Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a 2016 single-car collision, Galarza was found guilty of DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1)), failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident (11-601(a)), and operating an uninsured motor vehicle (3-707). The appellate court affirmed his conviction for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. The prosecution conceded error on the conviction for operating an uninsured motor vehicle, which was reversed. The court further determined the trial court had not been required to admonish Galarza under Rule 402(a), as his stipulated bench trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Viewing the stipulated evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found Galarza guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. A stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea if the state’s entire case is to be presented by stipulation and the defendant does not present or preserve a defense or the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant.” If a stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea, the court must give the defendant Rule 402(a) guilty plea admonishments. Galarza did more than deny stipulated facts, he presented a defense. View "People v. Galarza" on Justia Law

In 1993, Clark entered Catlin's Galesburg apartment to commit robbery. Clark was 24 years old; Catlin was 89. Clark killed Catlin by cutting her throat, then robbed the apartment. Clark pled guilty but mentally ill to first-degree murder and robbery. Clark suffered from antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and fetal alcohol syndrome. He had an IQ of 79 and the intellectual ability of a 13-14-year-old; he had been severely abused as a child and had an extensive criminal history. Clark was sentenced to 90 years of imprisonment for the murder, with a consecutive 15-year prison sentence for the robbery. The appellate court affirmed. In 2001 and 2012 Clark filed unsuccessful post-conviction petitions.In a 2018 motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, Clark challenged the constitutionality of his sentence as inconsistent with the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause. Clark argued that his sentence was the functional equivalent of a life sentence and that the circuit court failed to give sufficient weight to the characteristics of his intellectual disabilities and his young age as mitigation factors. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief.The proportionate penalties clause requires penalties to be determined with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship and provides a limitation on penalties beyond those afforded by the eighth amendment. Precedent does not establish “cause” for relaxing the res judicata doctrine with respect to the issues Clark raised, which were decided on direct appeal. Clark also cannot establish prejudice under the cause-and-prejudice test by advancing a challenge to his sentence as it relates to his intellectual disabilities. “Neurological development was not a prospect for” Clark. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

Heineman was the driver in a single-vehicle accident that resulted in the death of his passenger. Fisher— an officer who investigated the case—testified that he was familiar with the law and had received training on a mathematical formula for converting blood serum alcohol concentration into a whole blood equivalent. Fisher testified— over objection—that he learned of Heineman’s blood serum alcohol concentration test results and could apply the formula. He explained, “[y]ou would divide the blood serum level, which in this case is .155, by 1.18 to get a [whole blood alcohol concentration of] [.]131,” which exceeds the legal limit for DUI in Illinois. Heineman was convicted of two counts of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (2), (d)(1)(F)).The Illinois Supreme Court reversed as to count I; the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting Fisher’s testimony regarding the conversion factor, such that the state failed to prove Heineman’s whole blood alcohol concentration was 0.08 or greater when he drove. The court affirmed on count II, in which the state was required to prove he was under the influence of alcohol when he drove. Heineman conceded that, besides his whole blood alcohol concentration, the state presented other evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he was driving while under the influence and that evidence could sustain his conviction on count II despite any failure to prove his whole blood alcohol concentration. View "People v. Heineman" on Justia Law

Jones was arrested following a traffic stop and was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a). Officer Wakeland testified that he searched the car and found two rounds of .40-caliber ammunition in the glove compartment. Jones stated that the ammunition belonged to her husband; she acknowledged that she had a 2002 felony conviction for identity theft. Jones explained that she and her husband shared a vehicle; her husband had guns and a FOID card. Her husband, Brown, testified that although the vehicle was registered in Jone's name only, he also used the vehicle and sometimes took his firearm with him. Brown identified his FOID card and the.40-caliber cartridges as his. Jones knew that Brown transported a firearm in her car. The jury was instructed that the state must prove: “That the defendant knowingly possessed firearm ammunition; and Second Proposition: That the defendant had previously been convicted of the offense of Identity Theft.” The jury asked for the definition of “knowingly.” The court responded that the word should be given its plain meaning "within the jury’s common understanding.”The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Jones’s conviction, rejecting a challenge to the jury instructions. Defense counsel’s strategy with respect to the jury’s question was reasonable. A rational trier of fact could have found Jones had control over the premises where the ammunition was located and could find that she knowingly possessed the ammunition. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Davidson was charged with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i)), for pushing Correctional Officer Stitt in the chest. Stitt was on duty at the Montgomery County Jail when he heard loud banging, investigated, and noticed that a dry-erase board had been knocked off the wall. Stitt then saw Davidson screaming and swearing. Stitt explained that any yelling at the jail needed to be stopped immediately to reduce the likelihood of escalation among the inmates. Davidson refused to comply. Stitt informed him that he would be placed on lockdown. Davidson stated Stitt “would have to make [him] go on lockdown.” As Stitt attempted to block Davidson from running. Davidson shoved Stitt in the chest. Stitt, who was not injured, subdued Davidson. Stitt did not testify that he felt insulted or provoked by Davidson’s push. Davidson admitted to yelling and running away from Stitt. He denied hitting Stitt.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Davidson's conviction. The trier of fact must consider the context of the conduct when determining whether the contact was insulting or provoking. The physical contact was precipitated by Davidson’s intentional disregard of Stitt’s commands and taunting of Stitt; it would be reasonable for the jury to infer that Davidson’s act was insulting or was provoking a physical altercation. The state is not required to prove that a battery victim subjectively felt insulted or provoked by the contact but need only prove that a reasonable person would have felt insulted or provoked by the physical contact. View "People v. Davidson" on Justia Law

In 2011, police officers stopped Villareal while he was driving a car the officers believed had been involved in a neighborhood shooting. During the traffic stop, officers searched the car and recovered a fully loaded handgun. Villareal was charged with several offenses related to the firearm. Villareal pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a gang member (720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1). The circuit court sentenced Villareal to four years in prison. Villareal subsequently filed a petition, arguing his sentence was improperly increased by mandatory supervised release.The circuit court dismissed the petition. On appeal, Villareal challenged section 24-1.8(a)(1) as facially unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because it impermissibly criminalized his status as a gang member. He also argued that it violated substantive due process. The appellate court rejected Villareal’s Eighth Amendment challenge and declined to address the due process claim, as it was raised for the first time in Villareal’s supplemental brief.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in curbing gang violence in public places and is not unconstitutionally vague. The court noted plain language explaining when a person is an active gang member. Villareal did not allege or show all gang membership is involuntary. View "People v. Villareal" on Justia Law

In July 2017, Cross was charged with murder. He remained in custody through trial. At a preliminary hearing, the court ordered Cross to respond to the state’s motion for pretrial discovery within 30 days, with written notice of any defenses. The court granted Cross six continuances, attributing each delay to Cross for purposes of the 120-day statutory speedy-trial term. On July 16, 2018, the defense indicated "ready for trial" and demanded a speedy trial. Trial was set for September 24, 2018; the 70-day period after July 16 would be attributable to the state. On August 21, Cross first raised an alibi defense. The state argued that the alibi would have been known to Cross for a year, that the late disclosure would require further investigation, and that the time from July 16 to September 24 should be attributable to Cross The court attributed the 36-day period before August 21 to the state but attributed the subsequent 34-day period to Cross. The court set a new trial date of November 6; the delay after September 24 was attributed to the state. Defense counsel did not object to a statement that the speedy-trial term would run on November 29.On appeal following his conviction, Cross first argued that his statutory speedy-trial rights were violated. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court rejected his argument that there is no delay unless a trial date is postponed. Cross received effective assistance of counsel. View "People v. Cross" on Justia Law

Walls pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. He was sentenced to three consecutive 15-year prison terms. The court denied Walls’s motion to reconsider in October 2005. In November, Walls filed a “Motion for Rehearing,” arguing that his attorney had failed to comply with Rule 604(d) because he did not review the transcript of the plea hearing or file a Rule 604(d) certificate of compliance. The case was then delayed until 2010 when Walls sought relief under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401. After the state moved to dismiss the petition, the case was again delayed. In 2019, Walls filed “Amended Petition[s] to Vacate or Redress a Void Sentence.”The court concluded that the case was “still at the motion to reconsider sentencing stage because a [Rule 604(d)] certificate was never filed” and directed Walls’s attorney to comply. The attorney filed a Rule 604(d) certificate. The court denied Walls’s amended motion. The appellate court held that Walls’s direct appeal from the denial of his amended motion to reconsider was untimely. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b), Walls had 30 days from the 2005 date to file a notice of appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court erred in finding the proceedings on Walls’s original motion to reconsider remained “pending” due to his attorney’s noncompliance with Rule 604(d), which is not jurisdictional. Despite the absence of a Rule 604(d) certificate, the post-plea proceedings concluded when the trial court denied Walls’s motion to reconsider his sentence in 2005. View "People v. Walls" on Justia Law

Smith was charged with residential burglary alleging he knowingly and without authority entered Whittington’s Carbondale apartment with the intent to commit theft, In a pretrial motion, Smith sought to bar admission of two short video clips recorded by the building’s landlord, who had pointed an iPhone’s video camera at a screen as the recording of surveillance footage played. Smith argued admitting the cell phone video clips would violate the best evidence rule (Ill. Rs. Evid. 1001-1004.The Jackson County circuit court denied the motion. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Smith's conviction. The cell phone video clips constitute duplicates under Rule 1001(4), as required for admissibility under Rule 1003. Interpreting Rule 1001(4) to require any duplicate to include the entirety of an original would not follow its plain language. While the entire original recording was not duplicated, there is no question as to the accuracy of the recording, which shows Smith approach and stand close outside Whittington’s doorway for a few moments before walking away and—after a gap of 20 minutes—Smith leave Whittington’s apartment through the door, carrying a plastic bag. The landlord, a neutral observer, testified the hallway was “just empty” on the original surveillance footage captured between the two cell phone video clips. Admitting the duplicates was fair because the jury heard both sides. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Kidd was convicted on two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1)). The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The indictment does not set forth all the elements of the charged offenses; the court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment.In both counts, the grand jury alleged Kidd, "who was over the age of 17, committed an act of sexual contact, however slight, with T.F., in that said defendant placed his penis in contact with the mouth of T.F. and T.F. was under the age of 13 years old.” The counts alleged separate dates. A predatory criminal sexual assault indictment alleging contact requires an allegation that the purpose of the contact was for sexual gratification. The prosecutor and the court told Kidd the state could prove predatory criminal sexual assault by proving contact without also proving the purpose of the contact. Immediately before trial, the prosecutor told Kidd that he intended to prove Kidd acted for the purpose of sexual gratification. While the court did not allow the state to amend the indictment, the court permitted the change by including the statutory language of purpose in the jury instructions. View "People v. Kidd" on Justia Law