Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At approximately 1:15 a.m. on Saturday, December 17, 2011, defendant was driving from Iowa to Illinois on U.S. Highway 136, a four-lane road. Just across the border, Illinois State Police had erected a safety roadblock, marked by an orange sign with black lettering. Defendant saw the roadblock and made a U-turn at a railroad crossing approximately 50 feet from the roadblock. Hancock County Deputy Duffy stopped defendant as he proceeded westbound. Illinois State Police Officer Miller, at the roadblock, saw Duffy pull over defendant’s vehicle and went to assist. Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and was cited for driving “to the left of center of roadway.” Officers conducted an inventory search incident to arrest and recovered a metal pipe and less than one gram of marijuana. Defendant’s passenger was arrested based on an active warrant.The circuit court denied a motion to suppress, finding that defendant’s U-turn provided a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified the stop. The court found defendant guilty of driving with a suspended license and imposed a sentence of 24 months’ conditional discharge and 90 days in the county jail. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after considering the totality of the circumstances, including the location, day and time of the roadblock. View "People v. Timmsen" on Justia Law

In 1997, Pipes was found dead, with stab wounds to her neck and head; semen was discovered with vaginal swabs. There was no evidence of rape. Above the bathtub in which she was found, there was a palm print left in Pipes’s blood. In 2004, the state obtained a grand jury subpoena for the Illinois Department of Corrections to take palm and fingerprints of Boston, then incarcerated on a life sentence, who was Pipes' ex-boyfriend. After prints were taken, a warrant issued for defendant’s DNA. A test showed that the DNA profile extracted from the semen was consistent with having originated from Boston. In 2005, the state obtained an indictment. Boston unsuccessfully moved to quash the subpoena and suppress the palm print evidence, arguing that the state improperly used the grand jury to obtain the subpoena and to supplement a police investigation in violation of his fourth amendment rights, and violated grand jury procedures by failing to return the fingerprint card to the grand jury. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis to conclude that this was a “rogue police investigation.” The information provided to the grand jury was sufficiently tied to Boston to hold that there was individualized suspicion to warrant the subpoena. View "People v. Boston" on Justia Law

Ligon, convicted of aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm (AVH/DW), a Class X felony, under 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3), (b), was adjudged to be an habitual criminal and sentenced to a term of mandatory life imprisonment under 720 ILCS 5/33B-1(a), (e). He filed a petition for relief from judgment under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401), contending that the sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The trial court dismissed defendant’s petition sua sponte. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the state leave to appeal and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, rejecting the proportional it claim because AVH/DW and armed violence while armed with a category III weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a), 33A-1(c)(3)). Ligon was properly convicted of AVH/DW while using a BB gun as a common-law dangerous weapon of the third type. It is irrelevant that the indictment used the term “bludgeon” instead of BB gun; the two are interchangeable under the statute. View "People v. Ligon" on Justia Law

Defendant was driving a van registered to a woman named Chattic in the city of Sterling. Sterling police officer Bland pulled the van over because there was a warrant out for Chattic’s arrest. Bland was unable to see the driver of the van until after he had pulled the vehicle over. Upon approaching, Bland saw defendant was a man and could not have been Chattic. Bland asked defendant for a driver’s license and proof of insurance before explaining the reason for the stop. Defendant responded that he did not have a driver’s license and Bland cited him for driving while his license was suspended. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed suppression of the evidence, finding that Bland’s license request impermissibly prolonged the seizure of defendant and the van. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Rodriguez makes clear that a driver’s license request of a lawfully stopped driver is permissible irrespective of whether that request directly relates to the purpose for the stop. As a result, Officer Bland’s request for defendant’s license did not violate the fourth amendment by prolonging the stop. View "People v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Tolbert, age 17, was charged with possessing an “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible” firearm, under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) and with possessing a handgun while under 21 years of age under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)(a)(3)(I). Chicago police officers testified that they responded to a call about a “person with a gun” and found Tolbert and another man in the gated front yard. Others were outside the gate. The officers detained those individuals, searched, and recovered a loaded pistol from the house’s porch. According to the officers, Tolbert admitted to being its owner. He was transported to the police station where he was read his Miranda rights and again, according to officers, admitted to owning the pistol and placing it on the porch. The appellate court vacated his conviction under section 24-1.6(a)(1)(a)(3)(A) as unconstitutional. With respect to section 24-1.6(a)(1)(a)(3)(I), the court concluded that the charging instrument was fatally defective, citing statutory language that there is no criminal liability if the person is “on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with that person’s permission,” and holding that the state bore the burden of including the element in the charging instrument. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the invitee requirement is an exemption that the defendant must raise and proof. View "People v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

A search warrant was served at a home belonging to Chambers’ mother. He was found inside, along with a large quantity of cocaine, cash, weapons, and ammunition. The Cook County circuit court denied his repeated requests for a Franks hearing. He was convicted of armed violence and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to consecutive terms of 25 and 45 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court held that the trial court should have conducted a Franks hearing and remanded for determination of whether the search warrant was properly issued, stating that the informant’s appearance and testimony before an issuing judge is “but one factor to consider in determining whether to grant a Franks hearing, but it does not categorically preclude the court from holding a Franks hearing.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Chambers made a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly included in the warrant affidavit; it is irrelevant that the officer’s suspicions about the presence of guns and drugs at the address turned out to be well-founded. View "People v. Chambers" on Justia Law

Sanders was convicted of the 1992 first-degree murder and aggravated kidnapping of Cooks. Sanders was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 60 and 15 years. Bingham, May, and Barfield were convicted in separate trials. In 2010, Sanders filed a second successive postconviction petition, alleging actual innocence. Despite the absence of any motion for leave to file the successive petition, the circuit court allowed it and advanced it to the second stage of proceedings. The court then dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding purported new evidence and a recantation “not so conclusive in character as would probably change the result on retrial.” View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Williams pleaded guilty to unlawful delivery of a controlled substance in exchange for a sentencing cap of 25 years’ imprisonment. Defendant later moved to withdraw his plea, claiming he had been improperly admonished regarding the maximum sentence he faced. The court had stated, several times, that he faced a maximum sentence of 60 years’ imprisonment. In making the statement, the court applied 720 ILCS 570/408(a) which provides: “Any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this Act may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up to twice the maximum term otherwise authorized.” Defendant had a prior felony conviction, and his enhanced Class X maximum sentence of 30 years on the unlawful delivery charge was doubled to 60. The court denied defendant’s motion; the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that section 408(a) is ambiguous so that it was appropriate to invoke the rule of lenity. The court reasoned that it was unable to say with certainty that the legislature intended that section 408(a) would apply only to offenses committed in violation of the Act, as defendant argued, or whether, as the state claimed, it may apply to double defendant’s enhanced Class X maximum of 30 years to 60 years. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2008 Gill was shot to death while sitting outside his Chicago home with Clark. The evidence of defendant’s guilt consisted solely of two eyewitness identifications. The first identification, made by the victim, was admitted into evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Before Gill died, Gill’s father (Johnson) asked Gill who had shot him. Both Clark and Johnson testified that Gill responded that “Lucky” had shot him. Multiple witnesses testified that defendant, who lived across the street from Gill, was known by the nickname “Lucky.” Gill’s mother testified that Gill and defendant had been friends for years, that defendant often spent time in Gill’s home, and that defendant recently had been fighting with a member of Gill’s family. From photographs and during an in-person show-up, Clark identified defendant as the shooter. Clark admitted she had seen defendant only “[l]ike once or twice” before the shooting, had not spoken to him, and did not know him. Clark apparently contradicted herself about whether defendant wore a hood. Defendant filed a motion in limine to allow an attorney/licensed psychologist, to testify as an expert on the topic of memory and eyewitness identification. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed denial of the motion, finding that the requested testimony was relevant and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Lerma" on Justia Law

Thompson, was convicted of violating the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, (720 ILCS 646/25(a)(2), (d)(2), following a jury trial in which the circuit court admitted lay opinion identification testimony of four witnesses (Illinois Rule of Evidence 701), who identified Thompson as the person depicted in a surveillance videotape or still photographs that were taken from the crime scene. The appellate court reversed, stating that none of the witnesses aided the jurors’ own identification of who was depicted in the video and, therefore, the testimony encroached upon the function of the jury. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, noting that one witness merely laid the foundation for admission of the video and another had a perspective of the defendant that the jury did not have, so that there was some basis to conclude he was more likely to correctly identify the defendant. While admission of the testimony of the other two witnesses was in error, the error was harmless. Thompson acknowledged that he was the person on the video and the jury was repeatedly told by both attorneys and instructed by the court that it was up to the jury to make the ultimate determination of whether Thompson was the individual depicted on the video. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law