Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Missouri
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Seven individuals sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition from the Supreme Court of Missouri, claiming the circuit court failed to hold a preliminary hearing within the required timeframe, thus violating Rule 22.09(a), section 544.270, and section 544.320. The plaintiffs argued that this delay was to allow the circuit attorney additional time to secure an indictment. The primary plaintiff, Lamar Lamont Woods, had been held without bond for 162 days on the complaint, with his preliminary hearing delayed for 129 days beyond the 30-day deadline in Rule 22.09(a).The Supreme Court of Missouri noted that after the filing of a felony complaint, a preliminary hearing should be held within a reasonable time, but no later than 30 days following the defendant's initial appearance if the defendant is in custody, and no later than 60 days if the defendant is not in custody. The Court concluded that Woods was not entitled to a preliminary hearing on his charges, as he had been indicted on the same charges at issue in the complaint filed in June 2023. Since Woods had been indicted, the Court ruled that any relief it might issue in mandamus would not have practical effect on any existing controversy, thus rendering the case moot.The Court also concluded that the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply in this case, as Woods had not established this issue would recur. Consequently, the preliminary writ of mandamus was quashed. View "State ex rel. Woods vs. Dierker" on Justia Law

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On March 21, 2019, David Scott Nowicki was discovered unconscious in a vehicle in a ditch off Interstate 70 in Saline County, Missouri. After conducting field sobriety tests, Sergeant Dunfee concluded that Nowicki was impaired and arrested him. Nowicki was later transported to the Saline County jail, where he admitted he had been driving the vehicle but denied using alcohol or drugs in the last 72 hours. A jury trial was scheduled to determine whether Nowicki was guilty of driving while intoxicated. Before the trial, the circuit court was required to determine whether, if the jury found Nowicki guilty, he would be subject to an enhanced sentence due to prior convictions that qualified as intoxication-related traffic offenses (IRTOs). The state argued that Nowicki had four prior convictions that each qualified as an IRTO. As a result, the state contended Nowicki should be sentenced as a chronic offender. The jury found Nowicki guilty and the circuit court sentenced him as a chronic offender to five years in the department of corrections. Nowicki appealed the circuit court's judgment, arguing that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each of his four prior convictions qualifies as an IRTO.The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each of Nowicki's prior convictions was an intoxication-related traffic offense. The court found that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct underlying Nowicki's 1986, 1990, and 1994 convictions involved him actually, physically driving a vehicle while intoxicated. Accordingly, the court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for resentencing. View "State vs. Nowicki" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court overruling Appellant's Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035 motion for postconviction relief, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in concluding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate Appellant's competency at his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings.In his Rule 24.035 motion, Appellant, who pleaded guilty to second-degree assault of a special victim and resisting arrest, brought this motion alleging that his attorney was ineffective at both his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings by failing adequately to address his competency to proceed. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in concluding that Appellant's attorney was not ineffective for failing to investigate his competency at Appellant's guilty plea and sentencing proceedings. View "Hecker v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by the State of an order and judgment dismissing with prejudice criminal charges against Defendant, holding that there was no final, appealable judgment, and therefore, the State lacked statutory authority to appeal pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 547.200.Defendant, who was charged with second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The circuit court sustained the motion in part and dismissed the murder and robbery charges with prejudice, concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded those charges. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this was an improper appeal. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition barring the circuit court from taking any further action in Petitioner's criminal case other than dismissing the pending charges against him, holding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) mandated dismissal of Petitioner's case.As a basis for the writ, Petitioner claimed that the circuit court violated the IAD by continuing his criminal case and failing to conduct a trial within 180 days of his request to dispose of his pending charges of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the writ, holding (1) the IAD applied to the disposition of the state charges pending against Petitioner resulting in a detainer being lodged with the federal penitentiary where he was serving a federal sentence; (2) the State waived any post hoc objection as to the sufficiency of Petitioner's request to dispose of his pending charges; (3) good cause did not exist under the IAD warranting continuing Petitioner's trial; and (4) Petitioner's actions did not waive, toll or otherwise justify extending the timeline mandated by the IAD. View "State ex rel. Wishom v. Honorable Bryant" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Caitlyn Williams and Tamara LaRue (together, Parents) of failing to cause their children to attend school on a regular basis in violation of Missouri's compulsory attendance law, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.031.1 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied in this case.On appeal, Parents argued, among other things, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that their conduct was a purposeful or knowing violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.031.1 and that the children's attendance was not sufficiently "regular" to constitute a statutory violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 167.031.1 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case; and (2) there sufficient evidence to find that Parents knowingly failed to cause their children to attend school on a regular basis after their children were enrolled. View "State v. LaRue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal of the circuit court's final judgment in this criminal case, holding that Defendant's appeal was untimely.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of financial exploitation of an elderly person by undue influence. The circuit court sentenced her to ten years in prison and ordered her to pay restitution as a condition of parole. The circuit court dismissed Defendant's appeal. Thereafter, the circuit court set the amount of restitution and purported to resentence her to fifteen years in prison plus $26,118.51 in restitution. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal, holding that Defendant's notice of appeal was untimely. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case with directions for the circuit court to vacate the second judgment and sentence, holding that when the circuit court orally sentenced Defendant to ten years in prison, it exhausted its jurisdiction to withdraw Defendant's sentence, resentence her, or add restitution to the judgment. View "State v. Forbes" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's motions to suppress evidence obtained after his warrantless arrest for a felony, holding that to the extent the decision was based on Defendant's claim that the Fourth Amendment is violated when an arresting officer was outside of the officer's jurisdiction unless the officer personally observed the crime, the decision was clearly erroneous.Defendant was charged in two separate cases for his involvement in two robberies. Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after a warrantless arrest, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the officer was outside of his jurisdiction. The circuit court sustained the motions to suppress. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's decision, holding that while Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. banc 2015), requires both probable cause and that the crime be committed in the officer's presence for an arrest to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, when a warrantless arrest is for a felony, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the arresting officer has probable cause for the arrest, even when the felony was not committed in the arresting officer's presence. View "State v. Barton" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree statutory sodomy, incest, first-degree child molestation, and one count of first-degree attempted rape, holding that the circuit court's jury instructions did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict.On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence presented at trial included multiple allegations of abuse related to each count of sexual misconduct and that five separate verdict directors violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury instructions violated Defendant's right to a unanimous verdict. View "State v. Hamby" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the director of revenue to suspend Defendant's driver's license pursuant to Mo. Stat. 302.505, holding that the circuit court did not err in admitting testimony that a preliminary breath test was greater than 0.08 percent or in finding that Defendant was arrested upon probable cause for an alcohol-related offense.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the result of a preliminary breath test is a numerical percentage by weight of alcohol in the blood of the test person, and section 577.021.3 allows a court to admit the result as evidence of probable cause to arrest; (2) because the numerical result in this case was known to the arresting officer at the time of arrest the circuit court was allowed to consider it in determining that the officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (3) the judgment was supported by substantial evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. View "Wilmoth v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law