Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Dew-Becker sued Wu, alleging that the two had engaged in a daily fantasy sports (DFS) contest on the FanDuel website; that Dew-Becker had lost $100 to Wu; and that the contest constituted illegal gambling so that Dew-Becker was entitled to recover the lost money under 720 ILCS 5/28-8(a). The circuit court rendered judgment in favor of Wu, finding that section 28-8(a) does not allow recovery when the gambling is not conducted between one person and another person. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that recovery is unavailable. The DFS contest was not gambling under section 28-8(a). A person commits gambling if he “knowingly plays a game of chance or skill for money or other thing of value, unless excepted in subsection (b).” Subsection (b)(2) provides an exception to gambling for a participant in any contest that offers “prizes, award[s] or compensation to the actual contestants in any bona fide contest for the determination of skill, speed, strength or endurance or to the owners of animals or vehicles entered in such contest.” That “DFS contests are predominately skill-based is not only widely recognized” but has created a potential revenue problem for the DFS websites. New and unskilled players are often hesitant to participate. View "Dew-Becker v. Wu" on Justia Law

Rock Island officer Muehler received information that the defendant was selling narcotics from a motel room. The defendant had an extensive criminal record, including two 2012 arrests for the manufacture and delivery of controlled substances. Another officer contacted the defendant, who stated that he had narcotics for sale and agreed to meet. Muehler surveilled the motel and observed the defendant drive away. Muehler knew that the defendant had a suspended driver’s license. Another officer stopped the defendant, who was arrested and signed a waiver of rights form. The motel’s staff stated that the defendant was staying in Room 130. Deputy Pena and his K-9 partner, Rio, went to the motel. Rio conducted a “free air sniff” in the alcove outside Room 130 and alerted to the odor of narcotics “within inches of the door.” Muehler obtained a search warrant. Inside the room, police found heroin and related items. The defendant admitted that the heroin was his.After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant was convicted. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. The government can violate the Fourth Amendment either by a warrantless intrusion onto a person’s property or by a warrantless infringement of a person’s societally recognized privacy. Even if the defendant’s motel room was his home, the alcove outside it was not curtilage; it was not put to personal use by the defendant. He had no ownership or possession of the alcove, only a license to use it. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove. View "People v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

When police responded to a call that Brown was shooting a gun inside her home, they found a rifle in Brown’s bedroom. There was no evidence that the gun had been fired in the house. Brown was charged with possessing a firearm without a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card, 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1). Brown asserted that she kept the rifle for self-defense; that she was over 21; and that, although she did not possess a FOID card, she was a law-abiding citizen with no criminal record, history of mental illness, or other disqualifying condition and would have been eligible for a FOID card. She asserted that requiring her to go through the FOID process unconstitutionally infringed upon her fundamental right of self-defense in this “most private of areas.”The White County circuit court dismissed the charge, finding that, as applied to Brown, section 2(a)(1) was unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, finding that the circuit court unnecessarily reached the constitutional challenge. The court held that the FOID Card Act did not apply to the act of possessing a firearm in the home as a matter of statutory interpretation and, therefore, could not apply to Brown. This was an alternative, nonconstitutional basis for dismissal. In addition, there were unresolved factual issues concerning Brown’s possession of the gun and eligibility for a FOID card, which were the basis of her challenge. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

Officer Baker testified that he activated his lights to initiate a stop of Hill’s vehicle based on his reasonable belief that the passenger was a known fugitive, Lee. Hill finally came to a stop. Based on his experience and training, Baker knew vehicles that take a little while to stop often are concealing or destroying contraband or producing a weapon. Baker approached the passenger side of the vehicle and had the passenger lower the window. He immediately smelled the strong odor of raw cannabis. He saw a loose bud on the backseat. Baker could not recall when he realized the passenger was not Lee. Baker searched Hill’s vehicle based on the smell of raw cannabis. The search revealed cannabis and a small rock that tested positive for crack cocaine. There was a video of the stop. The trial court found the basis of the stop too tenuous and granted, in part, a motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, finding Baker had reasonable suspicion to stop Hill’s vehicle and probable cause to search the vehicle.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed and remanded, noting the legalization of medical cannabis and decriminalization of small amounts of cannabis. Facts available to the officer would put a reasonably prudent person on notice that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

Chicago sergeant Fraction testified that she was sitting alone in an unmarked police vehicle and observed McLaurin leave a building “carrying a silver handgun.” McLaurin entered a white van, which drove away. Calling for backup, Fraction followed and never lost sight of the van. Within minutes, the van was stopped by officers. McLaurin and two other men were ordered out of the vehicle. Fraction identified McLaurin and described a handgun that was recovered by police as “the same color [and] size of the handgun I saw.” Rodriguez, among the officers who stopped the van, testified that he had looked underneath the vehicle and saw the 9-millimeter chrome handgun on the ground but that he did not see anyone place or throw anything underneath the vehicle. McLaurin argued that no officer had seen any of the van's doors open, nor did any of them see an object being thrown underneath the van and that Fraction could only describe the gun's color and size.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed McLaurin’s convictions: armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)), unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (5/24-1.1(a)), and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (5/24-1.6). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, it was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that McLaurin possessed a firearm as defined by the FOID Act. View "People v. McLaurin" on Justia Law

On April 1, 2010, before 6 a.m., Thornton, mayor of Washington Park, Illinois, was fatally shot at close range while seated in his car. Witnesses told police that they heard gunshots, saw Thornton’s car crash into a tree, and then saw Jackson exit Thornton’s vehicle and get into a waiting vehicle, which drove from the scene. No firearm was recovered, but police found three spent bullets inside the vehicle. After a mistrial, Jackson was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)) and was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The prosecutor’s mischaracterization of two pieces of evidence during closing arguments was “brief and isolated” and not so prejudicial that real justice was denied or that the jury’s verdict may have resulted from those statements. The trial court properly concluded that “[t]he sufficiency of the allegations made by the defendant fail on their face to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Gayden was convicted of unlawful use or possession of a weapon for possessing a shotgun “having one or more barrels less than 18 inches in length” and was sentenced to two years in prison and one year of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Gayden argued that his attorney was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence. The appellate court declined to decide that claim, finding the record insufficient to determine the issue. The court noted that Gayden could pursue collateral relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Gayden sought rehearing, informing the court that he lacked standing to seek postconviction relief because he had completed his MSR while his appeal was pending and arguing that the court erred in finding the record insufficient to consider his ineffective assistance claim.Upon denial of rehearing, the appellate court held that, because Gayden had not informed the court that he had been released from custody when he filed his appeal, the court would not consider this new argument upon rehearing and that an argument concerning his ineffective assistance claim was impermissible reargument. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The appellate court properly concluded that the record was insufficient to decide the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. The court rejected Gaydens’s request to allow him to file a petition for postconviction relief or to order the appellate court to retain jurisdiction and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing in the trial court. View "People v. Gayden" on Justia Law

In 2013, Moore was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) stemming from a traffic stop in Joliet. His prior felony was a 1990 murder conviction. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting an argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to stipulate to Moore’s felon status, thereby allowing the jury to consider highly prejudicial evidence that Moore’s prior conviction was for murder. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. This type of prior conviction evidence generally has little probative value and creates a high risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. The jury was faced with two plausible versions of events that depended on witness credibility. The evidence was closely balanced, so informing the jurors that the defendant was previously convicted of murder made Deputy Hannon’s version more plausible and tipped the scales against Moore. There was a reasonable probability of a different result, had defense counsel prevented the jury from being informed of the nature of the prior felony conviction. There was sufficient evidence that the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, so double jeopardy does not preclude a new trial. View "People v. Moore" on Justia Law

Roddis was convicted of aggravated domestic battery and sentenced to six years in prison. The trial court dismissed as untimely Roddis’s pro se motion for reduction of his sentence that also alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The appellate court upheld the conviction and sentence but remanded for a “Krankel” hearing. On remand, the trial court conducted a “pre-inquiry Krankel hearing” to determine if the allegations of ineffective assistance were founded, at which point the court would appoint separate counsel and proceed to a “full-blown” Krankel hearing. The court conducted a hearing with Roddis and his previous counsel, giving Roddis the opportunity to elaborate on his allegations and allowing counsel to respond. The court ruled that the allegations did not establish ineffective assistance. The appellate court, finding that the trial court should not have decided the merits at that initial hearing, remanded.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the trial court judgment. Even in preliminary Krankel inquiries, a trial court must be able to consider the merits in their entirety when determining whether to appoint new counsel on a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This serves both the ends of justice and judicial economy. After scrutinizing the record, the court found that Roddis received effective assistance and was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ performance. The court rightfully exercised its discretion to decline to appoint new counsel to address his pro se posttrial claims. View "People v. Roddis" on Justia Law

Ashley was convicted of stalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2), (c)(1) and was sentenced to serve 18 months’ imprisonment. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting his arguments that the provisions of the stalking statute under which he was convicted are facially unconstitutional in violation of the first amendment and substantive due process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. The statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad; it does not criminalize protected speech consisting of threats to engage in lawful, nonviolent behavior. The amended statute requires two or more threats that the defendant knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; the legislature intended that the term “threatens” refers to “true threats” of unlawful violence such as bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, and restraint, as set forth in other subsections. The statute that the accused be consciously aware of the threatening nature of his speech and the awareness requirement can be satisfied by a statutory restriction that requires either an intentional or a knowing mental state. The term “threatens” is readily susceptible to a limiting construction and does not cover negligent conduct. The statute is not susceptible to arbitrary enforcement. View "People v. Ashley" on Justia Law