Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was involved in an accidental collision with a twelve-year-old boy riding on a scooter. Defendant stopped and checked on the boy. Defendant drove off when he saw the boy loaded into an ambulance. Defendant pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an injury accident in violation of Cal. Veh. Code 20001(a). The trial court sentenced Defendant to three years in prison and ordered him to pay $425,654.68 to the victim as restitution for injuries suffered as a result of the accident. The court of appeal reversed the restitution order, concluding that the trial court erred in fixing the amount of restitution. The Supreme Court affirmed. Cal. Penal Code 1202.4 provides that a defendant must pay restitution to the victim for losses incurred “as a result of the commission of a crime.” Here, Defendant’s crime was not being involved in a traffic accident but, rather, was leaving the scene of the accident without presenting identification or rendering aid. Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to order restitution for injuries that were caused or exacerbated by Defendant’s criminal flight from the scene of the accident, but it was not authorized to award restitution for injuries resulting from the underlying accident that involved no criminal wrongdoing. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Petitioner committed murder when he was sixteen years old and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The sentencing court did not give due consideration to the factors in Miller v. Alabama in imposing this sentence. Petitioner did not pursue an appeal. Here, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking a resentencing hearing at which the court would properly integrate the Miller factors into its sentencing calculus. The superior court granted habeas corpus relief. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Petitioner could seek recall of his sentence and resentencing to a term of life with the opportunity for parole pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 1170(d)(2), which remedied any constitutional defect in Petitioner’s sentence and therefore precluded habeas corpus relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 1170(d)(2) does not provide an adequate remedy at law for Miller error, and Petitioner may obtain a Miller resentencing as a form of habeas corpus relief. Remanded for a resentencing hearing. View "In re Kristopher Kirchner" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with the special circumstances of killing a witness, murder, in the commission of kidnapping, and lying in weight. The jury also found Defendant guilty of kidnapping, rape, and dissuading a witness. After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death for the murder conviction. The trial court imposed a judgment of death. The Supreme Court reversed the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding for insufficient evidence but otherwise affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the evidence did not support the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding, but no other prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase of trial; and (2) there was no prejudicial error during the penalty phase of trial. View "Poeple v. Becerrada" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Canadian citizen, pleaded guilty to a drug possession charge. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw the plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was insufficient because Defendant had received the standard statutory advisement that a criminal conviction may have the consequences of deportation. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that receipt of the standard statutory advisement that a criminal conviction “may” have adverse immigration consequences does not bar a noncitizen defendant from seeking to withdraw a guilty plea on that basis. Remanded to permit the trial court to determine whether Defendant has shown good cause for withdrawing his plea. View "People v. Patterson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether theft of access card account information is one of the crimes eligible for reduced punishment under Proposition 47. In 2014, Defendant pleaded no contest to a felony. Voters subsequently approved Proposition 47, which reduced the punishment for several crimes previously punished as felonies. In 2015, Petitioner filed a resentencing petition. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that Proposition 47 does not apply to theft of access card information. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that theft of access card account information is one of the crimes eligible for reduced punishment under Proposition 47. View "People v. Romanowski" on Justia Law

In 2014, the electorate passed the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (the Act), which reduced penalties for certain theft and drug offenses by amending existing statutes. The Act created the crime of “shoplifting,” which was defined as entering an open commercial establishment during regular business hours with the intent to commit “larceny” of property worth $950 or less. In 2013, Defendant entered a bank to cash a stolen check for less than $950. Defendant pled guilty to felony burglary. Defendant later petitioned for recall of his sentence and resentencing under Cal. Penal Code 1170.18, arguing that his conduct would have constituted misdemeanor shoplifting under the Act. The trial court denied the petition. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the electorate intended that the shoplifting statute apply to an entry to commit a nonlarcenous theft; and (2) therefore, Defendant’s criminal act now constitutes shoplifting under Cal. Penal Code 459.5, subd. (a), and Defendant may properly petition for misdemeanor resentencing. View "People v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and other crimes. The jury found true special-circumstance allegations. After a penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for modification of his sentence to life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no prejudicial error occurred during the pretrial phase of trial or during the guilt phase of trial; (2) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s convictions; (3) no prejudicial error occurred during the penalty phase of trial; and (4) Defendant’s challenges to the constitutionality of California’s death penalty scheme were unavailing. View "People v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of nonforcible lewd conduct. The trial court placed Defendant on probation, ordered him to register as a sex offender, mandated his participation in an approved sex offender management program, and imposed two probation conditions that were the subject of this appeal - (1) that Defendant waive any privilege against self-incrimination and participate in polygraph examinations, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 1203.067(b)(3); and (2) that Defendant waive any psychotherapist-patient privilege, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 1203.067(b)(4). Defendant appealed, arguing that conditioning probation on the waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination and on his participation in polygraph examinations violated his Fifth Amendment rights and, like the waiver of his psychotherapist-patient privilege, was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court of Appeal upheld the validity of the subdivision (b)(4) and (b)(3) conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probation conditions challenged in this case were not unconstitutional where they enabled those charged with monitoring the probation to obtain the information they need while otherwise safeguarding the probation’s privacy and protecting the probation from compelled self-incrimination. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery. The jury found true allegations that Defendant personally used a firearm during both robberies. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the elements of robbery. The Attorney General conceded the error but argued that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the error was reversible per se. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s failure to give the standard jury instruction on the elements of robbery was not reversible per se but was reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Merritt" on Justia Law

In People v. Hosner, the Supreme Court held that an indigent criminal defendant facing retrial is presumptively entitled to a full and complete transcript of the prior proceedings. Defendant in this case was an indigent pro se defendant charged with making criminal threats, among other offenses. A jury deadlocked on the charges, the court declared a mistrial, and retrial was set. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for a “complete record of trial transcripts.” Defendant received a transcript that included all witness testimony from the first trial but omitted the opening statements and closing arguments. The court then denied Defendant’s request for a transcript of the opening statements and closing arguments. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Hosner’s presumption applies only to transcripts of witness testimony and not to transcripts of opening statements and closing arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) a defendant facing retrial is presumptively entitled to a full transcript of the previous trial, including opening and closing statements; (2) when a defendant is denied only a portion of the transcript, the harmless error rule applies; and (3) the error was harmless in this case. View "People v. Reese" on Justia Law