Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The district court adjudged Defendant guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. On certiorari, Defendant argued that he did not constitutionally consent to a breath test that was taken after his arrest for OVUII because his consent was coerced by an implied consent form that conveyed a threat of imprisonment and punishment for refusal to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the district court’s judgment, holding that the result of Defendant’s breath test was the produced of a warrantless search, and therefore, the motion to suppress should have been granted. Remanded. View "State v. Gladman " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in (1) denying his post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal on statute of limitations grounds, and (2) denying his request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of sexual assault in the third degree. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated Defendant’s conviction on the ground that the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury on sexual assault in the third degree. Defendant appealed, challenging the ICA’s rejection of his claim that his post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted by the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; but (2) erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt facts establishing the timeliness of the prosecution, but this error was harmless. View "State v. Abdon" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of operating a vehicle after license and privilege have been suspended of revoked for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in permitting the State to amend the charge against Defendant to allege the required mens rea for the offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the defective charge did not constitute a jurisdictional defect that failed to confer subject-matter jurisdiction to the district court; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims lacked merit. View "State v. Gomez " on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). Defendant was subsequently taken to the police station where she read an implied consent form, which conveyed a threat of imprisonment and significant punishment for refusal to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test. Defendant chose to take a breath test. Defendant was later convicted of OVUII. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the breath test result, arguing that she did not constitutionally consent to the breath test because her consent was coerced by the implied consent form. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded to the district court, holding that, in light of State v. Won, the result of Defendant’s breath test is the product of a warrantless search. View "State v. Tavares " on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of entering or remaining in a public park during posted closure hours in violation of Honolulu ordinances. Defendant waived the “involvement” of a public defender after consulting with the public defender’s office before trial. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that Defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was not knowingly and intelligently made, as the district court failed to conduct a formal inquiry regarding Defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel. View "State v. Deming " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of assault in the third degree. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to thirty days’ imprisonment and increased Defendant’s bail from $200 to $2,000 cash only pending execution of sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) the circuit court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury on mutual affray; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in increasing Defendant’s bail from $200 to $2,000 cash only. Because there was sufficient evidence for the conviction, the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Henley" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by police officers while driving his vehicle and was subsequently arrested for operating his vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. Defendant was asked to submit to a test for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration. The police informed Defendant of his right to refuse to consent to a bodily search but told him if he exercised that right, his refusal to consent would result in a potential thirty-day term of imprisonment. The intermediate court of appeals upheld Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test and the statutory scheme imposing sanctions for withdrawing consent. Defendant appealed, arguing that the BAC evidence in this case was obtained in an unconstitutional manner and should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the result of Defendant’s breath test, the product of a warrantless search, was not admissible into evidence because voluntary consent was not demonstrated, and no other exception to the warrant requirement was applicable. View "State v. Won" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of committing robbery in the second degree. The jury was not required to find that Defendant had any prior convictions. The prosecution filed a post-conviction motion for the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and introduced into evidence the judgment for Defendant’s prior convictions. The circuit court took judicial notice on file for both of Defendant’s prior convictions and granted the State’s motion for imposition of mandatory minimum period of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting that, in accordance with Alleyne v. United States, a jury should have considered the facts alleged in the prosecution’s motion for imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) repeat offender sentencing under section 706-606.5 enhances the penalty of the crime committed, and therefore, a defendant’s predicate prior conviction(s) must be alleged in the charging instrument; (2) a jury is required to find that the defendant’s prior conviction(s) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt to trigger the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under section 706-606.5; but (3) these rules are given prospective effect only. View "State v. Auld" on Justia Law

In 2008, Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). The charging instrument did not allege that the offense took place on a public way, street, road, or highway. Two years later, the Supreme Court held in State v. Wheeler that operation of a vehicle on “a public way, street, road, or highway” is an attendant circumstance of the offense of OVUII and must be stated in the charge. Based on Wheeler, Defendant filed a petition to vacate and set aside the judgment under Haw. R. Penal P. 40, arguing that the complaint was fatally defective, thereby conferring no subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court. The district court denied the Rule 40 petition, concluding that Wheeler did not apply retroactively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the criminal jurisdiction of the district court is provided by Haw. Rev. Stat. 604; and (2) in this case, the district court had jurisdiction over the OVUII charge by satisfaction of the requirements set forth in chapter 604, and the fact that the OVUII charge failed to allege an element of the offense did not extinguish the criminal jurisdiction of the district court. View "Schwartz v. State" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of one each each of harassment and trespass. After a restitution hearing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution to the complaining witness, which included restitution for a ten-day period when the complaining witness was unable to work due to her injuries. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the restitution order, holding that lost wages are not a compensable category of restitution pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-646. The Supreme Court vacated in part the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the district court’s order of restitution as it related to lost wages, holding (1) section 706-646 permits restitution for reasonable and verified lost wages in appropriate circumstances; and (2) the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Defendant to pay restitution for wages that the complaining witness lost as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct. View "State v. DeMello" on Justia Law