Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and related offenses. The trial court sentenced Defendant under the Three Strikes law to an indeterminate term of twenty-five years to life. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, voters enacted the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, which amended the law to reduce the punishment prescribed for certain third strike defendants. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed. Defendant petitioned for rehearing, requesting that he be resentenced under the new sentencing provisions of the Three Strikes law. The court denied relief. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to automatic resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Act without a determination by the trial court as to whether that resentencing would pose “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that prisoners presently serving indeterminate life sentences imposed under the prior version of the Three Strikes law, including those with nonfinal judgments, may seek resentencing under the Act, but subject to judicial determination of whether resentencing would pose an unreasonable danger to the public. View "People v. Conley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder. The jury found true five special-circumstance allegations, including that Defendant committed murder while engaged in the commission of a burglary and while in the attempted commission of a robbery. At a penalty phase retrial, the jury returned a verdict for death. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court vacated the burglary-murder and robbery-murder special-circumstance findings but otherwise affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding (1) there was no prejudicial error in the selection of the jury; (2) the trial court did not prejudicially err in its evidentiary rulings; (3) prosecutorial misconduct did not occur in this case; (4) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury during the guilt phase; (5) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s true findings as to two special-circumstances pertaining to one murder; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s true findings as to the remaining special-circumstances allegations; and (7) there was no prejudicial error during the penalty phase of trial. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, first degree burglary with use of a knife, and assault causing great bodily injury. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by terminating his right to self-representation. The court’s rationale was that Defendant had been “dilatory” and had been “stalling.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s order was an abuse of discretion where the record was bereft of information to support the trial court’s revocation of Defendant’s pro per status, and thus, Faretta v. California and its progeny required reversal of the judgment. View "People v. Becerra" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, attempted murder, twenty-six counts of robbery, two counts of attempted robbery, five counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of assaults with a stun gun. The jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court imposed a judgment of death. The Supreme Court reversed one robbery count, modified the determinate prison sentence accordingly, and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) no reversible error occurred in the selection of the jury; (2) the trial court did not prejudicially err in its evidentiary rulings; (3) the evidence was insufficient as to one of the robberies; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the attempted murder conviction; (5) Defendant’s claims of instructional error failed; (6) no prejudicial error occurred during the penalty phase of trial; and (7) Defendant’s challenges to California’s death penalty law failed. View "People v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Penal Code section 424 applies to "[e]ach officer of this state, or of any county, city, town, or district of this state, and every other person charged with the receipt, safekeeping, transfer, or disbursement of public moneys." The court held that section 424 applies only to those public officers imbued with such responsibility over public moneys. In this case, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding defendant, who served as superintendent of the District, was charged with the "receipt, safekeeping, transfer, or disbursement" of public funds. The evidence demonstrated that defendant had explicit contractual responsibilities to oversee the "budget and business affairs" of the District, testimony that superintendents like defendant owe a duty to safeguard school district funds, and defendant‘s responsibility to ensure such public funds were spent in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "People v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of heroin and was sentenced to 16 months in prison. Defendant was given credit for time served, including conduct credits, of 220 days. Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (d), provides that a person who has been resentenced under the measure and given credit for time served “shall be subject to parole for one year following completion of his or her sentence, unless the court, in its discretion, as part of its resentencing order, releases the person from parole.” The court concluded that credit for time served does not reduce the parole period. When it voted on Proposition 47, the electorate was informed, and it intended, that a person who benefited from the new legislation by receiving a reduced sentence would be placed on parole for one year after completion of the reduced sentence, subject to the court's discretion to release the person from that parole. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, in violation of Penal Code section 21310, after a police officer found a Swiss Army knife in defendant's jacket pocket. The Court of Appeal reversed. The court found that the prosecution‘s expert demonstrated that the exposed blade of defendant‘s Swiss Army knife was not fixed or immobile and could be closed simply by applying pressure to the back of the blade. Therefore, the court concluded that the blade was not "locked into position" within the meaning of section 16470, and the knife was not a prohibited dirk or dagger. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Castillolopez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with personal use of a firearm and sentenced to death. Defendant admitted the truth of a special circumstance allegation that he had a prior murder conviction. Defendant was seventeen-years-old when he committed the prior murder, but was tried and convicted as an adult. The court concluded that when a murder committed by a juvenile results in an adult criminal conviction, there is no legal proscription against the use of that conviction as a special circumstance if the defendant murders a second victim after reaching the age of majority. In this case, defendant‘s argument fails to distinguish sufficiently between the permissible use of his prior juvenile murder as an aggravating circumstance and its allegedly improper use as a special circumstance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Defendant, sixteen-years-old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in state prison with the possibility of parole after 50 years. After plaintiff was sentenced, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits a mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentence for a juvenile offender who commits homicide. This court then held in People v. Caballero that the prohibition on life without parole sentences for all juvenile nonhomicide offenders established in Graham v. Florida applied to sentences that were the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence, including Caballero‘s term of 110 years to life. In this case, the court held that Penal Code section 3051 and section 4801 moot defendant‘s constitutional challenge to his sentence by requiring that he receive a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. In light of this holding, the court need not decide whether a life sentence with parole eligibility after 50 years of incarceration is the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional in defendant‘s case. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence. The court remanded so that the trial court may determine whether defendant was afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record at sentencing of mitigating evidence tied to his youth. View "People v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murdering his wife, petitioned for habeas relief contending that he is entitled to relief under the 2014 legislative revision of Penal Code section 1473. The Legislature amended section 1473 to state that - "'false evidence‘ shall include opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances." The court concluded that it is reasonably probable that the false evidence presented by the prosecution's dental expert at petitioner‘s 1997 jury trial affected the outcome of that proceeding. The expert had recanted his expert opinion testimony at trial that a lesion on the wife's hand was a human bite mark matching petitioner‘s unusual teeth. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "People v. Richards" on Justia Law