Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In January 1992, J. Sacramento Benitez was killed during a residential burglary and attempted robbery. Luis Ramon Manzano Arellano and two co-defendants were charged with murder, attempted robbery, and first-degree burglary, with firearm use enhancements. Arellano pled guilty to second-degree murder under conditions that included striking the firearm enhancement and dismissing the robbery and burglary charges. He was sentenced to 15 years to life.The Santa Clara County Superior Court received Arellano's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 in October 2020. The district attorney initially opposed but later stipulated to resentencing. The court vacated Arellano's murder conviction and set a hearing to redesignate the charge. The trial court agreed to redesignate the conviction as attempted robbery with a firearm enhancement, despite defense objections that the enhancement was neither admitted nor found true by a jury.The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the firearm enhancement could not be imposed because it was not proven or admitted. The court held that section 1172.6 does not allow for the imposition of uncharged and unproven enhancements during resentencing.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the Court of Appeal's judgment, holding that section 1172.6, subdivision (e) does not permit a court to impose a sentencing enhancement unless it was pled and proven or admitted by the defendant. The court emphasized that the resentencing procedure is limited to the target offense or underlying felony and does not include uncharged and unproven enhancements. The Supreme Court also reversed the Court of Appeal's order for a remand to reconsider the redesignated conviction, as the trial court had already considered and chosen not to redesignate the underlying felony as burglary. View "People v. Arellano" on Justia Law

The case involves Nicholas Needham, who was referred for evaluation as a possible Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) after serving his prison term for certain sex offenses. Two evaluators initially determined that Needham had a mental disorder making him likely to engage in sexual violence unless civilly committed. However, before the probable cause hearing, one evaluator changed his opinion, leading to the appointment of two other evaluators. One of these evaluators concluded that Needham qualified as an SVP, while the other did not. The trial court found probable cause to believe Needham was an SVP and ordered a trial.The People retained Dr. Craig King as an expert and sought discovery of Needham's evaluations and records. The trial court granted the request and ruled that Dr. King could interview and test Needham. Needham filed motions to preclude Dr. King from testifying at trial, which were denied. Needham sought a writ of mandate/prohibition to prevent Dr. King from conducting any further interviewing or testing and from testifying at trial. The Court of Appeal granted Needham's writ petition and directed the trial court to exclude Dr. King's testimony. The People petitioned for review from that ruling.The Supreme Court of California held that, under the SVPA, the People may call their retained expert to testify at trial, both to contest the testimony of other witnesses and to offer an independent opinion as to whether the defendant qualifies as an SVP. However, the People's retained expert may not compel a defendant to be interviewed or participate in testing before trial. The court reversed the Court of Appeal's contrary judgment and remanded the case for trial. View "Needham v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves John Harris, Jr., who was charged with attempted first degree murder and aggravated mayhem related to a violent rape committed over 30 years ago. The charges were based on a DNA match between Harris and evidence from the crime scene. The prosecution sought to detain Harris without bail under a provision of the California Constitution (article I, section 12(b)) that allows for pretrial detention without bail for certain violent felonies, if there is clear and convincing evidence that the person's release would result in great bodily harm to others.The trial court denied Harris's bail, relying on a proffer by the prosecution that included hearsay evidence and documents without the full evidentiary foundation required at trial. Harris challenged this decision, arguing that only evidence admissible at a criminal trial could support pretrial detention without bail.The Court of Appeal rejected Harris's argument but conditionally vacated the order denying bail and remanded the matter to the trial court for further findings, because the trial court failed to consider less restrictive alternatives to detention.The Supreme Court of California held that a trial court may consider reliable proffered evidence in making factual findings under article I, section 12(b) without violating due process principles. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to apply the standards discussed in its opinion and to consider less restrictive alternatives to detention. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

In the case of The People v. Giles Albert Nadey, Jr., the defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful sodomy and one count of first-degree murder for the killing of Terena Fermenick. The jury found that both offenses were committed with the use of a knife and the murder occurred during the commission of unlawful sodomy. After the first jury deadlocked on penalty, a second jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment.The case revolved around the murder of Terena Fermenick, who was sexually assaulted and killed. The defendant, Giles Albert Nadey, Jr., was a carpet cleaner who had been assigned to clean the carpets at the Fermenick's new home on the day of the murder. The prosecution's evidence included DNA evidence linking Nadey to the crime, as well as testimony from various witnesses.In the lower courts, Nadey was convicted of the charges and sentenced to death. His appeal to the Supreme Court of California was automatic due to the death sentence.In the Supreme Court of California, Nadey's conviction and sentence were affirmed. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court also rejected Nadey's claims of legal error and prosecutorial misconduct. The court held that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments were not improper and did not prejudice Nadey's right to a fair trial. The court also found that the trial court did not err in admitting certain evidence or in its handling of jury instructions. View "P. v. Nadey" on Justia Law

In 2021, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 333, known as the STEP Forward Act of 2021. This bill amended Penal Code section 186.22, imposing new requirements relating to gang enhancements and the criminal offense of gang participation. It also added section 1109, which provides that, if requested by the defense, a trial court must try a gang enhancement charge separately from the underlying offense. The Supreme Court of California was asked to determine whether section 1109’s provisions governing bifurcation apply retroactively to cases in which the judgment is not yet final.The lower courts were divided on this issue. Some courts concluded that section 1109 applies retroactively, while others concluded that it does not. The Supreme Court of California held that the Estrada inference of retroactivity does not extend to section 1109. The court reasoned that Estrada’s principle of statutory interpretation infers retroactivity from statutory reductions in punishment, not from the type of prophylactic rules of criminal procedure embodied in section 1109’s bifurcation provisions. Accordingly, the general presumption of prospective-only application applies to section 1109. The court also held that equal protection principles do not require section 1109 to be applied retroactively. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "P. v. Burgos" on Justia Law

In 2019, Emily Wheeler, a property owner, was charged with various violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code related to unlicensed cannabis activity on her property. Wheeler, who was 85 years old and had no criminal record, claimed she had no knowledge of the illegal activity. The trial court dismissed the charges against her, citing her age, clean record, and lack of knowledge about the illegal activity on her property. The People appealed the dismissal, arguing that the trial court erred in considering Wheeler's lack of knowledge because the charges were strict liability offenses.The appellate division of the superior court reversed the dismissal, agreeing with the People that the trial court should not have considered Wheeler's lack of knowledge. The appellate division reasoned that since the charges were strict liability offenses, Wheeler's lack of knowledge was not mitigating. Wheeler then petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to affirm the trial court's dismissal, but the Court of Appeal affirmed the appellate division's decision.The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment. The Supreme Court held that a trial court has discretion to consider a defendant's lack of knowledge when deciding whether to dismiss charges in furtherance of justice under Penal Code section 1385, even for strict liability offenses. The Supreme Court reasoned that the nature of the charged offense and a defendant's minimal culpability can be relevant considerations for a section 1385 dismissal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to affirm the trial court's dismissal. View "Wheeler v. Appellate Division of Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2007, Ishmael Michael Carter was committed to Coalinga State Hospital pending trial on a petition to commit him as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act. After waiting for trial for over 12 years, Carter filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting his due process right to a timely trial. Additionally, he filed a motion to replace his public defender, believing the office would be disqualified from litigating the motion to dismiss on his behalf. The trial court denied Carter's motion to replace his counsel, declined to rule on the motion to dismiss, and conducted a trial resulting in Carter's indeterminate commitment as an SVP.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decisions. Carter argued that the trial court's inquiry into his request for new counsel was insufficient and required a full reversal of the judgment or, alternatively, a conditional reversal pending reconsideration of his request for new counsel and potential litigation of his motion to dismiss. The Attorney General agreed that the trial court should have investigated whether a potential conflict of interest would have prevented Carter's public defender from litigating the motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of California held that the trial court conducted an insufficient inquiry into Carter's request for new counsel and erred in instructing Carter to file his motion to dismiss pro se. The court agreed with the Attorney General that a full reversal at this stage would be premature. The court conditionally reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case with directions to conditionally vacate the SVP judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "P. v. Carter" on Justia Law

In May 2019, police officers detained Marlon Flores in a Los Angeles neighborhood known for narcotics and gang activity. The officers observed Flores standing alone near a parked car, ducking behind it as they approached. The officers suspected Flores was involved in narcotics activity due to his behavior and the area's reputation. During a pat-down search, the officers found a drug pipe in Flores's car and methamphetamine in his wallet. Flores was subsequently charged with carrying a loaded firearm and armed possession of methamphetamine.The trial court denied Flores's motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that his behavior was suspicious enough to warrant detention and subsequent questioning. Flores pleaded no contest to the firearm charge, and the methamphetamine charge was dismissed. He was sentenced to three years' probation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that Flores was not detained until he was ordered to stand and put his hands behind his head, and that reasonable suspicion justified the detention.The Supreme Court of California reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the officers' observations of Flores's behavior, combined with his presence in a high crime area at night, did not provide a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Flores was engaged in illegal activity. The court emphasized that a person's mere presence in a high crime area cannot transform them into a suspect. The court concluded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Flores, and thus, the evidence obtained during the pat-down search should have been suppressed. The case was remanded to the trial court to allow Flores to withdraw his no contest plea and for the court to grant Flores's suppression motion. View "P. v. Flores" on Justia Law

The case involves Weldon K. McDavid, Jr., who was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and attempted premeditated murder. McDavid, a shooting instructor, had a romantic relationship with Diana Lovejoy, who was going through a contentious divorce. The two hatched a plan to kill Lovejoy's husband, Greg Mulvihill. McDavid shot Mulvihill, causing severe injuries but not killing him. The jury found true allegations that McDavid intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury, and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim.McDavid appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court was unaware of its full sentencing discretion under Senate Bill No. 620, which grants trial courts the discretion to strike formerly mandatory enhancements. The Court of Appeal agreed, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. However, the trial court declined to strike the enhancements. McDavid appealed again, and while the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeal held that a trial court has the authority to impose a lesser enhancement not only under section 12022.53 but also under other statutes if the facts supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true by a jury. The Attorney General filed a petition for rehearing, which the Court of Appeal granted. On rehearing, the Court of Appeal reversed course and held that a trial court’s discretion to impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement is confined to the enhancements in section 12022.53 and does not include enhancements specified in other statutes.The Supreme Court of California reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The court held that when a court has exercised its discretion under subdivision (h) to strike a section 12022.53 enhancement and finds that no other section 12022.53 enhancement is appropriate, the second sentence of subdivision (j) is inapplicable and does not bar the court from imposing a lesser included, uncharged enhancement under a law other than section 12022.53. The court thus has discretion to impose such an enhancement if it is supported by facts that have been alleged and found true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. McDavid" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of California was asked to interpret a witness dissuasion statute, Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2), in a case involving defendant Raymond Gregory Reynoza. Reynoza was found guilty of violating this statute based on actions that occurred after the complaint in the underlying criminal case had been filed. The court had to determine whether the statute applies where a defendant dissuades a witness from “assisting in the prosecution” of a case after the charging document has already been filed, or whether a conjunctive interpretation precludes a conviction under such circumstances.The lower courts had disagreed on the interpretation of the statute. The Court of Appeal held that section 136.1(b)(2) requires proof that the defendant attempted to prevent or dissuade another person from causing an accusatory pleading to be filed. If the defendant was aware the relevant charging document had already been filed, and the defendant did not attempt to prevent or dissuade the filing of any amended or subsequent charging document, the defendant has not violated section 136.1(b)(2).The Supreme Court of California found that the statute is equally susceptible to both the conjunctive and disjunctive constructions. Therefore, the rule of lenity counsels in favor of adopting the “interpretation more favorable to the defendant.” Here, that is the conjunctive construction, which does not permit a conviction to be based solely on proof of dissuasion from “assisting in the prosecution” of an already-filed charging document. Because there is no dispute that Reynoza’s conduct amounted to, at most, dissuasion after a complaint was filed, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing his conviction. View "P. v. Reynoza" on Justia Law