Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Palmer’s conviction for first-degree murder based on a 1998 Decatur killing was vacated in 2016, based on DNA evidence. He sought a certificate of innocence under 735 ILCS 5/2-702. The state argued that the new forensic evidence did not establish Palmer’s innocence by a preponderance of the evidence: the new evidence established he was not the primary assailant who killed the victim but did “nothing to refute the argument that petitioner may be guilty of the victim’s murder as an accessory or as a participant in a felony murder.” The circuit court rejected Palmer’s contention that the state was limited to arguing that he was guilty of first-degree murder as charged at trial. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Palmer had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was neither the principal nor an accomplice to the charged offense because “[t]he principal and the accomplice are, in the eyes of the law, one and the same,” rejecting Due Process and judicial estoppel arguments.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A petitioner seeking a certificate of innocence needs to prove that he was innocent of the offense only as it was originally charged, not that he was innocent of every conceivable theory of criminal liability for that offense. View "People v. Palmer" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, officers ran a name check on Bass, a passenger, which returned an investigative alert issued by the Chicago Police Department for an alleged sexual assault. Bass was arrested and made incriminating statements to investigators. The court denied a motion to suppress those statements and found him guilty of criminal sexual assault. The appellate court reversed, holding that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because it was unlawfully prolonged, that Illinois Constitution article I, section 6, provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment, and that arrests based on investigative alerts, even those supported by probable cause, violate the Illinois Constitution.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of Bass’s conviction, relying solely on the Fourth Amendment, without addressing investigatory alerts or the state constitution. The state failed to meet its burden of showing that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged. Officers cannot lawfully pursue unrelated investigations after quickly completing the mission by claiming that the overall duration of the stop (here, about eight minutes) remained reasonable, nor by waiting to resolve the mission (by writing a ticket or giving a verbal warning) until unrelated inquiries are completed. The name check was unrelated to resolving the red light violation; the officers resolved the traffic violation and then waited to issue the verbal warning so that they could engage in on-scene investigations into other crimes by checking names until they found something worth investigating. View "People v. Bass" on Justia Law

An officer stopped a van, driven by Wise, for speeding. There was a passenger in the front seat and another in the “very back” seat. As the officer spoke with Wise, he detected the odor of burnt cannabis and called for backup. Two officers conducted a probable cause search of the vehicle; one found a firearm and ammunition “in the rear passenger compartment [in] kind of like [a] little cupholder armrest, inside a glove.” The gun was not in plain view. Searching Wise’s handbag, the officer found a large number of prescription pills. Wise, who had a 1995 Iowa conviction for first-degree burglary, was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) and unlawful possession of a substance containing oxycodone, 720 ILCS 570/402(c). An officer testified that Wise had told the officer that his brother owned the van, that he knew the gun was present, and that the gun belonged to a friend who also borrowed the van from Wise’s brother. Both passengers stated that the gun did not belong to Wise. The officer estimated that the gun was five to 10 feet away from Wise while he was driving.The Illinois Supreme Court vacated Wise's conviction. The state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wise exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where the firearm was found; his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon under section 24-1.1(a) on a theory of constructive possession cannot stand. View "People v. Wise" on Justia Law

Burge, a certified nursing assistant (CNA) formerly employed as a home health care provider, pled guilty to theft, a Class A misdemeanor after stealing $280 from a client. Days later, Burge moved to withdraw her guilty plea and vacate the judgment, claiming that her plea was not voluntarily entered. The circuit court of Champaign County denied her motion. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burge’s motion. No manifest injustice occurred because she pled guilty under the misapprehension that she would not automatically lose her employment as a direct result of pleading guilty. Code of Criminal Procedure, 725 ILCS 5/113-4(c), which provides that “[i]f the defendant pleads guilty such plea shall not be accepted until the court shall have fully explained to the defendant” the various collateral consequences of pleading guilty does not apply when a defendant pleads guilty other than at arraignment. The legislature determined that only at arraignment, prior to the appointment of counsel, must a trial court admonish a defendant of the collateral consequences of pleading guilty; here, the defendant pled guilty after arraignment with defense counsel appointed and was properly admonished under Rule 402. View "People v. Burge" on Justia Law

Birge was convicted of burglary and arson, both Class 2 felonies carrying mandatory class X sentencing based on his criminal history, 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b). The Livingston County circuit court sentenced Birge to 24 years and 6 months’ imprisonment and to pay the victim $117,230 in restitution.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated Birge’s sentence. In admonishing the jury under Rule 431(b) the trial court properly grouped the principles of presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, the state’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right to not testify into one broad statement of law. The prospective jurors expressed their understanding and acceptance of the principles by a show of hands; nothing suggests that the jurors were confused by the court’s presentation and the defense counsel asked follow-up questions. The restitution order, however, lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for the amount imposed (730 ILCS 5/5- 5-6(f). The trial court must determine the amount of restitution based on such factors as “actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, [and] damages. View "People v. Birge" on Justia Law

Based on a 2001 gang-related shooting Jackson was convicted in Cook County of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. After his direct appeal and an initial post-conviction petition were unsuccessful, he sought leave in the circuit court to file a successive post-conviction petition, arguing that his constitutional right to due process of law was violated at trial by the state’s use of witness statements that were the product of police intimidation or coercion and that he is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson attached documents that purport to show a pattern and practice of witness intimidation in other cases by the police detectives who obtained the witness statements, as well as exculpatory affidavits.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition. The material regarding police misconduct attached to Jackson’s petition is not relevant to establishing a pattern and practice of witness intimidation by the interviewing detectives in this case, so Jackson has not satisfied the “prejudice” prong of the cause-and-prejudice test. Jackson cannot set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence because his supporting affidavits are not new; principles of “fundamental fairness” do not require additional proceedings. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Knapp and Rodriguez were charged with attempted first-degree murder, mob action, and aggravated battery in connection with the stabbing of Avitia, who survived the attack and identified the assailants. At a McHenry County jury trial, the prosecution argued that the defendants were members of the Norteños street gang and that they attacked Avitia based on his alleged association with a rival street gang. At the state’s request, the court admonished Knapp concerning his right to testify. Knapp acknowledged that he had discussed the issue with his attorney and made a choice not to testify.On appeal, Knapp unsuccessfully argued that his counsel was ineffective because counsel “elicited inadmissible other crimes evidence that was similar to the charged offense and also false” and failed to “pursue a ruling on the State’s motion to introduce gang evidence or renew his objection to the admission of such evidence.” Knapp then filed a pro se post-conviction petition, raising claims of actual innocence, involuntary waiver of his right to testify, and ineffective assistance.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the summary dismissal of the petition. While a pro se petitioner is not required to use precise legal language alleging a “contemporaneous assertion of the right to testify” to survive first-stage summary dismissal, summary dismissal is warranted when the record positively rebuts the allegations. The record contains nothing to suggest that Knapp ever alerted the court of his desire to testify, that he had any questions about that right, or that he otherwise was unsure about waiving his right to testify. View "People v. Knapp" on Justia Law

Reed was charged with armed violence, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Reed agreed to plead guilty to armed violence in exchange for a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. As its factual basis, the prosecution averred that Officer Daniels would testify that Reed fled and entered a house; Daniels followed, locating a shotgun and cocaine. The shotgun had Reed’s DNA on it. The court confirmed the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily and accepted the plea.Reed’s initial post-conviction petition, asserting actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel, was summarily dismissed. Reed sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, alleging that he did not reside at the residence in which the gun and drugs were found and did not know what was within that residence. No DNA links Reed to the drugs. The gun was found not on his person but under the bed in a different room. Reed attached an affidavit in which Callaway averred that he owned the cocaine and that Reed had no knowledge of its presence. Callaway wrote the affidavit after he was imprisoned with Reed. The court denied Reed’s petition, finding Callaway’s testimony new but not credible. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, first holding that a plea agreement does not preclude a subsequent claim of actual innocence. Pleas are no more foolproof than trials. The factual basis to support a plea requires only a basis from which the court could reasonably conclude that defendant actually committed the acts constituting the offense. Reed, however, did not provide new, material, noncumulative evidence that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that a trial would probably result in acquittal. View "People v. Reed" on Justia Law

Brown was charged with armed robbery and aggravated robbery. At a pretrial conference, defense counsel stated that Brown had told counsel that “a mental problem that he has had in the past has resurfaced. He’s under medication.... He tells me that he is again starting to hear the voices and said that he was having some difficulty in communicating with me … and that it may have factored into the events ... it may be necessary to do an evaluation to determine whether or not he’s fit to stand trial.” Judge Kouri ordered an evaluation, continuing the case for 30 days. The attorneys indicated the “evaluation would just be for fitness.” The fitness report indicated that Brown met the DSM-5 criteria for schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; PTSD; and mild intellectual disability but had the ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his defense. At the next court date, a written order set the matter for trial and included handwritten notations, “fitness report received, parties stipulate to contents” and “by agreement—Brown is fit to stand trial.” Brown was convicted.The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court failed to affirmatively exercise its judicial discretion to determine Brown’s fitness for trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the verdict and sentence. Neither the parties nor the trial court indicated a bona fide doubt of Brown’s fitness, either when Judge Kouri ordered the examination or 30 days later. No party ever requested a fitness hearing. Absent a bona fide doubt concerning his fitness to stand trial, Brown was not entitled to a fitness hearing. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

J.B. and Cordova had purchased a Romeoville home together and had three children. In January 2010, Cordova moved from the home. J.B. was granted an order of protection, prohibiting Cordova from having any contact with J.B. or the children and from entering the home. J.B. testified that, on November 20, 2010, as she was getting ready for a date, Cordova kicked in her locked bedroom door and entered the room, “going crazy.” He made threats, damaged property, and raped J.B. He then began choking her. Cordova only let go when J.B.'s cell phone rang; he stated he was going to return and then left. J.B. went to her neighbor’s house and called the police. J.B. was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. Cordova testified that he and J.B. had arranged to meet that day so he could retrieve some of his mother’s items. He denied any violence and testified they had consensual sexual relations. Cordova was convicted of criminal sexual assault, 720 ILCS 5/12- 13(a)(1), and home invasion predicated upon criminal sexual assault, section 12-11(a)(6).The trial and appellate courts rejected Cordova’s argument that under the one-act, one-crime doctrine he could be sentenced only on the home invasion conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Proof of criminal sexual assault is a necessary element of proof of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault. All the elements of criminal sexual assault are included in the offense of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault contains no element not included in home invasion. View "People v. Reveles-Cordova" on Justia Law