Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of assault and robbery, holding that there was no constitutional violation in the trial court's providing the jury with an instruction modeled on CALCRIM No. 315 that listed fifteen factors the jury should consider when evaluating eyewitness identification evidence.The instruction in this case listed as a factor the jury should consider when evaluating eyewitness identification evidence how "certain" the witness was when he or she made an identification. On appeal, Defendant argued that the certainty instruction violated his state and federal due process rights to a fair trial because research shows that a witness's confidence in an identification is generally not a reliable indicator of accuracy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that listing the witness's level of certainty as one of the factors the jury should consider when evaluating identification testimony did not render Defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. However, given the significance that witness certainty plays in the fact-finding process, the Court referred the matter to the Judicial Council to evaluate whether the instruction might be modified to avoid juror confusion regarding the correlation between certainty and accuracy. View "People v. Lemcke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for the first-degree murder and robbery of a deputy sheriff and his sentence of death, holding that Defendant's claims of error lacked merit.Specifically, the Supreme Court assumed error, but found no prejudice, as to (1) the trial court's failure to give a pinpoint jury instruction on Defendant's claim of accident relating to a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation; (2) the admission of a photograph of Defendant at the time of his prior sexual assault of Diane K.; and (3) the admission of certain victim impact testimony. Further, the trial court committed harmless error by using the 1996 revised version of CALJIC No. 8.71. The Court held that the cumulative effect of the three assumed error and the one harmless error did not warrant reversal. The Court remanded the matter for resentencing to strike a three-year prison term enhancement and otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Scully" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to vacate his 2002 conviction under Cal. Pen. Code 1473.7, holding that Defendant demonstrated a reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised by counsel about the immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have pleaded guilty to an offense subjecting him to mandatory deportation.Defendant was six years old when he came to the United States and lacked any meaningful ties to Mexico, his country of birth. In 2002, Defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine precursors with intent to manufacture. Defendant's counsel did not advise Defendant as to the actual immigration consequences of his plea. Defendant later obtained an order to expunge his conviction. In 2018, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7. The trial court denied the motion without considering whether Defendant suffered prejudice from counsel's failure to provide adequate advise. The court of appeal affirmed, determining that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance but that Defendant suffered no prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant demonstrated a reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised about the immigration consequences of his plea he would not have pleaded guilty to the offense. View "People v. Vivar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of the first degree murder of her four daughters and the attempted murder of her son but reversed her death sentence, holding that judicial misconduct during the penalty phase was prejudicial.The Supreme Court found or assumed seven errors in this case, including error in the guilt phase instructions regarding discovery violations, error limiting mental state testimony by defense experts in the guilt phase, error in excluding a neuropsychological expert's testimony in the penalty phase, error in excluding Defendant's positron emission tomography scan results from the penalty phase, error in failing to admit mitigating evidence from lay witnesses, erroneous penalty phase instructions regarding discovery violations, and judicial misconduct. The Supreme Court held (1) considered cumulatively, the errors during the guilt phase did not warrant reversal of the guilt judgment; (2) judicial misconduct in the penalty phase was prejudicial and warranted reversal of Defendant's death sentence; and (3) the prejudicial impact of additional penalty phase errors increased when considered together with the judicial misconduct. View "People v. Nieves" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and verdict of death, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below and that Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his conviction.A jury convicted Defendant of the first degree murder of a deputy sheriff. When the jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict the trial court declared a mistrial. Following a penalty retrial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the guilt phase, it was not prejudicial, and there were no other errors during the guilt phase; and (2) no prejudicial error occurred during the penalty phase, and Defendant's challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute were unavailing. View "People v. Steskal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of the murders of four young men during the robbery of a car wash and his sentence of death, holding that there was no merit to any of Defendant's claims.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err by denying a motion to suppress two witnesses' identifications of Defendant; (2) Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated by the trial court's admission of certain testimony; (3) the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of unpremeditated second-degree murder, and there was no other instructional error; (4) Defendant's claims of trial error in the admission of allegedly prejudicial hearsay were without merit; (5) the trial court's denial of Defendant's new trial motion was not erroneous; (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to investigate certain allegations raised by Defendant; and (7) Defendant's objections to the constitutionality of California's death penalty scheme were unavailing. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that when the court-appointed attorneys of parents in termination proceedings have failed to timely file a notice of appeal of an order terminating parental rights, parents whose rights have been terminated may seek relief based on the attorney's failure to provide competent representation.After M.B.'s parental rights to her child were terminated, M.B. timely asked her new court-appointed counsel to file an appeal. The attorney, however, did not file an appeal until after the sixty-day filing deadline had passed. The court of appeal dismissed the appeal as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) every parent facing the termination of parental rights is entitled to the assistance of competent counsel; and (2) when an attorney fails to file a timely appeal in accordance with his or her client's instructions, the parent may seek relief based on the denial of the statutory right to the assurance of competent counsel. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that Cal. Penal Code 632.7 applies only to nonparties and does not forbid a party to a phone call transmitted to or from a cellular or cordless telephone from recording the conversation without the consent of the other party or parties, holding that section 632.7 applies to parties as well as nonparties.Setion 632.7(a) makes it a crime when a person, "without consent of all parties to a communication," intercepts or intentionally records a communication transmitted between a cellular or cordless telephone and another telephone. At issue was whether the statute is concerned only with recording by persons other than parties, or nonparties, to the communication. The Supreme Court held that the statute applies to parties as well as nonparties that that recording a communication without the speaker's consent is unlawful, regardless of whether a party or someone else is performing the recording. View "Smith v. LoanMe, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that Petitioner was entitled to a new bail hearing, holding that the common practice of conditioning freedom solely on whether an arrestee can afford bail is unconstitutional.The trial court set Petitioner's bail at $350,000 without commenting on Petitioner's inability to afford bail. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that requiring money bail as a condition of release at an amount he could not pay was the functional equivalent of a pretrial detention order and requesting immediate release or a new bail hearing. The court of appeals reversed the bail order because the trial court failed to determine whether Petitioner could feasibly post bail. On remand, the superior court conducted a new bail hearing and ordered Petitioner released on various non-financial conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where a financial condition is necessary, the court must consider the arrestee's ability to pay the stated amount of bail and may not detain the arrestee solely because the arrestee lacked the resources to post bail; and (2) Petitioner was entitled to a new bail hearing. View "In re Humphrey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld Senate Bill 1391 as a permissible amendment to Proposition 57 and reversed the judgment in the case, holding that the Legislature acted within its authority.Proposition 57, which was passed in the November 2016 general election, allowed prosecutors to move to transfer some minors as young as fourteen years old from juvenile court to adult criminal court. Senate Bill 1391, enacted in 2018, amended Proposition 57 to prohibit minors under the age of sixteen from being transferred to adult criminal court. The court of appeal held that Senate Bill 1391 was invalid because it was inconsistent with Proposition 57. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the amendment was fully consistent with and furthered Proposition 57's purposes of promoting rehabilitation of youthful offenders and reducing the prison population, and therefore, Senate Bill 1391 was a constitutional amendment to Proposition 57. View "O.G. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law