Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Freeport Police Sergeant Weichel identified McGee as having fled the scene of a home invasion. Fane, apprehended with McGee, was charged with residential burglary, aggravated battery of a victim over 60, home invasion, and resisting or obstructing a peace officer. McGee pled guilty to residential burglary and home invasion and testified on Fane’s behalf, naming Beales as the other burglar. McGee claimed that as he fled, he encountered Fane and advised him to run because he had just conducted a drug deal and had been set up. McGee testified that he and Fane had been friends for 15 years.Fane objected to the use of jury instruction IPI Criminal 3.17 (Testimony Of An Accomplice): “When a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant, the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case.” Some appellate courts had deemed 3.17 inappropriate when the accomplice witness’s testimony completely exonerated the defendant.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction. A trial court need not find that the testimony implicates the defendant before giving the accomplice witness instruction. The instruction was an accurate, impartial, and nonargumentative summation of the law. View "People v. Fane" on Justia Law

Jones was a juvenile in 2000 when he pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement. After unsuccessfully petitioning for postconviction relief, Jones sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging his sentence violated the eighth amendment protections in the Supreme Court’s “Miller v. Alabama” decision.The appellate court affirmed the denial of his motion, finding that Jones’ claims did not invoke the protections provided to juveniles in Miller. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders apply only when a trial court lacks or refuses to use discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to life, or to a de facto life, sentence. The mandatory sentencing scheme that applied in Illinois at the time he was sentenced was never applied to Jones. By entering a plea agreement, a defendant forecloses any claim of error. A voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones. Jones has not claimed that the state engaged in any misrepresentation or committed any misconduct. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Chicago police officer Luzadder and his partner were on patrol at 11:36 p.m. when they received a dispatch stating that an anonymous person reported that two white females were walking with a white male wearing a black hoodie, who “was swinging at the females” and “has a gun” near a particular intersection. A second call reported that the group had moved north. Minutes later, at the second location, Luzadder saw Carter, a white male, wearing the described clothing, holding his waistband. Luzadder did not see two women nor did he see Carter violate any laws. Luzadder believed that Carter was attempting to conceal a firearm. Luzadder, with a hand on his service weapon, ordered Carter to raise his hands, patted down Carter over his clothes, and felt what he thought was the handle of a handgun. He lifted Carter’s shirt and recovered a revolver from Carter’s waistband. Luzadder arrested Carter, who was charged with being an armed habitual criminal, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon.The circuit court denied his motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed the denial of Carter’s motion and his nine-year sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part. The officers had the necessary reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. The court otherwise vacated. The state failed to prove Carter guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed habitual criminal; the other convictions were merged into that conviction. View "People v. Carter" on Justia Law

Schoonover was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault against his niece, M.L. The prosecution alleged Schoonover, who was over the age of 17, committed “act[s] of contact” with the victim, M.L., who was under the age of 13. Before M.L.’s testimony, the trial court indicated its intention to have the courtroom cleared except for M.L.’s family members and the media during M.L.’s testimony, barring Schoonover’s family members (Code of Criminal Procedure, 725 ILCS 5/115-11).The appellate court majority reversed Schoonover’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court committed second-prong plain error for failing to inquire as to whether the spectators removed from the courtroom during the minor’s testimony had a direct interest in the case.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding no clear or obvious error under section 115-11 or the sixth amendment. The plain language of section 115-11 is clear: the trial court need only formulate an opinion as to whether the spectators being excluded have a direct interest in the case. The determination as to whether a direct interest exists is left to the discretion of the court. Section 115-11 is constitutional and the trial court comported with its requirements and limitations. View "People v. Schoonover" on Justia Law

Rock Island police responded to a report of shots fired. Rush and Childs were found in a bullet-ridden car. Rush died of his gunshot wounds. Officers spoke to witnesses who had observed a dark Lincoln Town Car at the scene at the time of the shooting. An off-duty police officer had heard the gunshots and had observed a dark Lincoln Town Car fleeing. The Lincoln and its occupants—Phelps and Reed—were stopped. Both implicated Eubanks as the shooter. Police located Eubanks weeks later. He agreed to be interviewed. Eubanks denied any involvement but admitted to being with Phelps and Reed that day. He later stated that Reed had “set it up.” Under a subsequent plea agreement, the parties agreed to a 35-year sentence. Eubanks gave a detailed videotaped statement confessing to the crimes.The court granted a subsequent motion to vacate the plea. At his stipulated bench trial, Eubanks's statement was admitted into evidence. Eubanks was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. He filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress his statement under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(f). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition. The videotaped statement was not part of the negotiation process and, therefore, inadmissible under Rule 402(f). A plea deal was in place when Eubanks gave his statement. Giving that statement was not a condition precedent of the deal but, rather, was a fulfillment of the deal. View "People v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, in committing a respondent under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01), the circuit court must make an explicit finding that the respondent is substantially probable to commit sex offenses in the future if not confined. The Act was subsequently amended to include the required element of a substantial probability to reoffend within the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person.In 1973, Snapp pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent liberties with a child. In 1992, he pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse. In 1997, after Snappwas again charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, the state filed a petition and obtained his commitment under the Act. In 2004 and 2007, Snapp filed applications for recovery, seeking release from his civil commitment. Both of those applications were denied. In 2010, Snapp filed another application for recovery. A bench trial was held in 2018, The court denied Snapp’s petition, finding he was “still a sexually dangerous person and in need of confinement.” The appellate court vacated, finding that precedent required an express finding of a substantial probability to reoffend.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. The General Assembly eliminated the requirement of a separate explicit finding by the circuit court that the respondent is substantially probable to reoffend if not confined. View "In re Commitment of Snapp" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic battery, home invasion, and possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle. At trial, the victim (defendant’s former girlfriend) testified to having received threatening Facebook Messenger communications that used a nickname, “Masetti Meech” that defendant had used while they were dating. A message under that name led the victim to her car, days after defendant took it. The messages included personal information only defendant would have known. Police found defendant in possession of the victim’s car keys, near her brother’s workplace.The appellate court affirmed, finding that proof of intent to permanently deprive the victim of her car was not required because defendant was charged with conversion or theft. It was sufficient that the victim testified that defendant broke into her residence, committed assault, stole her keys, and took her car. Because the trial court failed to hold a “Krankel" hearing on defendant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the State agreed a hearing was necessary, and the appellate court remanded the cause for a preliminary Krankel hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding the contents of Facebook messages allegedly sent by defendant and that the state failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle. The prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence properly authenticating the Facebook Messenger messages. View "People v. Brand" on Justia Law

House was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on his participation in 1993 abductions and shooting deaths of two teenagers. House was 19 at the time of the crimes. He claimed that he had no idea of the larger plan when the victims were driven to the deserted location and that the victims were killed after he left. The circuit court sentenced him to a mandatory natural life term for the murder convictions and 60 years for each aggravated kidnapping conviction, to run consecutively.In 2001, House’s sentence for the kidnappings was reduced to consecutive 30-year terms. House filed a post-conviction petition, asserting actual innocence based on a witness’s recantation of her trial testimony; newly discovered evidence of police misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel; and that his mandatory sentence of natural life violated the Eighth Amendment and the Illinois constitution's proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court vacated House’s sentence, finding that his mandatory natural life sentence violated the Illinois proportionate penalties provision as applied because it precluded consideration of mitigating factors, specifically House’s age, level of culpability, and criminal history.The Illinois Supreme Court directed the appellate court to vacate its judgment and to reconsider the effect of its 2018 Harris opinion. On remand, the appellate court denied an agreed motion seeking remand and again vacated House’s sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. The appellate court erroneously held that House’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the as-applied constitutional challenge. The court vacated the dismissal of the actual innocence claim. View "People v. House" on Justia Law

In 2015, Yost was charged with multiple counts of first-degree murder in connection with the fatal stabbing of his former girlfriend, Randall. After Yost was convicted, he notified the court that he had just learned that his appointed counsel, Rau, had represented Randall in a past case; he requested a new trial. Rau also filed a motion for a new trial but did not reference Yost’s allegations of a conflict of interest. The court denied the motion and sentenced Yost to 75 years’ imprisonment. After conducting a preliminary inquiry on remand, the trial court concluded that the allegations had merit and appointed new counsel, Lookofsky, to investigate. Yost’s amended motion for a new trial alleged that Rau had represented Randall, on two prior occasions in an unrelated case. Yost waived any conflict of interest based on Lookofsky’s prior hiring of Rau on an unrelated civil matter and any conflict-of-interest claims based on the judge’s prior representation of Yost’s family members.The court concluded that there was no per se conflict of interest, which would have required automatic reversal of the conviction, absent a waiver. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Illinois now recognizes three per se conflicts of interest: when defense counsel has a contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution; when defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and when defense counsel was a former prosecutor who was personally involved in the defendant's prosecution. Yost did not claim an actual conflict of interest. View "People v. Yost" on Justia Law

On November 25, 2015, a police officer, investigating an accident, found Rogers in physical control of the vehicle and suspected him to be under the influence. The officer charged Rogers under 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4). At a hospital, Rogers underwent a blood test, which revealed the presence of THC. The officer filed the uniform citation on December 1, 2015. On December 14, Rogers’s counsel filed a speedy trial demand. On April 6, 2016, Rogers was charged by superseding information with two counts of misdemeanor DUI. The parties continued the trial to May 20. The circuit court granted the state two continuances after Rogers initially objected but then agreed to the continuance. On September 20, the court granted the state a continuance over Rogers’s objection. On October 28, 2016, the state filed a superseding three-count information. On December 1, the trial was continued by agreement. The trial occurred on January 17, 2018. Rogers, convicted on one count, was sentenced to 12 months of court supervision.The appellate court reversed, reasoning that, because of the similarity of the offenses and the officer having sufficient knowledge to ticket both offenses at the time of the first citation, compulsory joinder applied and the clock for speedy-trial purposes began to run on December 14, 2015. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Counsel’s performance could not have been deficient for failing to make an objection where binding precedent would have made such an objection meritless; any motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds premised on the compulsory-joinder rule would have been otherwise futile. View "People v. Rogers" on Justia Law