Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Birge was convicted of burglary and arson, both Class 2 felonies carrying mandatory class X sentencing based on his criminal history, 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b). The Livingston County circuit court sentenced Birge to 24 years and 6 months’ imprisonment and to pay the victim $117,230 in restitution.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated Birge’s sentence. In admonishing the jury under Rule 431(b) the trial court properly grouped the principles of presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, the state’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right to not testify into one broad statement of law. The prospective jurors expressed their understanding and acceptance of the principles by a show of hands; nothing suggests that the jurors were confused by the court’s presentation and the defense counsel asked follow-up questions. The restitution order, however, lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for the amount imposed (730 ILCS 5/5- 5-6(f). The trial court must determine the amount of restitution based on such factors as “actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, [and] damages. View "People v. Birge" on Justia Law

Based on a 2001 gang-related shooting Jackson was convicted in Cook County of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. After his direct appeal and an initial post-conviction petition were unsuccessful, he sought leave in the circuit court to file a successive post-conviction petition, arguing that his constitutional right to due process of law was violated at trial by the state’s use of witness statements that were the product of police intimidation or coercion and that he is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson attached documents that purport to show a pattern and practice of witness intimidation in other cases by the police detectives who obtained the witness statements, as well as exculpatory affidavits.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition. The material regarding police misconduct attached to Jackson’s petition is not relevant to establishing a pattern and practice of witness intimidation by the interviewing detectives in this case, so Jackson has not satisfied the “prejudice” prong of the cause-and-prejudice test. Jackson cannot set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence because his supporting affidavits are not new; principles of “fundamental fairness” do not require additional proceedings. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Knapp and Rodriguez were charged with attempted first-degree murder, mob action, and aggravated battery in connection with the stabbing of Avitia, who survived the attack and identified the assailants. At a McHenry County jury trial, the prosecution argued that the defendants were members of the Norteños street gang and that they attacked Avitia based on his alleged association with a rival street gang. At the state’s request, the court admonished Knapp concerning his right to testify. Knapp acknowledged that he had discussed the issue with his attorney and made a choice not to testify.On appeal, Knapp unsuccessfully argued that his counsel was ineffective because counsel “elicited inadmissible other crimes evidence that was similar to the charged offense and also false” and failed to “pursue a ruling on the State’s motion to introduce gang evidence or renew his objection to the admission of such evidence.” Knapp then filed a pro se post-conviction petition, raising claims of actual innocence, involuntary waiver of his right to testify, and ineffective assistance.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the summary dismissal of the petition. While a pro se petitioner is not required to use precise legal language alleging a “contemporaneous assertion of the right to testify” to survive first-stage summary dismissal, summary dismissal is warranted when the record positively rebuts the allegations. The record contains nothing to suggest that Knapp ever alerted the court of his desire to testify, that he had any questions about that right, or that he otherwise was unsure about waiving his right to testify. View "People v. Knapp" on Justia Law

Reed was charged with armed violence, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Reed agreed to plead guilty to armed violence in exchange for a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. As its factual basis, the prosecution averred that Officer Daniels would testify that Reed fled and entered a house; Daniels followed, locating a shotgun and cocaine. The shotgun had Reed’s DNA on it. The court confirmed the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily and accepted the plea.Reed’s initial post-conviction petition, asserting actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel, was summarily dismissed. Reed sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, alleging that he did not reside at the residence in which the gun and drugs were found and did not know what was within that residence. No DNA links Reed to the drugs. The gun was found not on his person but under the bed in a different room. Reed attached an affidavit in which Callaway averred that he owned the cocaine and that Reed had no knowledge of its presence. Callaway wrote the affidavit after he was imprisoned with Reed. The court denied Reed’s petition, finding Callaway’s testimony new but not credible. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, first holding that a plea agreement does not preclude a subsequent claim of actual innocence. Pleas are no more foolproof than trials. The factual basis to support a plea requires only a basis from which the court could reasonably conclude that defendant actually committed the acts constituting the offense. Reed, however, did not provide new, material, noncumulative evidence that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that a trial would probably result in acquittal. View "People v. Reed" on Justia Law

Brown was charged with armed robbery and aggravated robbery. At a pretrial conference, defense counsel stated that Brown had told counsel that “a mental problem that he has had in the past has resurfaced. He’s under medication.... He tells me that he is again starting to hear the voices and said that he was having some difficulty in communicating with me … and that it may have factored into the events ... it may be necessary to do an evaluation to determine whether or not he’s fit to stand trial.” Judge Kouri ordered an evaluation, continuing the case for 30 days. The attorneys indicated the “evaluation would just be for fitness.” The fitness report indicated that Brown met the DSM-5 criteria for schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; PTSD; and mild intellectual disability but had the ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his defense. At the next court date, a written order set the matter for trial and included handwritten notations, “fitness report received, parties stipulate to contents” and “by agreement—Brown is fit to stand trial.” Brown was convicted.The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court failed to affirmatively exercise its judicial discretion to determine Brown’s fitness for trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the verdict and sentence. Neither the parties nor the trial court indicated a bona fide doubt of Brown’s fitness, either when Judge Kouri ordered the examination or 30 days later. No party ever requested a fitness hearing. Absent a bona fide doubt concerning his fitness to stand trial, Brown was not entitled to a fitness hearing. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

J.B. and Cordova had purchased a Romeoville home together and had three children. In January 2010, Cordova moved from the home. J.B. was granted an order of protection, prohibiting Cordova from having any contact with J.B. or the children and from entering the home. J.B. testified that, on November 20, 2010, as she was getting ready for a date, Cordova kicked in her locked bedroom door and entered the room, “going crazy.” He made threats, damaged property, and raped J.B. He then began choking her. Cordova only let go when J.B.'s cell phone rang; he stated he was going to return and then left. J.B. went to her neighbor’s house and called the police. J.B. was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. Cordova testified that he and J.B. had arranged to meet that day so he could retrieve some of his mother’s items. He denied any violence and testified they had consensual sexual relations. Cordova was convicted of criminal sexual assault, 720 ILCS 5/12- 13(a)(1), and home invasion predicated upon criminal sexual assault, section 12-11(a)(6).The trial and appellate courts rejected Cordova’s argument that under the one-act, one-crime doctrine he could be sentenced only on the home invasion conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Proof of criminal sexual assault is a necessary element of proof of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault. All the elements of criminal sexual assault are included in the offense of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault contains no element not included in home invasion. View "People v. Reveles-Cordova" on Justia Law

From behind a closed hotel bathroom door, Casler told Sgt. Draper that his name was Jakuta King Williams, that he had no identification, and that he was from Virginia. Draper recognized Casler when he emerged and remembered having previously arrested him. Draper asked whether he was Rasheed Casler. Casler did not respond. The dispatcher indicated that Casler had an outstanding warrant. Draper arrested Casler. Casler did not attempt to resist or flee. There was no indication that Casler had disposed of evidence in the bathroom. The officers discovered Casler’s Illinois identification card.Casler was charged with possessing less than 15 grams of cocaine and less than five grams of methamphetamine and with obstructing justice by providing false information. Casler testified that, while in the bathroom, he thought that his friends were joking around, so he answered Jakuta King Williams; he did not know there were officers outside the bathroom and was not attempting to avoid arrest. Casler was acquitted of the drug possession charges and convicted of obstructing justice. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; 720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1), which criminalizes obstructing justice by furnishing false information, includes as an element of the offense that the false information materially impeded the administration of justice. In this case, the charge and the jury instructions did not identify that element of the offense. Retrial is not precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "People v. Casler" on Justia Law

In 2002, Lusby was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and home invasion and sentenced to 130 years’ imprisonment. Though he was 23 years old at the time of the trial, he was only 16 years old at the time of the offenses. After an unsuccessful direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings, he sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, asserting that his sentencing hearing was constitutionally inadequate under the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Miller v. Alabama. The Will County Circuit Court denied that motion. The appellate court reversed.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s decision, denying relief. Lusby failed to show cause and prejudice such that the trial court should have granted leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. Lusby had every opportunity to present mitigating evidence but chose not to offer any. The trial court considered his youth and its attendant characteristics before concluding that his future should be spent in prison. The de facto discretionary life sentence passes constitutional muster under Miller; Lusby has not shown prejudice under 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1). Miller does not require a court to use “magic words” before sentencing a juvenile defendant to life imprisonment but only requires consideration of “youth-related factors.” View "People v. Lusby" on Justia Law

Glispie has four Illinois convictions for residential burglary, having pled guilty to knowingly and without authority entering into other people’s dwelling places to commit thefts. He subsequently pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)), reserving the right to challenge his designation as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Burglary is included in the definition of a violent felony. The Supreme Court has ruled that burglary “contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The district court determined that Illinois’s residential burglary statute was no broader than generic burglary and that Glispie’s convictions qualified as violent felonies, increasing his sentencing range from a maximum of 10 years to a minimum of 15 years' imprisonment (and a maximum of life). The court imposed a 15-year sentence.The Seventh Circuit agreed with Glispie that, if the limited authority doctrine applied to the Illinois statute, his convictions would not constitute aggravating offenses. That doctrine provides that the “authority to enter a building for a specific lawful purpose is vitiated when the wrongdoer departs from that purpose and commits a felony or theft.” Answering a question certified by the Seventh Circuit, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the doctrine does apply. Over the course of multiple statutory amendments, the legislature was aware that the term “without authority” in both the burglary and home invasion statutes incorporates the limited authority doctrine. View "United States v. Glispie" on Justia Law

After a dispute at his parents’ house, Gaines was charged with criminal damage to property, criminal trespass to a residence, misdemeanor criminal damage to property, misdemeanor domestic battery, and misdemeanor aggravated assault. At a hearing, the judge initially accepted a negotiated plea to two counts, but subsequently rejected the plea and reinstated the charges. At trial, Gaines was convicted of felony criminal trespass to a residence and misdemeanor domestic battery. Gaines did not raise a double jeopardy argument in post-trial motions. The appellate court ordered his release.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the misdemeanor battery conviction. In the context of a guilty plea proceeding, jeopardy attaches when the court unconditionally accepts the guilty plea. A formal finding of guilt is not required, nor is imposition of a sentence. The court unconditionally accepted Gaines’s guilty plea; jeopardy attached. Jeopardy did not, however, terminate improperly, where the court sua sponte vacated the guilty plea. The court did not abuse its discretion because it had “good reason to doubt the truth of the plea.” Because jeopardy did not terminate improperly, (720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)), Gaines’s subsequent trial on the same offense did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Gaines cannot demonstrate prejudice, so his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. View "People v. Gaines" on Justia Law