Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, the defendant was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder and single counts of aggravated kidnapping and violating an order of protection. The defendant pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder; the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend a sentence of 55 years' imprisonment. Defense counsel noted that the terms were “effectively a life sentence” and that, against counsel’s advice, the defendant chose to “take it.” The court accepted the prosecution's factual basis for the plea and inquired about criminal history. The defendant had previously been convicted of manufacture or delivery of cannabis, a Class 1 felony. The parties waived a presentence investigation (PSI) report. The court imposed a 55-year sentence.The defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea, claiming he had not been “in a coherent state of mind” and ineffective assistance. The appellate court vacated his sentence, citing failure to comply with 730 ILCS 5/5-3-1, which requires a circuit court to consider a PSI before sentencing a defendant for a felony offense, except where “both parties agree to the imposition of a specific sentence, provided there is a finding made for the record as to the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality.” The court held that the PSI requirement cannot be waived.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the sentence. The defendant forfeited any section 5-3-1 claim by failing to raise it in his three motions to withdraw the plea. Despite his attorney’s stated willingness to take the case to trial, he persisted in taking the plea deal. View "People v. Sophanavong" on Justia Law

Legoo was charged with the misdemeanor offense of being a child sex offender in a public park (720 ILCS 5/11- 9.4-1(b)). An officer, attending his grandson’s T-ball game at Mendota's Strouss Park, recognized Legoo and believed he was a registered sex offender. Legoo rode his bicycle through an area between three baseball diamonds. Another officer Corrigan testified went to Legoo’s residence later that night. When asked about his presence in the park, Legoo stated he went there to look for his son. Legoo’s son, C.G., later testified that he was watching a baseball game in the park when Legoo arrived and told him to go home. Legoo then left the park. Legoo testified that he rode his bicycle to the park looking for C.G. and left the park after less than five minutes. Legoo testified that no one else was available to retrieve C.G. from the park that night.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Legoo’s conviction. An exception to liability, found in section 11-9.3(a10) applies when a child sex offender, in a public park, approaches, contacts, or communicates with a child under 18 years of age unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a person under 18 years of age present in the building or on the grounds. The exception does not apply to the section under which Legoo was convicted. View "People v. Legoo" on Justia Law

Swenson was convicted of disorderly conduct after a telephone conversation with the advancement director of a private school, during which he asked about the school’s security measures and spoke extensively about shootings and violence. The directed testified that “[h]e said if he were to show up at the campus with a gun what would be the protocol of our school?” He asked whether the school gave teachers “PEZ dispensers to defend themselves” and what the students would think “of seeing a gun pointed in their teacher[’]s face.” The conversation caused a soft lockdown at the school and police response. The director indicated that she thought Swenson was on campus and she did not know why Swenson shared with her that he had been kicked out of the school as a child. Swenson testified that he did not own any weapons.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Swenson’s statements were objectively threatening under the circumstances; he was subjectively aware of the threatening nature of his speech. The director reasonably perceived the questions and statements as a threat. Swenson’s speech constituted a true threat, unprotected by the first amendment. A rational trier of fact could conclude that the elements of disorderly conduct were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Swenson" on Justia Law

Following the death of his 26-month-old daughter from traumatic brain injuries, Radford was convicted of endangering the life or health of a child, 720 ILCS 5/12-21.6(a) in Kankakee County. His conviction and sentence were affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that the trial court did not violate the defendant's right to a public trial by partially closing the courtroom during jury selection and that no jury instruction error occurred.The trial court observed “emotions running high” due to the “nature of the case” when it determined that a partial closure was necessary. The court expressed concern about the possibility of having to declare a mistrial if members of the public expressed emotion in a way that impacted the venire. The court was aware that this case would require a large venire in order to find a suitable jury and there were limited seats in the courtroom. The trial was expected to last two weeks and was to begin before the Thanksgiving holiday. Media coverage had been granted; the parties had listed approximately 50 potential witnesses. Neither side objected to the court’s solution of allowing only two family members from each side to remain in the courtroom during jury selection. The court reopened after jury selection. Because the court gave the pattern jury instructions, which did not require a definitional instruction on “willfully” and tracked the language of both the statute and indictment, it did not commit clear error when instructing the jury. View "People v. Radford" on Justia Law

Robinson and two others were charged with the 1997 shooting death of Giles. Tucker testified that Robinson told him that he had killed Giles and had given details about the killing and the disposal of the body and of evidence. Muhammad testified that she had driven the men to the scene where the body was burned. McClendon testified that she was Robinson’s girlfriend and that Robinson told her they had burned Giles’s body and that he had shot Giles in the head. McClendon identified a picture of a rifle and testified that she had seen that weapon twice within the month before the shooting. After being advised of his rights, Robinson, then 18, had confessed to shooting Giles and burning the body. The state did not present physical evidence linking him to the crime; Robinson did not present a defense. His convictions were affirmed. His first post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, was unsuccessful.In 2015, Robinson sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, 725 ILCS 5/122-1, alleging actual innocence. He asserted that he was not involved in the crimes and that Giles was murdered by Tucker. He attached his own affidavit plus four others. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, in favor of Robinson. The only issue is whether Robinson may file his successive post-conviction petition alleging he is actually innocent. The new evidence supporting the petition need not be completely dispositive of innocence but need only be of such a conclusive character as to probably change the result upon retrial. Robinson satisfied the pleading requirements for granting leave to file a successive petition, so his claim must be advanced to second-stage proceedings. The court noted reasons for questioning the credibility of the witnesses at trial and reasons why the affiants might be credible. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Coty, who is intellectually disabled, was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse for conduct committed against a six-year-old. Because Coty had a prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault of a nine-year-old, the court had no discretion and sentenced him to the statutorily prescribed term of mandatory natural life in prison. Coty argued that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution because it categorically forbade the sentencing judge from considering his intellectual disability and the circumstances of his offense. He also argued that the statutory scheme, as applied to him, violated the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court found the mandatory sentencing statute unconstitutional as applied. On remand, Coty, who was then 52 years old, was sentenced to 50 years in prison. The appellate court vacated, finding that the sentence amounted to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence, violating Illinois’s proportionate penalties clause.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the sentence. The original sentence of natural life imprisonment did not violate the proportionate penalties clause. The penalty challenged in Coty’s initial appeal was not, as applied to him, clearly in excess of the legislature’s constitutional authority to prescribe. Some of the diminished capacity factors that the Supreme Court in Atkins found reduced culpability make Coty a continuing danger to re-offend. The purpose of the mandatory, natural life sentence for repeat sex offenders is to protect children by rendering it impossible for the incorrigible offender to re-offend. View "People v. Coty" on Justia Law

Green, was convicted of two counts of the first-degree murder for the gang-related shooting death of Lewis and was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment on one of those convictions. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The trial court rejected a post-conviction petition alleging that Green’s trial counsel, Ritacca, labored under a per se conflict of interest because his trial counsel had previously represented Williams, the intended victim of the murder, who was in the vehicle with Lewis at the time of the shooting. Green neither knew about the conflict nor waived the conflict was rejected.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no per se conflict of interest. Only three situations establish a per se conflict of interest: where defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution; where defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and where defense counsel was a former prosecutor who had been personally involved with the prosecution of the defendant. Ritacca’s representation of both defendant and Williams did not fit within any of those three per se conflict situations. View "People v. Green" on Justia Law

Dew-Becker sued Wu, alleging that the two had engaged in a daily fantasy sports (DFS) contest on the FanDuel website; that Dew-Becker had lost $100 to Wu; and that the contest constituted illegal gambling so that Dew-Becker was entitled to recover the lost money under 720 ILCS 5/28-8(a). The circuit court rendered judgment in favor of Wu, finding that section 28-8(a) does not allow recovery when the gambling is not conducted between one person and another person. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that recovery is unavailable. The DFS contest was not gambling under section 28-8(a). A person commits gambling if he “knowingly plays a game of chance or skill for money or other thing of value, unless excepted in subsection (b).” Subsection (b)(2) provides an exception to gambling for a participant in any contest that offers “prizes, award[s] or compensation to the actual contestants in any bona fide contest for the determination of skill, speed, strength or endurance or to the owners of animals or vehicles entered in such contest.” That “DFS contests are predominately skill-based is not only widely recognized” but has created a potential revenue problem for the DFS websites. New and unskilled players are often hesitant to participate. View "Dew-Becker v. Wu" on Justia Law

Rock Island officer Muehler received information that the defendant was selling narcotics from a motel room. The defendant had an extensive criminal record, including two 2012 arrests for the manufacture and delivery of controlled substances. Another officer contacted the defendant, who stated that he had narcotics for sale and agreed to meet. Muehler surveilled the motel and observed the defendant drive away. Muehler knew that the defendant had a suspended driver’s license. Another officer stopped the defendant, who was arrested and signed a waiver of rights form. The motel’s staff stated that the defendant was staying in Room 130. Deputy Pena and his K-9 partner, Rio, went to the motel. Rio conducted a “free air sniff” in the alcove outside Room 130 and alerted to the odor of narcotics “within inches of the door.” Muehler obtained a search warrant. Inside the room, police found heroin and related items. The defendant admitted that the heroin was his.After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant was convicted. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. The government can violate the Fourth Amendment either by a warrantless intrusion onto a person’s property or by a warrantless infringement of a person’s societally recognized privacy. Even if the defendant’s motel room was his home, the alcove outside it was not curtilage; it was not put to personal use by the defendant. He had no ownership or possession of the alcove, only a license to use it. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove. View "People v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

When police responded to a call that Brown was shooting a gun inside her home, they found a rifle in Brown’s bedroom. There was no evidence that the gun had been fired in the house. Brown was charged with possessing a firearm without a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card, 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1). Brown asserted that she kept the rifle for self-defense; that she was over 21; and that, although she did not possess a FOID card, she was a law-abiding citizen with no criminal record, history of mental illness, or other disqualifying condition and would have been eligible for a FOID card. She asserted that requiring her to go through the FOID process unconstitutionally infringed upon her fundamental right of self-defense in this “most private of areas.”The White County circuit court dismissed the charge, finding that, as applied to Brown, section 2(a)(1) was unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, finding that the circuit court unnecessarily reached the constitutional challenge. The court held that the FOID Card Act did not apply to the act of possessing a firearm in the home as a matter of statutory interpretation and, therefore, could not apply to Brown. This was an alternative, nonconstitutional basis for dismissal. In addition, there were unresolved factual issues concerning Brown’s possession of the gun and eligibility for a FOID card, which were the basis of her challenge. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law