Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for escape in the second degree but remanded the matter to the circuit court for calculation of Defendant's presentence detention credit consistent with this opinion, holding that the circuit court erred when it denied Defendant's credit for time serve on the sentence imposed for the escape conviction.Defendant was serving a term of life imprisonment when he left the Laumaka Work Furlough Center in Honolulu and did not return. A jury later convicted Defendant of escape in the second degree, and the circuit court imposed a five-year prison term to run concurrent to his life sentence. The circuit court denied Defendant credit for time served. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal, holding that the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court's decision denying Defendant credit for time served on his escape conviction. View "State v. Abihai" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the order of the circuit court dismissing the charge against Defendant for possession of a dangerous drug in the third degree, holding that the ICA erred in holding that, in order to prevail on a motion to dismiss a possessory drug violation as de minimis, a defendant must prove that the possessed drugs could not have any pharmacological or physiological effect.The charge against Defendant stemmed from the discovery that he was in possession of .005 grams of a substance containing cocaine. The circuit court found that the violation was de minimis and dismissed the charge. The ICA vacated the circuit court's order, determining that the circuit court erred in finding that the cocaine possessed by Defendant could not have had any pharmacological or physiological effect upon consumption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the record supported the determination that Defendant's violation was de minimis because the possessed drug was neither usable nor saleable; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge. View "State v. Melendez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the family court convicting Defendant on two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, holding that the ICA did not err in affirming the family court.At issue on appeal was the jurisdiction of the family court to try Defendant and the propriety of instructing the jury on a lesser included offense. The ICA affirmed, concluding that the family court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 571-14(a)(1) and that there was no rational basis to support an instruction of the lesser included offense of sexual assault in the third degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the jury should have been instructed to determine jurisdictional facts, the error was harmless; and (2) the family court was not obligated to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of sexual assault in the third degree. View "State v. Malave " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court primarily affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of various counts, including attempted murder of a police officer, and sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus ten years, holding that the issues Defendant raised on certiorari lacked merit.In his application for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court Defendant raised five questions, including the issue of whether the ICA committed grave errors of law and fact when it held that the trial court properly admitted evidence of Defendant's suicide attempt the day after the shooting. The Supreme Court addressed Defendant's question regarding his suicide attempt, holding (1) evidence of a suicide or attempted suicide is not automatically admissible as relevant to a defendant's consciousness of guilt, and (2) the circuit court correctly ruled that the evidence was admissible as probative of Defendant's identity as to the person who had committed the offenses charged. Further, the Court noted plain error affecting Defendant's substantial rights with respect to the lack of a merger instruction on Defendant's firearms convictions and remanded the relevant counts to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction of sexual assault in the first degree on the complaining witness pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 707-730(1)(b), holding that the ICA did not err in affirming the family court.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the jury should have been instructed to determine jurisdictional facts, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the ICA did not err in finding that there was no rational basis in the record to support providing the jury instruction of the lesser included offense of sexual assault in the third degree. View "State v. Malave" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction for failing to comply with the requirements of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291C-13, holding that both the complaint and the evidence were insufficient.Section 291C-13 requires that when an accident occurs, the driver that causes damage must stop the vehicle at, or as close as possible to, the accident scene and remain there until the driver has provided certain identifying information. The statute also requires that every such stop be made without obstructing traffic more than necessary. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction because, where it was necessary for the parties to move their vehicles out of traffic, the State was required to prove that the stop at the accident scene could have been made without obstructing traffic more than necessary. Defendant further argued that because the complaint and charge did not allege that "[e]very stop shall are made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary" she was not fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the complaint was insufficient; and (2) the State failed to prove that Defendant did not provide the required statutory information to the police after the accident in this case. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

On Defendant's appeal from his convictions of driving without a license and of no motor vehicle insurance, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings, holding that there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of Defendant's fundamental right to a jury trial.Specifically, the Court held (1) the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was not in constructive possession of a license from Mexico or Canada, which would have exempted him from licensing requirements pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 286-105; (2) the ICA erred by requiring Defendant to present evidence of a "borrower/lender relationship" with the registered owner of the vehicle to assert the "good faith lack of knowledge" defense, but this error did not require vacating Defendant's no motor vehicle insurance conviction; but (3) there was no valid waiver of Defendant's right to a jury trial on the charge of driving without a license, and therefore, Defendant's convictions must be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Domut" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's challenge for cause of Juror 48, an error that required that Defendant's conviction be vacated, but that double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial.Defendant was convicted of two counts of theft and one count of criminal property damage. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the circuit court erred by denying his challenge to two prospective jurors for cause, thereby violating his right to peremptory challenges. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court held that Defendant's conviction must be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because the circuit court improperly denied Defendant's challenge for cause of Juror 48, which required him to exercise one of his peremptory challenges to excuse that juror and caused him to exhaust his peremptory challenge, which impaired his right to exercise a peremptory challenge on a different juror. But because there was substantial evidence to support Defendant's convictions, double jeopardy principles did not preclude a retrial. View "State v. Carroll" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction on the charge of assault in the third degree, holding that the deputy prosecuting attorney's elicitation of evidence regarding Child Welfare Services' involvement in violation of a defense motion in limine was improper and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Defendant was charged with assault in the second degree against his minor son. A jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree. On appeal, Defendant argued that the family court plainly erred by failing to strike certain improper opening statements made by the deputy prosecuting attorney and by admitting certain x-rays into evidence without the necessary foundation. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, holding (1) the prosecutor improperly elicited evidence, and the error affected Defendant's substantial rights and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) there was insufficient foundation for admission of the contested x-rays into evidence; and (3) the conviction of assault in the third degree was supported by substantial evidence. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of kidnapping, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the "restraint" required to support a kidnapping conviction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 707-720(1)(d) is restraint in excess of any restraint incidental to the infliction or intended infliction of bodily injury or subjection or intended subjection of a person to a sexual offense.Defendant was charged with one count of kidnapping and one count of third degree assault in connection with a single incident. The third degree assault count was dismissed before trial, and, after a trial, Defendant was found guilty on the kidnapping count. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the circuit court plainly erred in not instructing the jury that Defendant's restraint of the complaining witness had to be restraint in excess of restraint incidental to any intended infliction of bodily injury or a sexual offense upon the complaining witness. View "State v. Sheffield" on Justia Law