Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2017, Brown was charged with violating section 2(a)(1) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1)), which requires a person who possesses a firearm in Illinois to have a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card issued by the State Police. Brown challenged section 2(a)(1) as unconstitutional as applied under the Second Amendment. The circuit court dismissed the charge, finding that the legislature did not intend for the FOID Act to apply in a person’s home because “such an interpretation would lead to absurd and unworkable results.”The Illinois Supreme Court stated: “The circuit court’s ruling that section 2(a)(1) … is unconstitutional as applied was not necessary to the resolution of this case. Therefore, we remand this cause … direct that the order … be vacated." When the cause was remanded, the matter proceeded before a new judge, who adopted the reasoning of an Illinois Supreme Court dissent and again found the section unconstitutional as applied.The Illinois Supreme Court again vacated and remanded. The circuit court had no authority to set aside the directions on remand and enter a different order. The mandate was “precise and unambiguous.” On remand, “the circuit court shall not entertain any motion from any party, nor take any action other than entering the modified order.” View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

Sroga was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor under the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4-104(a)(4)) for displaying an unauthorized license plate on a vehicle. He later filed a petition under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, asserting that his conviction violated the Illinois proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 11). He argued that section 3-703 of the Vehicle Code created a Class C misdemeanor covering the same conduct for which he was convicted but imposed a lesser penalty. Neither provision contained an express mental state requirement.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The court inferred a requisite mental state of knowledge for Sroga’s section 4-104(a)(4) conviction and concluded that the parallel provision in section 3-703 imposes absolute liability. Although the two offenses criminalize the same physical act, they possess different mental state requirements. Because section 4-104(a)(4) has an inferred mental state of knowledge and section 3-703 imposes absolute liability, the imposition of harsher punishment for a conviction under section 4-104(a)(4) than under section 3-703 is constitutionally sound. View "People v. Sroga" on Justia Law

Smith was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder; two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm; and one count each of home invasion, armed robbery, and aggravated battery of a child. Because the trial court failed to rule on his pro se post-conviction petition within 90 days, the petition automatically advanced to the second stage of proceedings. Assistant Public Defender Avant was appointed to represent Smith and filed a Rule 651(c) certificate. The Rule provides: “The record filed in that court shall contain a showing, which may be made by the certificate of petitioner’s attorney, that [(1)] the attorney has consulted with petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in-person to ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, [(2)] has examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and [(3)] has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” Avant left the public defender’s office; Underwood was subsequently appointed and represented Smith at a hearing on the state's motion to dismiss.The trial court dismissed his petition. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Smith’s argument that Underwood’s representation did not comply with Rule 651(c). Underwood was not required to independently demonstrate compliance with Rule 651(c) when all that remained for her to do upon assuming the role of second-stage postconviction counsel was orally argue against the motion to dismiss. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault against his daughter and his stepdaughter. During rebuttal closing arguments the prosecutor, in response to the defense’s remarks about “uncorroborated” testimony, that the defense also had subpoena power. Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment.The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the judgment. While the defense has no burden to produce evidence, the statement was an accurate and reasonable response to defense counsel’s claim that the prosecution should have called certain witnesses. The comment was not substantially prejudicial. It was brief, constituting three lines in nearly 17 pages of the trial transcript. The prosecutor and the jury instructions subsequently reminded the jury that the state has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is not required to prove his innocence, and that closing arguments are not evidence. The prosecutor’s statement that hearsay is “something that’s said outside of court” and “[i]t’s a rule we can’t bring in hearsay” and that defense counsel was aware of that rule did not constitute a clear and obvious error. The evidence against the defendant was not closely balanced, so the comment was not prejudicial. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILCS 150/1, the state initiated forfeiture proceedings against currency totaling $223,743 that was seized from a van driven by Tyler, but owned by Salaam, following a traffic stop. The forfeiture complaint alleged that there was probable cause to believe that the currency was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance. The state unsuccessfully attempted to serve Tyler with notice of the forfeiture proceedings by mail, before serving notice by publication. No one filed a claim to the currency. The circuit court entered a default judgment of forfeiture. More than two years later, Salaam moved to vacate, arguing that the judgment was void because he was not served with notice. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that it had in rem jurisdiction over the currency; that notice was properly given to the driver, as the “owner or interest holder” of the currency; and that Salaam was not entitled to notice because he was not an “owner or interest holder.” The appellate court affirmed,The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction of the case under the Forfeiture Act and had in rem jurisdiction over the seized currency, so any failure to comply with statutory notice rendered its judgment voidable, not void. Any challenge to that order had to be filed within two years of its entry. Salaam’s motion was not timely. View "Alvarez v. $59,914 United States Currency" on Justia Law

In 2004, Grant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault. The trial court merged the counts and sentenced him to 14 years in prison. In 2013, Grant sought forensic testing of a hair that was discovered during a post-assault examination of the victim. It was subsequently discovered that all the forensic evidence in Grant’s case was destroyed in 2007, pursuant to Peoria Police Department policy.Defense counsel moved for a new trial or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, citing PPD’s failure to fulfill its duty to preserve the forensic evidence as required by 725 ILCS 5/116-4. The circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court vacated Grant’s conviction, remanded for further proceedings, and ordered a jury instruction at any retrial that the state failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence as required and that the jury may construe that fact against the state. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the judgment of the circuit court. Section 116-4 contains nothing to indicate that the legislature intended for the failure to comply with the statute to result in vacatur of a defendant’s conviction; the legislative intent is further confirmed by the criminal liability set forth for intentional non-compliance with section 116-4. View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law

Defendant fired a gun at four police officers and was convicted of armed robbery and four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. The appellate court reversed in part after finding no speedy trial or public trial violation and no reversible error on a jury instruction issue. The appellate court vacated three of the aggravated discharge convictions, finding that the state had effectively prosecuted the defendant based on his firing a single shot at four officers.The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, agreeing with the appellate court. As to the speedy trial claim, the defendant did not demand trial in the statutorily directed manner and is considered to have agreed to the first continuance. There was no abuse of discretion in granting the state’s first motion for continuance. Counsel was not ineffective on that issue. The erroneous and contradictory jury instructions, however, require reversal and retrial. On retrial, the unit of prosecution issue is likely to recur. Where the legislature can, but does not, define the unit of prosecution, the doctrine of lenity applies. The offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm does not clearly define the unit of prosecution, so a single discharge in the direction of multiple police officers can sustain only one conviction. View "People v. Hartfield" on Justia Law

Responding to a burglary at a Chicago bar in 2009, police found the bar owner in the parking lot with multiple injuries. The man died hours later. Salamon was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and burglary and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 33 years.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. While an inculpatory statement Salamon made to police about two years after the burglary was involuntary and should have been suppressed, the admission of that statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated that a prolonged incommunicado detention disguised as “normal police procedure” cannot be condoned; an unwarranted delay in providing the simple expedient of a telephone call takes on significant importance in evaluating the voluntariness of an inculpatory statement made after an extended period of incommunicado detention. However, the substance of Salaman’s video-recorded confession was cumulative and duplicated other evidence that was properly admitted at trial, so the result of the trial would have been the same if the confession had been excluded. View "People v.Salamon" on Justia Law

Moon was charged with domestic battery for causing bodily harm to a minor. Before jury selection, the court typically administers a voir dire oath to prospective jurors but the record does not establish whether the court administered a voir dire oath before or during jury selection. The circuit court asked each potential juror several questions. All the prospective jurors indicated that they would follow the court's instructions. After jury selection, the court asked the circuit clerk to swear the jury in. There is no verbatim record of the oath but the parties stipulated that the clerk incorrectly asked the already-selected jurors: “[D]o you solemnly swear or affirm you’ll truthfully answer all questions asked concerning your qualifications as jurors?” Before his conviction, Moon did not object to the unsworn status of the jury. Denying a post-trial motion, the circuit court concluded that the error was harmless. The appellate court concluded that Moon had forfeited and was not prejudiced by this “clear error.”The Illinois Supreme Court held that reversal of Moon’s conviction is required, regardless of the strength of the evidence or any showing of prejudice. Swearing the jury with a trial oath was essential to the common-law system of trial by jury; deprivation of this constitutional right amounts to structural error. A jury must be sworn with an oath that substantially incorporates specific elements. Because jeopardy never attached, the state is not precluded from retrying the defendant on remand. View "People v. Moon" on Justia Law

After a night of drinking, Deroo drove his car off the road, flipped several times, and crashed into a ditch. He was taken to the hospital by ambulance. Deroo was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) and aggravated driving while his license was revoked and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of nine and three years, respectively. At trial, the results of a blood test establishing his blood alcohol content were admitted into evidence under the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a)), which allows the admission of chemical tests of blood conducted in the course of emergency medical treatment “as a business record exception to the hearsay rule.” Deroo argued that section 11-501.4(a) conflicted with Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6), which excluded “medical records in criminal cases” from the business records hearsay exception.The appellate court found no conflict and affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Rule 803(6)'s medical records exclusion for criminal cases is not logically defensible. The court amended that Rule, striking the exception and stating that ordinary rules of evidence do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because by simply permitting evidence to be admitted at trial, they do not at all subvert the presumption of innocence. View "People v. Deroo" on Justia Law