Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The prosecution alleged that on September 19, 2011, Bates entered A.P.’s home and, armed with a knife, sexually assaulted her; on October 6, 2011, he entered C.H.’s home, armed with a knife, and sexually assaulted her. The State elected to try him for the assault of A.P. first and moved to introduce other crimes evidence of the assault of C.H. (725 ILCS 5/115- 7.3(b)). After that motion was granted, Bates retained private counsel for the A.P. trial. The public defender continued to represent Bates regarding the C.H. assault. The court authorized payment for DNA testing and granted the defense a continuance but allowed C.H. to testify about her assault, despite a defense argument that counsel “couldn’t possibly do as good a job in defending my client since it wasn’t my case.” During closing argument, defense counsel asked the jury not to put much weight on the “case within a case,” stating that “[t]here’s been no review by any DNA experts.” The jury found Bates guilty. In an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, counsel claimed that he was surprised at the depth of the evidence introduced regarding the other crimes and that counsel would have had that evidence tested by his own experts had he known the depth.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that counsel’s statements constituted an admission that he neglected Bates’s case, such that a Krankel hearing was warranted. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must come from the defendant. An attorney may raise his own ineffectiveness only if he does so clearly and at the defendant’s direction and informs the court that the defendant has instructed him to make such a claim. View "People v. Bates" on Justia Law

Morger, convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and criminal sexual abuse of his teenage sister, challenged, as overbroad and facially unconstitutional, the probationary condition set forth in the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5- 6-3(a)(8.9). He argued that the section’s “complete ban on accessing ‘social networking websites’ as a condition of probation is unreasonable and unconstitutional under the First Amendment.” The condition applies to all probationers who are convicted of a sex offense, whether or not a minor was involved and whether or not the use of social media was a factor in the commission of the offense. The appellate court rejected that argument. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding the condition overbroad. The court noted the absolute nature of the ban. Morger could not, without violating his probation, even access or use a device with Internet capability without the prior approval of his probation officer. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court examined the nature of Morger’s offenses; whether the condition reasonably relates to the rehabilitative purpose of the legislation; and “whether the value to the public in imposing this condition of probation manifestly outweighs the impairment to the probationer’s constitutional rights. View "People v. Morger" on Justia Law

Abdullah was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 40 years for first-degree murder and 20 years for attempted first-degree murder. In a subsequent motion, the prosecution argued that consecutive sentences were mandatory and sought a term of at least 45 years on the murder conviction: the 20-year minimum term for that offense plus a 25-year firearm enhancement. The indictment did not charge firearm enhancements. The state moved to dismiss Abdullah’s notice of appeal, arguing that Abdullah could not bring an appeal until valid sentences were imposed. The court resentenced Abdullah, imposing consecutive prison terms of 50 years for murder and 31 years for attempted murder, including a 25-year firearm enhancement for both. Abdullah unsuccessfully argued that once his notice of appeal was filed, the court lacked jurisdiction to increase his sentences. On Abdullah’s motion to reconsider, the court reduced the consecutive term for attempted murder to 26 years: the 6-year minimum for that offense plus a 20- year firearm enhancement. The appellate court affirmed. The trial court dismissed Abdullah’s post-conviction petition.Years later, Abdullah sought relief under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, arguing that the addition of the firearm enhancements violated ex post facto laws because it was unconstitutional at the time of his offense as violating the proportionate penalties clause of the state constitution (the “Morgan” decision was subsequently overturned) and that the enhancements were based on facts not alleged in the charging instrument and not submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Abdullah’s original concurrent sentences must be reinstated. The prosecution’s post-sentencing motion to modify Abdullah’s sentences was not authorized by statute or by rule and could not be used to delay or circumvent Abdullah’s right to appeal. View "People v. Abdullah" on Justia Law

Defendant and Matthew lived together along with her children and shared an iCloud account. Matthew was aware of this data-sharing arrangement but did not disable it. Text messages between Matthew and the victim, who was a neighbor, appeared on defendant’s iPad. Some of the text messages included nude photographs of the victim. Matthew and the victim were aware that defendant had received the pictures and text messages. Defendant and Matthew broke up. Defendant wrote a letter detailing her version of the break-up and attached four of the naked pictures of the victim and copies of the text messages. Matthew’s cousin received the letter and informed Matthew., Matthew contacted the police. The victim stated that the pictures were private and only intended for Matthew but acknowledged that she was aware that Matthew had shared an iCloud account with defendant. Defendant was charged with nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images, 720 ILCS 5/11-23.5(b). The circuit court found section 11-23.5(b) an unconstitutional content-based restriction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The court declined to find “revenge porn” categorically exempt from First Amendment protection, concluded that the statute is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, and applied intermediate scrutiny. Stating that First Amendment protections are less rigorous where matters of purely private significance are at issue, the court found that the statute serves a substantial governmental interest in protecting individual privacy rights and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary. View "People v. Austin" on Justia Law

Murray was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)) and unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member (section 24-1.8(a)(1)). He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 50 years and 10 years respectively. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, rejecting an argument that the state failed to prove that the Latin Kings are a “street gang” as defined by the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act, 740 ILCS 147/10, finding that a detective’s testimony about the organizational structure of street gangs in general, and the Latin Kings in particular, and that the Latin Kings are a street gang within the meaning of Illinois law was sufficient. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The prosecution did not present evidence that established the elements codified in the statute. There was no “course or pattern of criminal activity” testimony that the Latin Kings were involved in two or more gang-related criminal offenses; that at least one such offense was committed after January 1, 1993; that both offenses were committed within five years of each other; and that at least one offense involved the solicitation to commit, conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or commission of any offense defined as a felony or forcible felony. View "People v. Murray" on Justia Law

In 2009, Burtner, a 65-year-old veteran, went to deposit VFW receipts at a Midlothian bank. A teller saw Burtner approach and saw a man in a hooded sweatshirt walk quickly behind him. After briefly losing sight of both men, she saw the hooded man run in the opposite direction, carrying something. The man (Smith) got into the passenger seat of a black car driven by Brown; the car sped off. A bank employee found Burtner lying on the ground. After a high-speed police chase, the car crashed. Smith and Brown ran in opposite directions. Police found Brown minutes later hiding underneath a car and recovered $1200 in cash from his pocket; they recovered the bank deposit bags and money from inside the car. DNA evidence linked the car to Smith. Three days later, Burtner died. The medical examiner reported that the cause of death was a heart attack and that the assault was a significant contributing factor. After separate trials, the court acquitted defendants on a felony murder charge but convicted them of robbery and aggravated battery of a senior citizen in which they caused great bodily harm, after merging the other aggravated battery counts. The court imposed consecutive sentences based on the nature of the crimes and defendants’ lengthy criminal histories. The appellate court vacated their convictions for aggravated battery of a senior citizen, citing the one-act, one crime rule. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The convictions were based on separate acts and are not lesser-included offenses. Not all the elements of aggravated battery of a senior citizen are included in the offense of robbery, and the aggravated battery offense contains elements that are not included in robbery. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Custer had already been convicted of several crimes when entered an open plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance in 2010. Before his sentencing hearing, Custer was arrested again after an attack on a police officer and for possession of a knife while threatening people at a bar. Based on his many convictions involving “crimes of violence,” and being the subject of “a multitude” of protective orders sought by different women, the court sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment for the drug crime. In 2013, Custerer entered a negotiated guilty plea to the charges of aggravated battery of a police officer and unlawful possession of a weapon; the court imposed consecutive sentences of 4½ years and 5 years in prison and dismissed the remaining charges. Custer filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging that his private counsel in the 2010 drug case, Hendricks, was ineffective for failing to appeal or move to withdraw his guilty plea as requested. Appointed post-conviction counsel (Snyder) filed a supplemental petition, with four affidavits from Custer and his girlfriend, Colvin. Hendricks acknowledged telling Custer he had a “good chance” of receiving no more than four years in prison but he had explained that entering an open plea would make it difficult to challenge his sentence. He denied that Custer expressed a desire to appeal or withdraw his plea. Before the court entered an order, Custer sent the judge a letter claiming that Snyder failed to provide adequate representation by refusing to call Colvin as a witness. Stating that it found Custer’s testimony totally unbelievable, the court denied relief. After a hearing for which Custer was absent and Snyder appeared but did not present argument, the court denied a motion to reconsider. Custer filed a second post-conviction appeal, arguing the court erred in denying his reconsideration request without conducting a Krankel hearing. The appellate court acknowledged that Krankel has never been extended to post-conviction proceedings, but remanded. The state appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court declined to expand its holding Krankel, which established procedures to protect a pro se criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel. Extending those procedures to similar claims of unreasonable assistance by post-conviction counsel in statutory proceedings commenced under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act would be an unwarranted drain on judicial resources. View "People v. Custer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court's reversal of defendant's conviction of burglary. The court held that the appellate court erred in its analysis of the limited-authority doctrine and in holding as a matter law that there was not sufficient evidence to support the element of the burglary statute that requires a defendant's entry to be "without authority." In this case, the evidence showed that defendant and an accomplice placed two backpacks on a coin-exchange machine in the Walmart vestibule, entered the store proper, and a short time later returned to retrieve the backpacks in order to stuff merchandise into them. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Clark pled guilty to charges of burglary and unlawful use of a credit card and was released on bond pending the imposition of sentence. While awaiting sentencing, Clark was found guilty of violating 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) for knowingly failing to report to the Whiteside County Jail after leaving a substance abuse treatment center, as required by her bail bond. Section 31-6(a) has two independent clauses: one contains an escape from custody provision and the other contains a knowing failure to report provision. The appellate court found that Clark's failure to report did not constitute an escape because she was not in custody while on bond awaiting sentencing. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the circuit court. The plain and unambiguous language of the knowing failure to report provision of section 31-6(a) does not contain a “custody” element; the statute is violated when two elements are proved: a person is convicted of a felony, and the person knowingly fails to report to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

In 2014, the defendant was charged with four counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against a nine-year-old girl. During deliberations, the judge indicated on the record that she had received a note from the jury: “After deliberating for five hours, and despite our best efforts, we are at an impasse.” The judge explained that the jury had also, earlier, informed the bailiff that they were at an impasse. The judge questioned the foreperson in open court in the presence of the jury. After the judge conferred with the attorneys, the judge discharged the jurors and the court declared a mistrial. The prosecution announced its intention to retry defendant. The court notified the parties, without objection that the matter was continued to reset for trial. Thereafter, defendant unsuccessfully moved to bar further prosecution based on double jeopardy principles, arguing that there had been no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial of that motion. When a mistrial is declared, a retrial may proceed without offending double jeopardy principles if the defendant consents or there is a manifest necessity for the mistrial. Manifest necessity was evidenced by two statements from the jury indicating. The judge initially urged the jurors to continue and subsequently took care to clarify where the jury stood with respect to the deliberative process. The judge specifically asked the foreperson whether additional time would be helpful and expressed concern about coercion. View "People v. Kimble" on Justia Law