Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court overruled State v. Hamili, 952 P.2d 390 (1998), which held that prohibited fishing with gill nets was a nonprobationable offense, holding that the underlying offenses at issue in this case were probationable, and therefore, Hamili is overruled.Defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby he agreed to plead guilty or no contest to hunting hours (count III) and artificial light prohibited (count IV), both petty misdemeanors. Defendant filed a motion for a deferred acceptance of no contest (DANC) plea requesting that the circuit court defer acceptance of his no contest pleas pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 853. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion for a DANC plea. Defendant was subsequently convicted of count III and count IV. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant was ineligible for a DANC plea under Haw. Rev. Stat. 853-4(a)(5) because the offenses to which he pled no contest were nonprobationable. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal and Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion for a DANC plea. View "State v. Medeiros" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Defendant could be convicted of homicide if the victim's death was the immediate result of the victim's family's choice to withdraw medical care. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of manslaughter and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the circuit court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on causation and culpability pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-215 and 207-216.After Defendant severely beat the victim, the victim was comatose for more than a week. Twelve days later, the victim was removed from life support and declared dead. A jury found Defendant guilty of manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Haw. Rev. Stat. 327E-13(b), a provision in the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, which prohibits designated as a homicide any "[d]eath resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of health care" under the Act, did not shield Defendant from conviction; and (2) the jury should have been given instructions on causation pursuant to sections 702-215 and 702-216, which would have enabled the jury to consider whether the intervening volitional conduct of the medical team and family interrupted the chain of causation between Defendant's actions and the victim's death such that it would be unjust to convict Defendant of homicide. View "State v. Abella" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempted murder in the second degree arising from the stabbing of Defendant's friend, holding that the jury's discovery of "stains" during an improper examination of Defendant's clothing to search for evidence of blood during deliberations was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.During deliberations, the jurors requested scissors to cut open the packaging containing Defendant's clothing, and three of the jurors examined the clothing for blood. The jurors found small spots on the inside of the pants and determined that the spots must be blood. The stains had not been introduced as evidence during trial. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the jurors' discovery of the stains constituted an outside influence that may have tainted the jury's impartiality, and the jury's exposure to the stains was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Pitts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that the deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA) improperly referenced a pathologist's testimony as a defense expert in two of the most well-publicized murder trials in Hawai'i within the last decade, which affected Defendant's substantial right to a fair trial.Defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years of incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenged the DPA's cross-examination of James Navin, N.D., who had testified in the murder trials involving Kirk Lankford and Matthew Higa, and closing arguments about that testimony. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the DPA committed misconduct in referencing Navin's testimony, and the error deprived Defendant of her right to a fair trial. View "State v. Udo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversing the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered from a search of Defendant's residence, holding that the ICA erred in not accepting the circuit court's findings of fact and in concluding that the particularity requirement was satisfied.As the basis for his motion to suppress Defendant argued that the search warrant did not state with specificity the subunit of the multiple-occupancy building he resided in. The circuit court concluded that the search warrant did not describe Defendant's subunit with particularity and that the search violated Defendant's constitutional rights. The ICA reversed, holding that there residence was not a multiple-occupancy building. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the warrant was invalid because it did not particularly describe Defendant's unit; and (2) the search violated Defendant's constitutional rights. View "State v. Rodrigues" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment on appeal of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) to the extent that it affirmed the circuit court's order of resentencing and revocation of probation, holding that the ICA gravely erred in affirming the order of resentencing and revocation of probation.Defendant pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault in the second degree. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to probation. Defendant later left Hawai'i to visit his father while in Louisiana. In Louisiana, Defendant was arrested for an outstanding warrant from a previous sexual assault in Arkansas. After Defendant failed to report to his probation officer the State filed a motion for revocation of probation. The circuit court found that Defendant inexcusably violated a substantial condition of probation by failing to report to his probation officer and resentenced Defendant. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in using Defendant's argument that he did not inexcusably violate the terms of his probation as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence in contravention of the rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Stat v. Kamano, 82 P.3d 401 (2003). View "State v. Fleetwood " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the circuit court dismissing John Doe's appeal from a ruling of the Department of the Attorney General (AG), holding that the record did not support the AG's ruling.Doe, a registered sex offender in the State of Washington, requested a declaratory ruling as to whether he was required to register as a sex offender in Hawai'i before visiting Hawai'i with his family for more than ten days. The AG issued a ruling that Doe was required to register in Hawai'i. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record did not support the AG's decision. View "Doe v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeal (ICA) and the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of Haw. R. Pen. P. (HRPP) 48(c)(5).On the day of his scheduled jury trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss indictment for violation of HRPP Rule 48, asserting the violation based on the passage of 181 unexcludable days, a difference of only one day from the requirement that trial commence within 180 days. The circuit court denied the motion. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of manslaughter. The ICA affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that a nearly three-month delay was not excludable because he was not "unavailable" for purposes of Rule 48. The Supreme Court set aside Defendant's conviction, holding (1) the time period a defendant continues to be held in State custody in a mainland prison after his conviction is set aside and a new trial ordered is not excludable under Rule 48(c)(5); and (2) therefore, the time Defendant spent in Arizona in State custody was not excludable under Rule 48(c)(5), and the circuit court erred in denying the Rule 48 motion. View "State v. Hernane" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court vacated the sentence set forth in the circuit court judgment and affirmed by the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and otherwise affirmed the lower courts' judgments, holding that the State violated Defendant's due process rights.Defendant was convicted of four offenses. The ICA vacated three of the convictions. On remand, the State was given the option of either retrying Defendant on the charges underlying three convictions vacated by the appellate court or dismissing two of those charges and having the trial court reinstate the conviction on the remaining charge. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the three counts, arguing that Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 (b)(3) had been violated. The circuit court denied the motion. The State failed to disclose which two of the three charges would be dismissed before Defendant exercised the right of allocution at sentencing. Defendant was subsequently resentenced. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding ((1) the ICA correctly concluded that the circuit court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 48(b)(3); but (2) Defendant's right of allocution was violated by the court’s failure to require timely disclosure of the offense for which Defendant would be sentenced. View "State v. Carlton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions of murder in the second degree, carrying or use of a firearm in the commission of a separate felony, ownership or possession prohibited of any firearm, and place to keep loaded firearms other than pistols and revolvers, holding that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence five instances of prior abuse committed by Defendant and erred by not submitting a merger instruction to the jury.Defendant was convicted of fatally shooting his longtime girlfriend. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence five instance of prior abuse that were not shown to be followed by a period of separation between Defendant and the decedent. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions, holding (1) the prior bad acts were inadmissible to rebut Defendant's extreme mental and emotional distress defense, the circuit court erred in admitting the prior incidents of misconduct and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury was improperly instructed on the use of the prior bad acts; and (2) the circuit court's failure to submit a merger instruction constituted plain error and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Lavoie" on Justia Law