Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Mary Ann German was convicted of felony driving under the influence ("DUI") resulting in death and sentenced to eleven years' incarceration. Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress evidence of her blood alcohol content ("BAC") obtained through a warrantless blood draw, which was taken pursuant to section 56-5-2946 of the South Carolina Code while she was hospitalized after an automobile accident. Finding that section 56-5-2946 was constitutional as applied and unchanged by the holdings of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to suspect Appellant of felony DUI and properly obtained the blood draw pursuant to section 56-5-2946. Appellant appealed her conviction based on the denial of her motion, and the court of appeals requested certification pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the warrantless blood draw based on section 56-5-2946 violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights or her rights under the South Carolina Constitution and, in effect, whether section 56-5-2946 was constitutional. The Court concluded section 56-5-2946 was facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied in Appellant's case. However, the Court found the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress because law enforcement acted in good faith based on existing precedent at the time of the blood draw. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "South Carolina v. German" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Jones, Jr. admitted to killing his five young children and was indicted for five counts of murder. He was convicted by jury and sentenced to death. In a direct appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Jones raised eight issues centering on three points: juror qualification, requested voir dire and a related jury instruction, and evidentiary rulings made during the guilt and sentencing phases. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the juror qualification, voir dire, and jury instruction rulings. The Court held the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings; however, the Court found the errors were harmless and affirmed Jones's conviction and death sentence. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law

At Stewart Middleton's trial for third-degree criminal sexual conduct, the State introduced a police detective's testimony that Middleton was evasive in response to her attempts to get Middleton to come in for an interview. The trial court admitted this testimony over Middleton's relevance objection. The jury found Middleton guilty and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in finding the testimony relevant because the State did not establish a nexus between Middleton's conduct and a consciousness of his guilt. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Craig Busse appealed his conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, claiming the deputy solicitor improperly vouched for the victim's credibility in a statement he made during closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the deputy solicitor's statement was technically in error and the trial court should have sustained Busse's objection. However, the statement did not amount to vouching. Therefore, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Busse" on Justia Law

Four prisoners filed a declaratory judgment action challenging two of the execution methods set forth in South Carolina's death penalty statute: electrocution and firing squad. The prisoners contend the methods violate the South Carolina Constitution's article I, section 15 prohibition against cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment. The circuit court concluded electrocution and the firing squad were unconstitutional under state law, and the parties filed cross-appeals with the South Carolina Supreme Court. The primary appeal concerned the merits of the ruling, and the prisoners' cross-appeal challenged the partial denial of their pretrial discovery request for information on the availability of a third statutory method of execution, lethal injection. At this time, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's discovery ruling (which was the subject of the cross-appeal), and remanded the discovery issue to the circuit court for further proceedings to be completed in accordance with time limits set forth in this opinion. The Supreme Court held the remainder of the appeal in abeyance pending the circuit court's resolution of the discovery issue. View "Owens, et al. v. Stirling, et al." on Justia Law

Respondent Maunwell Ervin was granted post-conviction relief (PCR) for being twice tried for multiple offenses stemming from a search if his rented residence. Ervin was charged on firearms and drug trafficking charges; the first trial ended in an acquittal of the firearm charge, and a mistrial on the trafficking charge. The second trial resulted in another mistrial on the trafficking charge. Ervin and the State reached a plea agreement by reducing the charge to a lesser offense and imposing the minimum sentence. Ervin then applied for PCR on the negotiated plea. The PCR court granted relief on Ervin’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, premised on counsel’s failure to raise a double jeopardy objection based on the rule established in Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110(2009). The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the PCR court misapplied Yeager, thereby erring in granting PCR relief. Accordingly, relief was reversed and the negotiated guilty plea and sentence were reinstated. View "Ervin v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Jaron Gibbs was convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in (1) allowing Detective Michael Arflin to present lay testimony about single and double action revolvers and (2) allowing the State to reference Arflin's testimony in its closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed Gibbs's convictions. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that because the court of appeals held Arflin's personal knowledge rendered the lay testimony proper, it did not squarely address whether the trial court erred in finding this subject matter was not outside the ordinary knowledge of most jurors. In any event, the Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the testimony did not have to be given by an expert. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals as modified and hedld the trial court did not err in admitting Arflin's lay testimony. Likewise, the Court found the solicitor's closing was "certainly proper" when viewed as a reply to Gibbs's theory of the case. "Under the invited reply doctrine, conduct that would be improper otherwise may be appropriate if made in response to statements or arguments made by the defense." The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' analysis and held the trial court did not err with respect to the solicitor's closing argument. View "South Carolina v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

Angela Brewer was convicted of homicide by child abuse after her thirteen-month-old grandson died from drinking lemonade mixed with oxycodone. Brewer contended the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's admission of an interrogation video when she was under the influence of medication. She also raised an issue relating to the scope of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause when the State sought to introduce the contents of a toxicology report from an out-of-state laboratory through a pathologist who did not perform the actual testing. The trial court concluded the toxicology report was not testimonial in nature, thereby removing it from the confines of the Sixth Amendment, and the court of appeals affirmed. While the South Carolina Supreme Court saw no error in admitting the interrogation video, it reversed Brewer's conviction and sentence based on a Confrontation Clause violation: "the Confrontation Clause mandates that an individual who actually performed the forensic testing be subject to cross- examination." View "South Carolina v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Victim, who was fifteen at the time of trial, alleged she was sexually assaulted on multiple occasions by respondent Charles Rampey, her stepfather, when she was eleven and twelve years old. Victim testified that sometime around her birthday in June of 2013, Rampey called Victim into a room and forced her to touch his penis. On another occasion, Victim testified that Rampey had her perform oral sex on him. This escalated to multiple instances of sexual intercourse, according to Victim. In this criminal sexual conduct case with a minor, the trial judge gave an Allen charge to the jury after approximately two hours and twenty minutes of deliberations. About an hour and fifteen minutes later, the jury returned with a not guilty verdict as to criminal sexual conduct with a minor (CSC) in the second degree and a guilty verdict as to CSC third degree. Rampey, appealed, asserting the Allen charge was unconstitutionally coercive. The court of appeals reversed the conviction in an unpublished opinion, primarily citing to South Carolina v. Taylor, 829 S.E.2d 723 (Ct. App. 2019). Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. "The trial court's overemphasis of the resources expended and the need for a verdict, combined with the absence of the critical cautionary language despite being requested by defense counsel, renders the charge unconstitutional and warrants a new trial. Moreover, the post-verdict polling of the jurors by the trial court did not cure this error." View "South Carolina v. Rampey" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Frasier was convicted of trafficking cocaine in excess of 100 grams after police discovered cocaine during a traffic stop for an inoperable brake light. The questions this appeal presented for the the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether police had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic encounter and whether Frasier consented to the search. The trial court concluded the officer had reasonable suspicion and Frasier consented, and the court of appeals affirmed. In deciding these two issues, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of its standard of review in the Fourth Amendment context. Ultimately, the Court reversed the court of appeals because law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop, and Frasier did not consent to the search. View "South Carolina v. Frasier" on Justia Law