Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Taylor was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). The magistrate court dismissed the charge, finding the State failed to comply with subsection 56-5-2953(A)'s requirement that the DUI incident site video recording "show" the defendant being advised of his Miranda rights. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address two issues: (1) the meaning of the word "show" as it was used in subsection 56-5-2953(A); and (2) whether per se dismissal of a DUI charge was the proper remedy for a video's failure to "show" a DUI defendant being advised of his Miranda rights at the incident site. The Supreme Court concluded the magistrate court correctly interpreted the meaning of the word "show" as used in subsection 56-5-2953(A); however, the Court held that failure to show a DUI defendant being advised of his Miranda rights did not mandate per se dismissal. View "South Carolina v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Arguing that a drug raid of his home violated the Fourth Amendment, Petitioner Kelvin Jones appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine within the proximity of a school. Jones's pretrial motion to suppress was denied and he was convicted following a jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis the issue was not preserved for appellate review. The South Carolina Supreme Court held Jones's argument as to the search warrant was preserved but failed on the merits. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in result the court of appeals' opinion and took this opportunity presented by this case to clarify issue preservation rules with respect to pre-trial rulings of constitutional dimension. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law

Ontario Stefon Patrick Makins was indicted for lewd act upon a minor, third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, and first-degree CSC with a minor. A jury convicted him of third-degree CSC with a minor. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding a therapist's affirmation she treated the minor victim (Minor) improperly bolstered Minor's credibility. The South Carolina Supreme Court found no improper bolstering occurred in this case, however, it repeated its warning about dual experts: "Using one witness as both a characteristics expert and the treatment witness is a risky undertaking. This issue might have been avoided completely had the State called a blind characteristics expert, a path the trial court repeatedly encouraged the State to follow. Instead, the State chose to proceed with [the expert here] acting as a dual expert." The court of appeals' judgment was reversed and the judgment of conviction reinstated. View "South Carolina v. Makins" on Justia Law

A South Carolina circuit court's granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent Dennis Powell, Jr. on his claims challenging the internet publication and lifetime duration of his mandated registration as a sex offender under the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry Act ("SORA"). The circuit court held SORA's lifetime registration requirement was punitive under the Eighth Amendment and violated Respondent's rights to due process and equal protection. The court also determined SORA did not permit publication of the State's sex offender registry on the internet. Mark Keel, Chief of the State Law Enforcement Division ("SLED"), and the State of South Carolina (collectively, "Appellants") appealed the circuit court's decision. The South Carolina Supreme Court held SORA's lifetime registration requirement was unconstitutional absent any opportunity for judicial review to assess the risk of re-offending. Furthermore, the Court held subsection 23-3-490(E) permitted dissemination of the State's sex offender registry information on the internet. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed as modified in part and reversed in part. View "Powell v. Keel" on Justia Law

Terrance Stewart was convicted by jury of distribution of heroin and two crimes based on his knowing possession of illegal drugs: trafficking in heroin and what we commonly refer to as "simple possession" of oxycodone. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari review to two aspects of the jury instructions: (1) the trial court's definition of constructive possession; and (2) the trial court's explanation of an inference of "knowledge and possession" that the court told the jury it may draw when illegal drugs are found on the defendant's property. The Supreme Court found the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the inference of knowledge and possession. The Court reversed the trafficking and simple possession convictions and remanded those charges for a new trial. However, because the erroneous jury instruction did not prejudice Stewart on the distribution charge, the distribution conviction was affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Stewart" on Justia Law

John Willie Mack, Sr. petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court for review of the dismissal of his second application for post-conviction relief. He alleged his DNA counsel failed to timely appeal the denial of his application for DNA testing under the Access to Justice Post-Conviction DNA Testing Act ("DNA Act"). The Supreme Court found that because Mack was prevented from seeking appellate review, it was necessary to provide an avenue of relief akin to Austin v. South Carolina, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991) that afforded him the opportunity to obtain belated review. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded to the court of general sessions for an evidentiary hearing. View "Mack v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant James Harrison, a former state legislator, was convicted and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment in a public corruption probe. The case was prosecuted by David Pascoe, Solicitor of the First Judicial Circuit, who was serving as the acting Attorney General. As recognized in prior case law, Solicitor Pascoe's authority to pursue the corruption probe was bestowed on him by South Carolina's then-current Attorney General, Alan Wilson. Appellant contended Solicitor Pascoe's authority did not grant the solicitor the power to investigate or prosecute Appellant. Conversely, Solicitor Pascoe dismissed any suggestion that his authority was limited, contending he had the authority to prosecute public corruption wherever the investigation led. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined Solicitor Pascoe had the authority to prosecute Appellant for perjury, but did not have the authority to prosecute Appellant for misconduct in office. Consequently, the Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and eighteen-month sentence for perjury, but reversed the statutory and common law misconduct in office charges, and remanded to the presiding judge of the State Grand Jury for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Jose Reyes Reyes was convicted by a jury of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Reyes's petition for a writ of certiorari to address two questions: (1) whether the trial court improperly ruled in the jury's presence that the child victim (Minor) was competent to testify; and (2) whether the solicitor improperly bolstered Minor's credibility by phrasing questions to Minor in the first person. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "South Carolina v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sha'quille Washington was indicted for the murder of Herman Manigault and was convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted petitioner's petition for certiorari review of the appellate court's judgment. After such review, the Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in giving an accomplice liability instruction, and held petitioner was prejudiced by this error. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit court for a new trial on the charge of voluntary manslaughter. View "South Carolina v. Washington" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Bradley Sanders' driver's license pursuant to South Carolina's implied consent statute after he refused to take a blood-alcohol test following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The suspension was upheld by the Office of Motor Vehicles and Hearings (OMVH), the Administrative Law Court (ALC), and the court of appeals. Sanders argued on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court that the decision of the court of appeals should have been reversed due to a lack of substantial evidence in the record to support the suspension. Specifically, Sanders argued the court of appeals erred in: (1) determining there was substantial evidence that a nurse, who was working in the emergency room at the time Sanders was admitted, qualified as licensed medical personnel; and (2) holding the statements used to establish his alleged inability to submit to a breath test were not hearsay. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the suspension. View "Sanders v. So. Carolina Dept. Motor Veh." on Justia Law