Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Appellant-Attorney James Brown was appointed to represent Alfonzo Howard. Mr. Howard was charged with multiple crimes, including first degree criminal sexual conduct, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime. From the beginning, Appellant complained about the appointment, first to the circuit's chief administrative judge, and then to the trial judge. The charges against Howard proceeded to trial.  During the trial, Appellant's belligerent unwillingness to comply with the court's order continued. The trial court, "displaying remarkable patience," only threatened Appellant with contempt and instructed Appellant to proceed.  Appellant then invoked his right to counsel.  The trial against Howard was briefly continued to allow Appellant's attorney to appear.  After consulting with his attorney, Appellant finally decided to continue with representation of the indigent defendant. The trial judge awarded costs for investigative work and expert fees, which was substantially in excess of the statutory cap of $500. However, the court denied Appellant's motion to award attorney's fees in excess of the $3,500 statutory amount. The sole basis for denying Appellant an award of fees in excess of the statutory cap was his unprofessional conduct.  During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court accepted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the South Carolina Bar concerning the potential constitutional implications arising from the court appointment of attorneys to represent indigent clients.  The Supreme Court elected to address this matter of significant public interest.  The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is implicated when an attorney is appointed by the court to represent an indigent litigant.  In such circumstances, the attorney's services constitute property entitling the attorney to just compensation. However in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion for denying Appellant fees in excess of the statutory cap for his behavior at trial. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

After his conviction for homicide, Petitioner Lucas Bailey filed an unsuccessful application for post conviction relief. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleged his counsel failed to object to jury instructions that allowed the jury to convict him for an act that was not in the indictment. Upon careful consideration of the record below, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge may have engaged in an off-the-record discussion with the jury: "we are troubled that the decision regarding the jury instruction may have been made without the judge conferring with the attorneys." The Court vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial.

The State appealed a circuit court order dismissing its case against Respondent Gregory Duncan. Respondent was indicted for murder after he shot and killed Christopher Spicer at his home. The court ruled that Respondent was immune from prosecution under the state Protection of Persons and Property Act. The Supreme Court found that the trial record reflected ample evidence to support the circuit court's ruling. The Court affirmed the circuit court's decision to dismiss the State's case.

Appellant Kenneth Justus was sentenced to death for the murder of Justin Bregenzer. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it disqualified one of his two appointed counsel. The counsel in question, Maite Murphy, had worked for the State's lead investigator as a divorce attorney. The trial court removed Ms. Murphy as Appellant's trial counsel, holding that that a former business relationship presented a conflict-of-interest issue. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to remove Appellant's counsel.

Appellants South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) and three of its officers appealed a circuit court order enjoining them from forwarding certain information regarding Respondent James Compton to the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (DPPPS). Respondent committed burglary, assault and battery, armed robbery and aggravated assault and battery in South Carolina. He fled to Georgia, but was apprehended there a short time later. Respondent voluntarily returned to South Carolina where he was prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to life plus forty-five years' imprisonment. In 1982, Respondent was "away without leave" (AWOL) for a period of time. No charges were filed against him when he returned. In 1995, Respondent went AWOL again, but he was not returned to custody until 2002. An arrest warrant and indictment were issued on escape charges, but they were "nol prossed" when the State failed to appear before the grand jury. The circuit court issued an order in 2005 for the destruction of the arrest warrant and indictment in connection with the 1995 incident. Respondent's criminal history still referenced the 1995 charges. Respondent was not granted parole because questions regarding the 1995 escape charges persisted at DPPPS hearings. Respondent petitioned the court for a declaration that SCDC failed to comply with the court order to destroy records of his 1995 escape charges. The court found that SCDC was not in willful violation of the court orde, and that the entries were in Respondent's criminal history for security and classification purposes. The court enjoined the SCDC from forwarding information regarding the 1995 escape to DPPPS. SCDC argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the circuit court erred in granting Respondent an injunction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reasoned that "a prisoner absenting himself from a prison (commonly referred to as an escape) is a fact that exists regardless of whether charges are filed in connection with it ... Because the injunction we affirm only enjoins the dissemination of records pertaining to criminal charges and not historical facts, [SCDC] is not enjoined from forwarding information they have a duty to send to DPPPS." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Petitioner Terrance Edwards appealed a circuit court order that denied him post conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted for murder, robbery, and grand larceny. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner alleged that his attorney was ineffective for failing to interview a witness whose testimony could have exonerated him. Testimony by Petitioner's trial counsel revealed that it was a strategic decision not to interview the witness. The lower court determined that Petitioner failed to establish any resulting prejudice from his attorney's actions. Upon review of Petitioner's arguments, the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found probative evidence to support the lower court's conclusion. The Court dismissed petitioner's application for post conviction relief and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Petitioner Najjar Byers unsuccessfully appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to strike a witness' testimony at trial. On an evening in June 2005, a bingo hall was robbed at gunpoint. Police stopped a car after noticing its occupants were not wearing seat belts. Petitioner was a passenger in the car, along with three others. The driver gave police permission to search the car. Police found a cash register till, two handguns and two ski masks. The officer then received a bulletin from his radio that police were looking for a vehicle that matched the description of the car he had just pulled over. The officer took the car's occupants into custody. Petitioner was the only sober occupant at the time of the arrest. The key issue in this case was whether or not Petitioner was a passenger in the car at the time of the robbery. At trial, the State presented contradictory testimony from two of the other occupants. When defense counsel examined the other occupants, they testified they were either too drunk or too high to remember whether Petitioner was in the car. Petitioner moved to strike testimony by the occupants that he was in the car which was denied. Petitioner moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's evidence that was also denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him based on the evidence presented at trial. "With the greatest respect for the learned opinion of the court of appeals," the Supreme Court could "not understand the basis for its conclusion." The Court concluded, "another rational conclusion could have been reached by the jury." The Court reversed Petitioner's conviction.