Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In deciding whether a defendant is guilty of murder, the jury is permitted to consider evidence of voluntary invocation on the question of whether the defendant intended to kill but not on the question of whether he believed he needed to act in self-defense.Defendant was charged with first degree murder and first degree burglary. Defendant claimed he was guilty of, at most, voluntary manslaughter because he killed in “unreasonable self-defense” - that is, he actually believed he needed to act in self-defense even if that belief was unreasonable. The jury acquitted Defendant of first degree murder but found him guilty of second degree murder and first degree burglary. On appeal, the court of appeal concluded that the trial court erred in prohibiting the jury from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication on the question of whether Defendant believe he needed to act in self-defense, but the error was harmless. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on how it could consider Defendant’s evidence of voluntary intoxication. View "People v. Soto" on Justia Law

In 2005, Chavez pleaded no contest to charges that he offered to sell a controlled substance and failed to appear after being released on his own recognizance. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Chavez on probation for four years, a term he successfully completed in 2009. In 2013, Chavez, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, asked the court to exercise its authority under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss his previous convictions in the interests of justice. He did not seek relief under section 1203.4, which permits eligible defendants to obtain dismissal of accusations after completing probation. The trial court, court of appeal, and California Supreme Court denied him relief. A trial court would exceed the authority conferred by section 1385 if it dismissed an action after the probation period expires; a court may exercise that dismissal power before judgment is pronounced but not after judgment is final. In the case of a successful probationer, final judgment is never pronounced, and after the expiration of probation, may never be pronounced; section 1385’s power may be exercised until a judgment is pronounced or when the power to pronounce judgment runs out. View "People v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Daveggio and Michaud were each convicted of one count of first-degree murder (Pen. Code 187(a)), two counts of oral copulation in concert by force (section 288a(d)), and one count of oral copulation on a person under 18 years of age (288a(b)(1)). The jury also found true two special circumstances, kidnapping, and rape by instrument (190.2(a)(17)(B), (K)), and returned verdicts of death. The trial court denied the automatic motions to modify the verdicts and sentenced defendants to death. On automatic appeal (section1239(b)), the Supreme Court of California affirmed after recounting numerous uncharged crimes. The court upheld the denial of the defendants’ severance motions, the admission of the evidence of uncharged incidents, and evidentiary rulings concerning fingerprint evidence, carpeting in Michaud’s van, and certain weaponry. View "People v. Daveggio & Michaud" on Justia Law

The collection requirement of Proposition 69, known as the “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act” (DNA Act), is constitutional as applied to an individual who, like Defendant, was validly arrested on “probable cause to hold for a serious offense” and who was required to swab his cheek as part of a “routine booking procedure” at county jail.Defendant was arrested for arson and related felonies and transported to jail. At booking, Defendant was informed that he was required to provide a DNA sample by swabbing the inside of his cheek. Defendant refused and was later convicted of both the arson-related felonies and the misdemeanor offense of refusing to provide a specimen required by the DNA Act. After the case was remanded, the Court of Appeal reversed Defendant’s misdemeanor refusal conviction on the ground that the DNA Act violates the state Constitution’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Cal. Const. art. I, 13 to require Defendant to swab his cheek as part of a routine jail booking procedure following a valid arrest for felony arson; and (2) therefore, Defendant was subject to the statutory penalties prescribed in Cal. Penal Code 298.1. View "People v. Buza" on Justia Law

The collection requirement of Proposition 69, known as the “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act” (DNA Act), is constitutional as applied to an individual who, like Defendant, was validly arrested on “probable cause to hold for a serious offense” and who was required to swab his cheek as part of a “routine booking procedure” at county jail.Defendant was arrested for arson and related felonies and transported to jail. At booking, Defendant was informed that he was required to provide a DNA sample by swabbing the inside of his cheek. Defendant refused and was later convicted of both the arson-related felonies and the misdemeanor offense of refusing to provide a specimen required by the DNA Act. After the case was remanded, the Court of Appeal reversed Defendant’s misdemeanor refusal conviction on the ground that the DNA Act violates the state Constitution’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Cal. Const. art. I, 13 to require Defendant to swab his cheek as part of a routine jail booking procedure following a valid arrest for felony arson; and (2) therefore, Defendant was subject to the statutory penalties prescribed in Cal. Penal Code 298.1. View "People v. Buza" on Justia Law

Statutory developments warranted modification of a settlement order between Petitioner and the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) to relieve the Board of any obligation to calculate “base terms” of an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence for use at the inmate’s initial parole hearing.Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in December 2012 against the Board seeking to avoid parole determinations leading to grossly disproportionate prison terms. An ensuing settlement agreement required the Board to calculate “base terms” under the agreement. At the time of the agreement, “base terms” governed the earliest possible release date for inmates serving indeterminate sentences. Since then, statutory developments altered the statutory landscape such that “base terms” no longer governed the release dates of inmates subject to indeterminate sentences. The Court of Appeal concluded that the settlement order could remain in force despite the statutory changes. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the elimination of “base term” calculations from any statutory role in determining release dates for those sentenced to indeterminate terms was a sufficiently material change that it required modification of the settlement by the Court of Appeal; and (2) the Board was not constitutionally required to continue calculating base terms as required in the settlement order. View "In re Butler" on Justia Law

Statutory developments warranted modification of a settlement order between Petitioner and the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) to relieve the Board of any obligation to calculate “base terms” of an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence for use at the inmate’s initial parole hearing.Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in December 2012 against the Board seeking to avoid parole determinations leading to grossly disproportionate prison terms. An ensuing settlement agreement required the Board to calculate “base terms” under the agreement. At the time of the agreement, “base terms” governed the earliest possible release date for inmates serving indeterminate sentences. Since then, statutory developments altered the statutory landscape such that “base terms” no longer governed the release dates of inmates subject to indeterminate sentences. The Court of Appeal concluded that the settlement order could remain in force despite the statutory changes. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the elimination of “base term” calculations from any statutory role in determining release dates for those sentenced to indeterminate terms was a sufficiently material change that it required modification of the settlement by the Court of Appeal; and (2) the Board was not constitutionally required to continue calculating base terms as required in the settlement order. View "In re Butler" on Justia Law

Defendant was not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47 because if Proposition 47 had been in effect when Defendant committed his offense in 2007, he would still be guilty of a felony not covered by Proposition 47.Proposition 47, enacted in 2014, reduced certain drug- and theft-related offenses from felonies to misdemeanors and authorized inmates currently serving sentences for a reclassified crime to petition the court for resentencing. As relevant to this appeal, Defendant filed a petition for resentencing on a felony conviction of transportation of methamphetamine. The trial court found Defendant ineligible for resentencing on the transportation offense. On appeal, the court of appeal held, among other things, that only offenders convicted of a felony offense enumerated in Proposition 47’s resentencing provision may have their crimes reduced to misdemeanors. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the mere fact that former Cal. Health & Safety Code 11379 is not one of the code sections enumerated in Cal. Penal Code 1170.18(a) is not fatal to Defendant’s petition for resentencing on his transportation offense; but (2) the court of appeals correctly found that Defendant was ineligible for resentencing because if Proposition 47 had been in effect when he committed his offense in 2007, he would still be guilty of a felony not covered by Proposition 47. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and vacated the judgment of conviction because false evidence was introduced at trial.Petitioner, Vincente Benavides Figueroa, was convicted of murder - committed with the special circumstances of felony-murder rape sodomy, and lewd conduct - and rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Petitioner later filed a petition or habeas corpus relief, asserting that false evidence, now repudiated or undermined, resulted in his convictions and the special circumstances findings. The Supreme Court issued an order to show cause on Petitioner's claims that his convictions were based on false evidence and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, conceded that Petitioner was entitled to relief based upon the introduction of false evidence and argued that the murder conviction should be revised from first to second degree. The Supreme Court disagreed and vacated the judgment in its entirety, holding that a reduction to second degree murder was not warranted. View "In re Figueroa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and vacated the judgment of conviction because false evidence was introduced at trial.Petitioner, Vincente Benavides Figueroa, was convicted of murder - committed with the special circumstances of felony-murder rape sodomy, and lewd conduct - and rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Petitioner later filed a petition or habeas corpus relief, asserting that false evidence, now repudiated or undermined, resulted in his convictions and the special circumstances findings. The Supreme Court issued an order to show cause on Petitioner's claims that his convictions were based on false evidence and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, conceded that Petitioner was entitled to relief based upon the introduction of false evidence and argued that the murder conviction should be revised from first to second degree. The Supreme Court disagreed and vacated the judgment in its entirety, holding that a reduction to second degree murder was not warranted. View "In re Figueroa" on Justia Law