Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's petition for relief and resentencing under the new procedure set forth in Senate Bill No. 1437 (former Cal. Penal Code 1170.95, subd. (a); now Cal. Penal Code 1172.6, subd. (a)), holding that the trial court erred.Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Twelve years later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437 narrowing or eliminating certain forms of accomplice liability for murder. Petitioner petitioned for relief and resentencing under the new procedure, but the trial court denied the petition for failure to state a prima facie case. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in rejecting Petitioner's prima facie showing and should have proceeded to an evidence hearing on Petitioner's resentencing petition. View "People v. Curiel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal declining to remand this case for resentencing in light of a new law that was enacted after Defendant had been sentenced but while his appeal was still pending, holding that the court of appeal erred.At issue was Senate Bill No. 567, which created a presumption that the sentencing court shall entered a lower term sentence when, inter alia, a "psychological, physical, or childhood trauma" contributed to the offense and set forth the circumstances when a sentencing court may depart from the lower term presumption. Defendant was found guilty of false imprisonment by violence or menace and sentenced to seven years and four months in prison. While Defendant's appeal was pending, Senate Bill 567 was passed, amending Cal. Pen. Code 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (A). The Supreme Court remanded this case for resentencing, holding that the court of appeal erred by finding that the record clearly indicated that the trial court would not have imposed a lower term sentence if it had been aware of the scope of its discretionary powers under the current section 1170 at the time Defendant was sentenced. View "People v. Salazar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that persons facing involuntary commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 6600 et seq., have a due process right to a timely trial but that whether pretrial delay violates that right depends in the first instance on the reasons for the delay. See Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 531.In 2005, Petitioner was determined to be an SVP and committed to the state hospital for two years. The next year, the applicable statute was amended to provide for indefinite commitment instead of renewable two-year terms. Before Petitioner's term ended, the State filed a recommitment petition seeking indefinite commitment under the new version of the statute. Petitioner later filed a motion to dismiss the petition to extend commitment, arguing that the "excessive delay" in his case violated his due process right to a timely trial. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, after which Petitioner filed an original petition for a writ of mandate. The court of appeal denied the writ petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to establish a violation of his due process rights. View "Camacho v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal that a Department of Insurance regulation prohibiting bail bond agents from entering into agreements with jail inmates to be notified when individuals have recently been arrested and thus may be in need of bail bond services was facially invalid under the First Amendment, holding that the court of appeal erred in holding that the regulation was unconstitutional on its face.In declaring the regulation constitutionally invalid the court of appeal concluded that the regulation imposed burdens on the free speech rights of bail bond agents that were not adequately justified by the State's interests in deterring abusive bail solicitation practices. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the regulation burdened a protected speech right, that intermediate scrutiny applied, and that the regulation passed constitutional muster. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeal affirming Defendant's convictions for, among other crimes, first degree murder and two counts of attempted, premeditated murder of a police officer and his sentence of life without the possibility of parole, holding that the trial court's erroneous concurrent intent instruction was prejudicial as to one attempted murder count.At issue was the proper standard of review when a defendant challenges a court's decision to instruct on a concurrent intent - or kill zone - theory as applied to an allegation of attempted murder. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals to the extent it affirmed one of Defendant's attempted murder convictions based on the concurrent intent theory, holding (1) the substantial evidence standard applies to giving or reviewing a concurrent intent instruction; (2) a concurrent intent instruction was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the error was prejudicial as to one of the attempted murder counts. View "People v. Mumin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal affirming Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder, holding that when the record contains substantial evidence of imperfect self defense, the trial court's failure to instruct on that theory amounts to constitutional error and is subject to review under the federal Chapman standard. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed harmful error in denying his request for an instruction on imperfect self-defense. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court erred but that the error was subject to the "reasonable probability" standard for evaluating prejudice set forth in People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (1956) and that Defendant suffered no prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the form of misconstruction in this case precluded the jury from making a finding on a factual issue necessary to establish the element of malice, thus qualifying as a federal error; and (2) the court of appeal's harmless error analysis did not comport with the standards for evaluating prejudice under Chapman. View "People v. Schuller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that because certain statements fell within an exception to the hearsay requirement they automatically qualified for admission into evidence, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that it was not necessary to balance Defendant's confrontation interests against any countervailing government interests.Defendant was charged with inflicting corporate injury upon a person in a dating relationship and residential burglary. The prosecution moved to revoke Defendant's probation based on the same incident. At the criminal trial, the prosecution sought to admit the complaining witness's (N.S.) statements as recorded on a body-worn camera video, but the trial court ruled that the statements were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The court subsequently dismissed the criminal proceeding. At the subsequent probation revocation the court ruled that statements within the first portion of the video qualified as spontaneous statements under Cal. R. Evid. 1240 and admitted N.S.'s statements without making an express finding of good cause for not securing N.S.'s live testimony. The court of appeal affirmed the order revoking Defendant's probation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the statements automatically satisfied the minimum due process requirements necessary for their admission into evidence. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal concluding that the actions of Defendants Lonnie Mitchell and Louis Mitchell were sufficient to demonstrate that each proximately caused the victim's death, regardless of who actually shot the victim, holding that Defendants' deadly actions in this case constituted proximate cause consistent with the holding in People v. Sanchez, 26 Cal. 4th 834.In Sanchez, the Supreme Court upheld the first-degree murder conviction of a defendant who had engaged in a shootout that left an innocent bystander dead. At issue in this case was whether Sanchez's analysis of "substantial concurrent cause" permitted Defendants' convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court, consistent with Sanchez, properly instructed the jury on substantial concurrent causation with respect to the victim's death. View "People v. Carney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal with instructions to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings on Defendant's petition for resentencing, holding that the trial court erred in denying the petition.Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and street terrorism, as well as gang and firearm enhancements. Two years after Defendant was sentenced, the legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 to amend section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, "in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought." Thereafter, Defendant petitioned the trial court for resentencing under what is now Cal. Penal Code1172.6, arguing that his murder conviction was based on the now-invalid natural and probable consequences theory. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendant's second-degree murder conviction, and to the extent the petition was rejected under a direct aiding and abetting theory, the trial court reversibly erred by misunderstanding the legal requirements of direct aiding and abetting implied malice murder. View "People v. Reyes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the judgment of the appellate court reducing the length of Defendant's probation from three years to two, holding that Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) applies retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal.On January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill 1950 became effective and reduced the maximum length of probation for most felonies to two years. While Defendant's appeal from his conviction and sentence was pending, the legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1950. The court of appeal agreed with Defendant that the probation limit applied to Defendant retroactively and that the proper remedy was remand to allow the trial court to allow the parties to renegotiate a resolution. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively to all nonfinal cases; and (2) the proper remedy in this case is to modify the judgment to reflect a new probationary term of two years. View "People v. Prudholme" on Justia Law