Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) as well as the district court's judgment convicting Defendant of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII), holding that certain evidence was inadmissible under Haw. R. Evid. 608(b)..At trial, Defendant's counsel sought to impeach the credibility of police officer Jared Spiker under Rule 608(b), arguing that the "specific instances of conduct" evincing Officer Spiker's untruthfulness were contained in transcripts from three other proceedings in which Officer Spiker was a witness for the state. The district court refused to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Officer Spiker concerning these proceedings. The ICA upheld the evidentiary rulings, holding that the district court had in its possession materials concerning the three other proceedings and therefore did not abuse its discretion in preventing further cross-examination of Officer Spiker concerning his testimony in those proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in finding that two of the prior proceedings were not probative of Officer Spiker's credibility; and (2) to the extent the ICA suggested that the district court reached its judgment by taking into account evidence it had excluded, such suggestion is wrong. View "State v. Su" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for violating Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH) 29-5.1 for engaging in business on any public sidewalk where Defendant's operation tended to or did impede or inconvenience the public or any person, holding that the conviction was not supported by substantial evidence.Defendant set up a table at the edge of the sidewalk along Kalakaua in Waikiki to perform a painting demonstration and showcase his art for sale. A crowd formed to watch as Defendant worked, and some pedestrians were forced to detour around the spectators. The district court convicted Defendant for violating ROH 29-5.1. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erroneously included the spectators as part of his "operation." The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) a defendant's operation does not include spectators over which a defendant has no control; and (2) because there was no evidence that Defendant's operation, excluding spectators, impeded or inconvenienced any person, Defendant's conviction was not supported by substantial evidence. View "State v. Zowail" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction for two counts of sexual assault in the first degree for molesting a minor child, holding that the testimony of Dr. Alexander Bivens, the State's expert witness in child sexual assault dynamics, did not improperly profile Defendant as a child molester.The challenged testimony was not introduced during the State's case-in-chief but, rather, was elicited by the defense during cross-examination. The State further developed that testimony on redirect examination without any objection by the defense. On appeal, Defendant argued that the testimony impermissibly bolstered the child's credibility and improperly profiled him as a molester. The ICA affirmed, concluding that the testimony neither impermissibly profiled nor unduly prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not properly preserve his claim about bolstering and waived his ability to challenge the statements under Haw. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); (2) under plain error review, Defendant's substantial rights were not affected; and (3) the testimony did not improperly profile Defendant as a child molester. View "State v. Engelby" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this criminal matter to the circuit court for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress as to certain drug evidence.Defendant was convicted of one count of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree and one count of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court noticed plain error affecting Defendant's substantial rights with respect to the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Court held (1) a dog sniff conducted by the Kauai Police Department (KPD) was unrelated to the initial stop and seizure of the truck driven by Defendant for evidence of the alleged theft of a purse; (2) KPD did not have independent reasonable suspicion to believe the truck contained drugs; and (3) therefore, the dog sniff violated Defendant's constitutional right against unreasonable searches. View "State v. Ikimaka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of assault in the second degree, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses was violated when the circuit court prevented defense counsel from cross-examining the complainant about a potential source of bias.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in precluding the defense from cross-examining the complainant about disciplinary action the complainant might have faced as a United States Marine for instigating a fight in violation of its code of conduct provisions. Defendant further argued that the court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as to the contents of a security video that recorded the altercation but that had subsequently been destroyed. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the defense was prevented from questioning the complainant about a potential source bias, the jury did not have sufficient information from which to make an informed appraisal of the complainant's motives or bias. The Court also provided guidance concerning the admissibility of other evidence as to the contents of a destroyed video recording under Haw. R. Evid. R. 1004 and 403. View "State v. Miranda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for violating a protective order for coming within 100 feet of the complainant while at his place of work, holding that Defendant's place of work was not a "neutral location" under the terms of the protective order.The order for protection at issue prohibited Defendant from coming within 100 feet of the protected party at a "neutral location." Defendant was convicted of violating the order of protection after he encountered the protected party on the steps of the Fifth Circuit courthouse, where he worked as a documents clerk. On appeal, Defendant argued that the courthouse was not a "neutral place" because it was his place of employment. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the order for protection is ambiguous and must therefore be construed in favor of Defendant; (2) in accordance with the rule of lenity, a "neutral location" is a place that is unaffiliated with either party; and (3) because Defendant's workplace was not a neutral location Defendant did not violate the order for protection. View "State v. Bright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the intermediate court of appeals' judgment on appeal (ICA) inasmuch as the opinion implicitly affirmed the circuit court's calculation at resentencing of Defendant's credit for time served under his 2001 sentence without accurately applying Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-671(2), holding that Defendant's 2017 resentencing failed to give him full credit for time he served on his 2001 sentence.In 2001, Defendant was convicted and sentenced for seven counts of sexual assault in the first degree and other offenses. Defendant later filed a habeas corpus petition, which the federal district court granted. The court vacated Defendant's 2001 sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that the 2001 sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In 2017, Defendant was resentenced. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in calculating his credit for time served. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the circuit court erred in calculating Defendant's credit for time served. View "State v. Thompson " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanding Defendant's criminal case to the circuit court, holding that it was within the circuit court's discretion to dismiss the drug charge against Defendant as de minimis.Defendant was charged with criminal trespass onto state lands and promotion of a dangerous drug in the third degree. Defendant moved to dismiss his drug charge as de minimis pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-236. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that attendant circumstances weighed in favor of dismissal. In addition, the circuit court determined that criminal trespass onto state lands was not a property crime and accordingly did not constitute a "harm" or "evil" with which the drug statute was concerned. The ICA remanded the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was within he circuit court's discretion to dismiss the charge against Defendant as de minimis; (2) while there were errors of fact in the circuit court's order dismissing the charge, those errors were harmless; and (3) while criminal trespass onto state lands is a property crime, it is not the type of property crime that motivated the legislature to criminalize possession of any amount of a dangerous drug. View "State v. Enos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, holding that Defendant's untimely filing of his application for writ of certiorari was due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore, this Court may consider the merits of the issues raised in the application.Defendant sought and received an extension of time to file an application for a writ of certiorari. After the extended due date, Defendant filed his application for writ of certiorari. In his motion to accept the untimely application, Defendant argued that the Court should consider his application on the merits because the failure to file within the deadline resulted from either computer system error or his counsel's mistake. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) certiorari review is a critical stage of criminal proceedings in which a defendant has the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; (2) because defense counsel failed to ensure the timely filing of the certiorari application, Defendant was deprived of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, and this Court may consider the merits of the issues raised in the certiorari application; and (3) the ICA did not err in affirming the district court's judgment. View "State v. Uchima" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence for criminal property damage in the second degree, holding that the risk of unfair prejudice posed by the introduction of four prior incidents of aggressive and erratic behavior by Defendant directed at the complaining witnesses and their home substantially outweighed their limited probative value.Defendant was charged with criminal property damage in the second degree for damaging the complainants' vehicle. During trial, the trial court allowed, over Defendant's objections, the State to introduce evidence of the four prior incidents. The court further permitted the State to adduce evidence of the fear the complaining witnesses experienced experienced as a result of the prior incidents and the countermeasures they undertook in response to the incidents. Defendant was convicted. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' judgments, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in its application of Haw. R. Evid. 403; and (2) the court's error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Gallagher" on Justia Law