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleged his counsel failed to object to jury instructions that allowed the jury to convict him for an act that was not in the indictment. Upon careful consideration of the record below, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge may have engaged in an off-the-record discussion with the jury: "we are troubled that the decision regarding the jury instruction may have been made without the judge conferring with the attorneys." The Court vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial.

The State appealed a circuit court order dismissing its case against Respondent Gregory Duncan. Respondent was indicted for murder after he shot and killed Christopher Spicer at his home. The court ruled that Respondent was immune from prosecution under the state Protection of Persons and Property Act. The Supreme Court found that the trial record reflected ample evidence to support the circuit court's ruling. The Court affirmed the circuit court's decision to dismiss the State's case.

Appellant Kenneth Justus was sentenced to death for the murder of Justin Bregenzer. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it disqualified one of his two appointed counsel. The counsel in question, Maite Murphy, had worked for the State's lead investigator as a divorce attorney. The trial court removed Ms. Murphy as Appellant's trial counsel, holding that that a former business relationship presented a conflict-of-interest issue. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to remove Appellant's counsel.

Appellants South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) and three of its officers appealed a circuit court order enjoining them from forwarding certain information regarding Respondent James Compton to the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (DPPPS). Respondent committed burglary, assault and battery, armed robbery and aggravated assault and battery in South Carolina. He fled to Georgia, but was apprehended there a short time later. Respondent voluntarily returned to South Carolina where he was prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to life plus forty-five years' imprisonment. In 1982, Respondent was "away without leave" (AWOL) for a period of time. No charges were filed against him when he returned. In 1995, Respondent went AWOL again, but he was not returned to custody until 2002. An arrest warrant and indictment were issued on escape charges, but they were "nol prossed" when the State failed to appear before the grand jury. The circuit court issued an order in 2005 for the destruction of the arrest warrant and indictment in connection with the 1995 incident. Respondent's criminal history still referenced the 1995 charges. Respondent was not granted parole because questions regarding the 1995 escape charges persisted at DPPPS hearings. Respondent petitioned the court for a declaration that SCDC failed to comply with the court order to destroy records of his 1995 escape charges. The court found that SCDC was not in willful violation of the court orde, and that the entries were in Respondent's criminal history for security and classification purposes. The court enjoined the SCDC from forwarding information regarding the 1995 escape to DPPPS. SCDC argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the circuit court erred in granting Respondent an injunction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reasoned that "a prisoner absenting himself from a prison (commonly referred to as an escape) is a fact that exists regardless of whether charges are filed in connection with it ... Because the injunction we affirm only enjoins the dissemination of records pertaining to criminal charges and not historical facts, [SCDC] is not enjoined from forwarding information they have a duty to send to DPPPS." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Petitioner Terrance Edwards appealed a circuit court order that denied him post conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted for murder, robbery, and grand larceny. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner alleged that his attorney was ineffective for failing to interview a witness whose testimony could have exonerated him. Testimony by Petitioner's trial counsel revealed that it was a strategic decision not to interview the witness. The lower court determined that Petitioner failed to establish any resulting prejudice from his attorney's actions. Upon review of Petitioner's arguments, the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found probative evidence to support the lower court's conclusion. The Court dismissed petitioner's application for post conviction relief and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Petitioner Najjar Byers unsuccessfully appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to strike a witness' testimony at trial. On an evening in June 2005, a bingo hall was robbed at gunpoint. Police stopped a car after noticing its occupants were not wearing seat belts. Petitioner was a passenger in the car, along with three others. The driver gave police permission to search the car. Police found a cash register till, two handguns and two ski masks. The officer then received a bulletin from his radio that police were looking for a vehicle that matched the description of the car he had just pulled over. The officer took the car's occupants into custody. Petitioner was the only sober occupant at the time of the arrest. The key issue in this case was whether or not Petitioner was a passenger in the car at the time of the robbery. At trial, the State presented contradictory testimony from two of the other occupants. When defense counsel examined the other occupants, they testified they were either too drunk or too high to remember whether Petitioner was in the car. Petitioner moved to strike testimony by the occupants that he was in the car which was denied. Petitioner moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's evidence that was also denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him based on the evidence presented at trial. "With the greatest respect for the learned opinion of the court of appeals," the Supreme Court could "not understand the basis for its conclusion." The Court concluded, "another rational conclusion could have been reached by the jury." The Court reversed Petitioner's conviction.