Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was placed under arrest for theft in the fourth degree. At the time of the arrest, Defendant was issued a trespass warning. Defendant subsequently violated the trespass warning. That violation was used as the underlying basis for Defendant’s ensuing charge of burglary in the second degree. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the State’s reliance on the written trespass warning failed to establish probable cause that he violated the second-degree burglary statute. The circuit court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The intermediate court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was probable cause to support the charge of burglary in the second degree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the violation of a trespass warning may not be used as an underlying basis for a charge of second-degree burglary; and (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that there was no probable cause to support the felony information. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by complaint with one count of unauthorized possession of confidential personal information (UPCPI). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. The circuit court granted the motion in part. The intermediate court of appeals vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the UPCPI statutes are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. In a separate dismissal motion, Defendant alleged that the complaint failed to provide him fair notice of the nature and cause of the accusation. The circuit court dismissed the case, concluding (1) the complaint was fatally defective because it denied Defendant of his right to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and (2) the UPCPI statutes were not void for vagueness but were overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the complaint was legally insufficient; (2) the UPCPI statutes are not facially overbroad; and (3) portions of the UPCPI statutes are unconstitutionally vague, but they are severable from the constitutional parts of the statutes. View "State v. Pacquing" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary in the second degree. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to compel discovery requesting access to the property where he allegedly committed the criminal offense. The circuit court denied the motion to compel. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of burglary in the second degree. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to compel discovery and that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was wrongly denied access to the crime scene, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Tetu" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of theft in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft in the second degree. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s judgment of conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding (1) there was a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting Defendant of theft in the first degree and convicting him of theft in the second degree; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft in the second degree, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Faamama" on Justia Law

Hawaii News Now (HNN) submitted an application for extended coverage for the criminal case, State v. Nilsawit, which involved the controversy regarding the Honolulu Police Department’s then-practice of allowing undercover police officers to engage in sexual conduct with people selling sexual services during sting operations. The district court prohibited HNN from televising or publishing the faces or likenesses of three officers involved in the case. HNN filed a motion for leave to appeal. The district court denied HNN’s motion, concluding that HNN exceeded the five-day period within within which a motion for review of an order regarding coverage must be filed under the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii (RSCH) Rule 5.1(f)(8). HNN appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed HNN’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where the request for extended coverage originates from a member of the media, review of a district court’s decision regarding that request is limited to the procedure set forth in RSCH Rule 5.1(f)(8); and (2) further, there is no independent statutory authority that would allow the ICA to review the district court’s decision. View "State v. Nilsawit" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of robbery in the second degree, kidnapping as a class A felony, and kidnapping as a class B felony. The circuit court merged Count 1 - the robbery, a lesser grade class B felony - into Count 2 - one of the kidnappings, a higher grade class A felony. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence as to Count 2 as a class A felony and remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction on Count 2 as a Class B felony and resentencing on Count 2, concluding that the circuit court erred in convicting Defendant of kidnapping as a class A felony on Count 2 because Defendant was entitled to the mitigating defense, which would have reduced the kidnapping to a class B felony. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the ICA erred in remanding the case for resentencing solely on the Count 2 kidnapping conviction because the kidnapping convictions merged into the robbery conviction. Remanded for the circuit court to reinstate Defendant’s conviction on Count 1 and to dismiss the convictions on Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 and to resentence Defendant on Count 1 only based on the merger of Counts 2 through 5 into Count 1. View "State v. Deguair " on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with manslaughter, and the case went to trial. After deliberating, the jurors sent a note to the court expressing concern for their safety. The circuit court subsequently declared a mistrial based on manifest necessity due to the jurors’ concerns about their safety. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in finding manifest necessity and declaring a mistrial, and (2) further prosecution was prohibited on double jeopardy grounds. The circuit court denied the motion, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the presumption of prejudice was not overcome beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that manifest necessity existed for a mistrial; and (2) accordingly, the court properly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. View "State v. Gouveia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the judgment of conviction of the circuit court, holding (1) the State did not lay a proper foundation to introduce the results of a Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrometer (FTIR) test, and therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion by permitting a criminalist with the Honolulu Police Department to testify that the results of the test conclusively established that the substances police officers recovered from Defendant contained methamphetamine; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Subia" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder and assault. Defendant was found unfit to proceed due to mental disease or disorder, and the proceedings against him were suspended until further court order. Defendant was committed to the custody of the Director of Health. The Director then moved for a transfer of Defendant’s custody from the Hospital to the Department of Public Safety (DPS). The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that pending a ruling that he had regained fitness, as an unfit person, Defendant could not be transferred to the DPS. The day after the Director’s appeal, the circuit court found Defendant fit to proceed and committed him to the custody of the DPS. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) dismissed the Director’s appeal as moot, ruling that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear the appeal because custody of Defendant had already been transferred from the Director to the DPS and no exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s order, holding that the ICA erred in not considering the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. Remanded. View "State v. Tui" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for the attempted murder of his wife. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Haw. Const. art. I, 7 by denying his motion to suppress. The Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s conviction, concluding that the circuit court erred in applying the plain view doctrine to the discovery of certain evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the ICA’s judgment on appeal and affirmed the trial court’s amended judgment of conviction, holding (1) the ICA adopted an interpretation of the plain view doctrine that is contrary to the Court’s prior decisions and the protections and limits of the rights guaranteed under Haw. Const. art. I, 7; and (2) the warrantless seizure of the evidence at issue was lawful. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law