Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first degree murder, attempted deliberate and premeditated murder, and other crimes, holding that Defendant's statements were improperly admitted in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, Defendant argued that his statements to police were taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Specifically, Defendant argued that his unequivocal request for counsel was not honored. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) under Edwards, the officers were required to stop the interrogation once Defendant unequivocally requested counsel, but because the officers did not do so Defendant's statements were inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial; and (2) the erroneous admission of Defendant's statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to any of the jury's findings. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming Defendant's sentence in connection with his convictions for several offenses, including five counts of second degree robbery, holding that the trial court erred in imposing five twenty-five-year-to-life enhancements in connection with counts as to which the enhancements had not been alleged.As to each of the five counts of second degree robbery, the information alleged personal firearm use enhancements. After the close of the evidence, however, the trial court instructed the jury on a set of more serious firearm enhancements based on the theory that Defendant was vicariously responsible for a coparticipant's harmful discharge of a firearm. None of the vicarious firearm discharge enhancements had been alleged in connection with the robbery counts. The jury returned true findings. The trial court enhanced Defendant's sentence for the robberies by five consecutive additional terms of twenty-five years to life. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed a pleading error because Defendant did not receive adequate notice that the prosecution was seeking to impose additional punishment on the robbery counts, and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question posed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding the time gap between the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a lower California court and the filing of a new petition in a higher California court raising the same claims for purposes of determining whether a claim was timely presented.The Court summarized the procedures relevant to gap delay and then answered that, during the process, the delay between the filing of a habeas corpus petition challenging a state court judgment in a high court after the lower court denied relief is relevant to the overall question of timeliness of the claims presented in the petition, but no specific time limits exist. Specifically, delay of up to 120 days would not be considered substantial delay and would not alone make the claim untimely if the petition had otherwise presented the claim without substantial delay. Gap delay of more than 120 days is not automatically considered substantial delay but is a relevant factor in a court's analysis under In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th, 770 (1998). View "Robinson v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and other crimes and sentence of death, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the trial proceedings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless probation search of his home; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to sever the capital charges from his remaining charges; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (4) Defendant's challenges to the trial court's guilt phase instructions lacked merit; (5) a failure of consular notification under the Vienna Convention occurred in this case, but no prejudice resulted from it; (6) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to modify the verdict; and (7) Defendant's challenges to California's death penalty law were unavailing. View "People v. Vargas" on Justia Law

In this appeal stemming from a first degree murder judgment the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal denying Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the jury's special circumstance finding that the murder was committed during an attempted robbery, holding that Petitioner did not act with reckless indifference to human life and thus the special circumstance finding must be reversed.After a trial, the jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder and attempted robbery and found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed during an attempted robbery. After Petitioner's conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015), and People v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016), which clarified the meaning of the special circumstances statute. After the court of appeal denied Petitioner's habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court granted review to determine whether Petitioner's conduct was proscribed by the special circumstances statute as construed in Banks and Clark. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment, holding that the evidence did not support a finding that Petitioner acted with reckless indifference to human life. View "In re Scoggins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this matter to the superior court to allow Defendant an opportunity to seek relief under Senate Bill 1393, holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that a certificate of probable causewas not required and that Senate Bill 1393 applied retroactively to Defendant.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to one first degree burglary and admitted one serious felony conviction in exchange for a nine-year sentence. The sentence was based on the low term for burglary, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus five years for the serious felony enhancement. While Defendant's appeal was pending, a new law went into effect - Cal. Penal Code 1385, subd. (a) - permitting the trial court to strike a serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant was not required to obtain a certificate of probable cause to claim on appeal that the new law applied to him retroactively; (2) the new law applied to Defendant because his case was not yet final on appeal; and (3) the superior court is not authorized to exercise its discretion to strike the enhancement but otherwise maintain the plea bargain. View "People v. Stamps" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal conditionally reversing Defendant's convictions and sentence with instructions for the trial court to consider Defendant's eligibility for diversion under Cal. Penal Code 1001.36, holding that the court of appeal did not err when it remanded this case for a diversion eligibility hearing.Defendant was found guilty of two counts of second degree robbery and of throwing a substance at a motor vehicle without intent to cause injury. While Defendant's appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 100.36, which created a pretrial diversion program for certain defendants with mental health disorders. The court of appeal conditionally reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence, concluding that section 1001.36 applies retroactively to all nonfinal judgments and that Defendant was entitled to a limited remand because he appeared to satisfy at least one of the statute's threshold eligibility requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 1001.36 applies retroactively; and (2) a conditional limited remand was appropriate in this case. View "People v. Frahs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to modify the jury's verdicts of burglary and first degree murder, first degree forcible rape, second degree robbery and false imprisonment by violence and sentencing Defendant to death, holding that considering assumed errors altogether, reversal was not warranted.Defendant, an African-American, was charged with raping and murdering a White woman. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the prosecutor improperly exercise peremptory challenges to excuse two prospective jurors, who were African-American, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, and People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor struck the potential jurors for reasons other than his race; (2) there was no error in the trial court's decision to excuse two jurors for cause; (3) there was no merit to Defendant's allegations of error during the guilt phase; and (4) any assumed errors during the competency phase and penalty phase were not prejudicial and, considered cumulatively, did not require reversal. View "People v. Miles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal finding that the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied bail to Petitioner, holding that the trial court's decision to order Petitioner detained was not an abuse of discretion.Petitioner was charged with felony offenses involving acts of violence and sexual assault. The trial court denied bail. Petitioner challenged the no-bail order by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court of appeal upheld the trial court's findings and denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Petitioner was guilty of at least one of the offenses for which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) a court could conclude by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial likelihood that Petitioner's release could result in great bodily harm to others; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Petitioner detained on this basis. View "In re White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal reversing Defendant's conviction of two counts of assault by an inmate with a deadly weapon and other offenses, holding that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for testifying officers' credibility.Specifically, the court of appeals held that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for witness credibility by asserting in closing argument that two testifying officers would not lie because each would not put his "entire career on the line" and would not subject himself to "possible prosecution for perjury." The court further held that the error was prejudicial. The Attorney General petitioned for review solely on the question of whether the prosecutor's argument constituted impermissible vouching. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's closing argument constituted improper vouching; and (2) while the court of appeals appears to have overstated the import and effect of the prosecutor's remarks, the Attorney General did not argue harmlessness, and this Court expresses no view on the appellate court's conclusions that the statements were prejudicial. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law