Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction for operating or assuming actual physical control of a vehicle with .08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, holding that the district court erred in admitting two sworn statements by an Intoxilyzer supervisor to prove that the Intoxilyzer used to test Defendant’s breath alcohol content was in proper working order. The court held that the statements were improperly admitted under the public records exception because they contained an evaluative opinion that did not constitute a “matter observed” within the meaning of Haw. R. Evid. 803(b)(8). Therefore, the State failed to lay a sufficient foundation that the Intoxilyzer was in proper working order when the breath test was administered to Defendant. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

An anticipatory search warrant must, on its face, identify the triggering condition on the face of the warrant to be valid.Petitioners were charged with drug offenses based on evidence seized in a search conducted pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant. The circuit court denied Petitioners’ motion to suppress the evidence, and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and the circuit court’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to suppress, holding that, in light of this opinion, the search warrant was unlawful. The court remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Curtis" on Justia Law

In this summary disposition order, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest but reversed Defendant’s conviction for burglary in the second degree. The court held that the intermediate court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s motion of acquittal as to the burglary count. Specifically, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. King, 386 P.3d 886 (2016), Defendant’s contravention of a written trespass warning did not constitute an unlawful entry for the purposes of burglary in the second degree. Accordingly, a reasonable juror could not have concluded, based on the evidence, that Defendant was guilty of burglary in the second degree. View "State v. Collins " on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of methamphetamine trafficking in the first degree and two counts of prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia. The circuit court imposed a mandatory minimum term of thirteen years and four months on Defendant’s twenty-year sentence on the methamphetamine trafficking charge because Defendant had a prior conviction for methamphetamine trafficking. The Supreme Court remanded Defendant’s case to the circuit court for a new trial, holding that the circuit court erred in construing Defendant’s prior conviction as an element of the offense, thus unnecessarily subjecting Defendant to potential prejudice due to the jurors learning of his prior felony conviction. View "State v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. Before he decided whether to submit to alcohol concentration testing, Defendant was affirmatively advised that he was not entitled to an attorney before submitting to any such tests. Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII) and refusal to submit to a breath, blood, and/or urine test. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the evidence was obtained in violation of his right to consult with counsel as provided by Haw. Rev. Stat. 803-9. The district court denied the motion to suppress. After a trial, Defendant was convicted of OVUII and the refusal offense. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the advisory given in this case is inconsistent with Hawaii’s statutory right to access counsel; but (2) under the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s refusal to submit to testing was not subject to suppression. View "State v. Scalera" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of Counts VI and VIII in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 709-906(1) and (5). The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, ruling (1) regarding Count VI, the self-defense and defense of others jury instructions were not plainly erroneous; and (2) regarding Count VIII, the circuit court properly refused the time-specific elements instruction and did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the ICA’s judgment as to Count VI, holding that the circuit court properly gave the relevant jury instructions; but (2) vacated the lower courts’ judgment as to Count VIII, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, as the trial testimony of the complaining witness created a material time variance from the State’s response to the notice of alibi, thus undermining the defense that Defendant prepared. View "State v. Yang " on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of disorderly conduct. The district court sentenced Defendant to six months of probation, seventy-five hours of community service, and $105 in fees and assessments. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the evidence failed to prove that she engaged in “tumultuous behavior” within the meaning of the disorderly conduct statute. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction, concluding that the prosecution presented substantial evidence to show that Defendant engaged in tumultuous behavior. The Supreme Court reversed the ICA’s judgment and the district court’s order, holding that the State did not present substantial evidence that Defendant’s conduct was “tumultuous” within the meaning of the disorderly conduct statute, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. View "State v. Teale" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison for numerous sexual assaults on a minor. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but reversed his sentence, holding (1) the circuit court did not explain adequately its reasons for imposing multiple consecutive prison terms on Defendant; and (2) the circuit court improperly appeared to use Defendant’s refusal to accept guilt - or his lack of remorse - as an aggravating factor in imposing his sentence. Remanded for resentencing before another judge. View "State v. Barrios" on Justia Law

Defendant was placed under arrest for theft in the fourth degree. At the time of the arrest, Defendant was issued a trespass warning. Defendant subsequently violated the trespass warning. That violation was used as the underlying basis for Defendant’s ensuing charge of burglary in the second degree. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the State’s reliance on the written trespass warning failed to establish probable cause that he violated the second-degree burglary statute. The circuit court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The intermediate court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was probable cause to support the charge of burglary in the second degree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the violation of a trespass warning may not be used as an underlying basis for a charge of second-degree burglary; and (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that there was no probable cause to support the felony information. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by complaint with one count of unauthorized possession of confidential personal information (UPCPI). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. The circuit court granted the motion in part. The intermediate court of appeals vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the UPCPI statutes are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. In a separate dismissal motion, Defendant alleged that the complaint failed to provide him fair notice of the nature and cause of the accusation. The circuit court dismissed the case, concluding (1) the complaint was fatally defective because it denied Defendant of his right to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and (2) the UPCPI statutes were not void for vagueness but were overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the complaint was legally insufficient; (2) the UPCPI statutes are not facially overbroad; and (3) portions of the UPCPI statutes are unconstitutionally vague, but they are severable from the constitutional parts of the statutes. View "State v. Pacquing" on Justia Law