Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILCS 150/1, the state initiated forfeiture proceedings against currency totaling $223,743 that was seized from a van driven by Tyler, but owned by Salaam, following a traffic stop. The forfeiture complaint alleged that there was probable cause to believe that the currency was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance. The state unsuccessfully attempted to serve Tyler with notice of the forfeiture proceedings by mail, before serving notice by publication. No one filed a claim to the currency. The circuit court entered a default judgment of forfeiture. More than two years later, Salaam moved to vacate, arguing that the judgment was void because he was not served with notice. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that it had in rem jurisdiction over the currency; that notice was properly given to the driver, as the “owner or interest holder” of the currency; and that Salaam was not entitled to notice because he was not an “owner or interest holder.” The appellate court affirmed,The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction of the case under the Forfeiture Act and had in rem jurisdiction over the seized currency, so any failure to comply with statutory notice rendered its judgment voidable, not void. Any challenge to that order had to be filed within two years of its entry. Salaam’s motion was not timely. View "Alvarez v. $59,914 United States Currency" on Justia Law

In 2004, Grant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault. The trial court merged the counts and sentenced him to 14 years in prison. In 2013, Grant sought forensic testing of a hair that was discovered during a post-assault examination of the victim. It was subsequently discovered that all the forensic evidence in Grant’s case was destroyed in 2007, pursuant to Peoria Police Department policy.Defense counsel moved for a new trial or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, citing PPD’s failure to fulfill its duty to preserve the forensic evidence as required by 725 ILCS 5/116-4. The circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court vacated Grant’s conviction, remanded for further proceedings, and ordered a jury instruction at any retrial that the state failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence as required and that the jury may construe that fact against the state. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the judgment of the circuit court. Section 116-4 contains nothing to indicate that the legislature intended for the failure to comply with the statute to result in vacatur of a defendant’s conviction; the legislative intent is further confirmed by the criminal liability set forth for intentional non-compliance with section 116-4. View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law

Defendant fired a gun at four police officers and was convicted of armed robbery and four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. The appellate court reversed in part after finding no speedy trial or public trial violation and no reversible error on a jury instruction issue. The appellate court vacated three of the aggravated discharge convictions, finding that the state had effectively prosecuted the defendant based on his firing a single shot at four officers.The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, agreeing with the appellate court. As to the speedy trial claim, the defendant did not demand trial in the statutorily directed manner and is considered to have agreed to the first continuance. There was no abuse of discretion in granting the state’s first motion for continuance. Counsel was not ineffective on that issue. The erroneous and contradictory jury instructions, however, require reversal and retrial. On retrial, the unit of prosecution issue is likely to recur. Where the legislature can, but does not, define the unit of prosecution, the doctrine of lenity applies. The offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm does not clearly define the unit of prosecution, so a single discharge in the direction of multiple police officers can sustain only one conviction. View "People v. Hartfield" on Justia Law

Responding to a burglary at a Chicago bar in 2009, police found the bar owner in the parking lot with multiple injuries. The man died hours later. Salamon was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and burglary and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 33 years.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. While an inculpatory statement Salamon made to police about two years after the burglary was involuntary and should have been suppressed, the admission of that statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated that a prolonged incommunicado detention disguised as “normal police procedure” cannot be condoned; an unwarranted delay in providing the simple expedient of a telephone call takes on significant importance in evaluating the voluntariness of an inculpatory statement made after an extended period of incommunicado detention. However, the substance of Salaman’s video-recorded confession was cumulative and duplicated other evidence that was properly admitted at trial, so the result of the trial would have been the same if the confession had been excluded. View "People v.Salamon" on Justia Law

Moon was charged with domestic battery for causing bodily harm to a minor. Before jury selection, the court typically administers a voir dire oath to prospective jurors but the record does not establish whether the court administered a voir dire oath before or during jury selection. The circuit court asked each potential juror several questions. All the prospective jurors indicated that they would follow the court's instructions. After jury selection, the court asked the circuit clerk to swear the jury in. There is no verbatim record of the oath but the parties stipulated that the clerk incorrectly asked the already-selected jurors: “[D]o you solemnly swear or affirm you’ll truthfully answer all questions asked concerning your qualifications as jurors?” Before his conviction, Moon did not object to the unsworn status of the jury. Denying a post-trial motion, the circuit court concluded that the error was harmless. The appellate court concluded that Moon had forfeited and was not prejudiced by this “clear error.”The Illinois Supreme Court held that reversal of Moon’s conviction is required, regardless of the strength of the evidence or any showing of prejudice. Swearing the jury with a trial oath was essential to the common-law system of trial by jury; deprivation of this constitutional right amounts to structural error. A jury must be sworn with an oath that substantially incorporates specific elements. Because jeopardy never attached, the state is not precluded from retrying the defendant on remand. View "People v. Moon" on Justia Law

After a night of drinking, Deroo drove his car off the road, flipped several times, and crashed into a ditch. He was taken to the hospital by ambulance. Deroo was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) and aggravated driving while his license was revoked and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of nine and three years, respectively. At trial, the results of a blood test establishing his blood alcohol content were admitted into evidence under the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.4(a)), which allows the admission of chemical tests of blood conducted in the course of emergency medical treatment “as a business record exception to the hearsay rule.” Deroo argued that section 11-501.4(a) conflicted with Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(6), which excluded “medical records in criminal cases” from the business records hearsay exception.The appellate court found no conflict and affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Rule 803(6)'s medical records exclusion for criminal cases is not logically defensible. The court amended that Rule, striking the exception and stating that ordinary rules of evidence do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because by simply permitting evidence to be admitted at trial, they do not at all subvert the presumption of innocence. View "People v. Deroo" on Justia Law

Johnathan was adjudicated a delinquent minor under 705 ILCS 405/5-701 after he was found guilty of 10 counts of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a seven-year-old victim. During his sex offender evaluation, Johnathan stated that his lawyer did not return calls, that they “didn’t talk” and that he was never prepared for the stand. On appeal, Jonathan argued that the circuit court erred because it did not conduct a “Krankel” preliminary inquiry regarding his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in not conducting a “Krankel” hearing. The Krankel procedure applies in juvenile proceedings and is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A pro se defendant only has to bring his claim to the trial court’s attention and is not required to file a written motion. The procedure applies even though the defendant has retained counsel. Johnathan clearly stated that his attorney was not doing something that he should have been doing. A juvenile in a juvenile delinquency proceeding need do nothing more than bring his pro se claim to the attention of the court. View "In re Johnathan T." on Justia Law

After being convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), Mudd argued on appeal that comments made in the prosecution’s rebuttal closing argument constituted reversible error because they misrepresented the evidence and shifted the burden of proof to him. Alternatively, he contended that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to those rebuttal comments. The defense had emphasized the lack of evidence supporting the testimony by police officers; the prosecutor had responded that jurors should use their “common sense”; no one else was near the van when Mudd knelt beside the tire, so he was the only person who reasonably could have left the gun there, making forensic testing of the weapon unnecessary.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court upheld his conviction. To establish plain error, Mudd had to prove that the prosecutor’s comments were “clear or obvious” reversible error that shifted the burden of proof to him. Mudd had equal access to the weapon for purposes of testing. It is difficult to imagine how an accurate portrayal of the parties’ ability to request forensic testing, as required by Illinois law, can be deemed to be unduly prejudicial to a defendant. View "People v. Mudd" on Justia Law

Gorss pled guilty to aggravated driving under the influence arising from a 2016 accident that resulted in a death. He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. Gorss, through counsel, moved to reconsider his sentence. Counsel filed a certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) The circuit court denied the motion. Gorss argued that his counsel failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d) by failing to state, in the certificate, that he consulted with Gorss to ascertain his contentions of error with the entry of the guilty plea. The appellate court affirmed Gorss’s conviction and sentence, finding that the Rule 604(d) certificate did not violate the rule.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Counsel must strictly comply with each provision of Rule 604(d); failure to do so requires a remand for the filing of a new motion to withdraw a guilty plea or to reconsider a sentence. The rule is clear: counsel must certify that consultation to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error as to both the sentence and entry of the guilty plea took place. Here, counsel’s certificate as written leaves unclear whether he consulted with Gorss as to his contentions of error in the entry of his guilty plea. View "People v. Gorss" on Justia Law

The appellate court reversed Cline’s conviction for residential burglary because the only evidence tying him to the burglary was a fingerprint found on a portable headphone case inside the residence and there was no evidence that the state’s fingerprint expert, Dennewitz, verified his results with another examiner.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Cline did not dispute that the resident’s testimony was sufficient to show that someone knowingly entered his apartment without authority and with the intent to commit theft there. Cline also did not challenge the admissibility of Dennewitz’s expert testimony. The court rejected Cline’s argument that, without proof that Dennewitz’s conclusion was verified by another examiner, the state “failed to prove” Dennewitz followed the “accepted” ACE-V analytical method for fingerprint identification. Dennewitz was found qualified by the trial court to testify as an expert in forensic fingerprint identification. The evidence was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of Cline’s guilt of residential burglary. View "People v. Cline" on Justia Law