Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held in these two cases that a probationer may not be discharged from probation as a result of Earned Compliance Credits (ECCs) accrued under Mo. Rev. Stat. 217.703 unless she has paid the full amount of any court-ordered restitution because Mo. Rev. Stat. 559.105.2, which prohibits such a discharge if the probationer has failed to pay the full amount of court-ordered restitution, takes precedence over section 217.703.7.In the case of Nettie Pallai, the judge sustained Pallai’s motion for discharge from probation, and the prosecutor, Kevin Hillman, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. In the case of Erica Long, the judge overruled Long’s motion to be discharged from probation. Both Pallai and Long accrued sufficient ECCs to be discharged under section 213.703.7 but failed to pay restitution. The Supreme Court made permanent the preliminary writ of probation in Hillman’s case and quashed the preliminary writ of prohibition in Long’s case, holding that a probationer may accrue ECCs under section 217.703.3, but she may not be discharged from probation by applying those ECCs to shorten her term of probation under section 217.703.7 unless she pays any court-ordered restitution in full pursuant to section 559.105.2. View "State ex rel. Hillman v. Honorable John D. Beger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed a preliminary writ of prohibition and denied Petitioner’s petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the Honorable Brian May from proceeding with any action other than vacating an order denying Petitioner’s application for change of judge pursuant to Rule 32.07, holding that Petitioner did not timely file his application for change of judge.Rule 32.07(b) requires the applicable for change of judge to be filed within ten days of the initial plea in a criminal case or within ten days of the designation of the trial judge. Petitioner filed an application for change of judge pursuant to Rule 32.07 in the underlying criminal case. When Respondent denied the application, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) Petitioner did not file his application for change of judge within ten days of the initial plea in his criminal case, and the fact that Petitioner waived arraignment on new charges in a superseding indictment did not negate the fact that he previously entered the initial plea in his criminal case approximately two years earlier; and (2) Petitioner’s application for change of judge was not filed within ten days of the designation of Respondent as the trial judge for Petitioner’s criminal case. View "State ex rel. Mario Richardson v. Honorable Brian H. May" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision overruling Defendant’s motion suppress evidence found during a warrantless search and seizure of a bag that the police seized from the back seat of the vehicle in which Defendant had been riding, holding that no prejudice resulted from the suppression motion being overruled.On appeal, Defendant argued that under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), and State v. Carrawell, 481 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. banc 2016), the evidence should have been suppressed because, contrary to the ruling of the circuit court, the drugs and drug paraphernalia in the bag were not within his possession or control when the bag was seized. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the issue of whether Gant or Carrawell required the suppression of the evidence, holding that any error was not prejudicial because other unchallenged evidence fully supported the judgment reached by the circuit court. View "State v. Hughes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition barring Respondent, Judge Bryan E. Round, from enforcing his order disqualifying the entire Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (PAO) in the underlying post-conviction case, holding that Respondent’s order failed to comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d 416 (Mo. banc 2015), and will cause irreparable harm if relief is not granted.Jeanette Wolpink of the Missouri Public Defender System (MPDS) was appointed to represent on appeal Defendant in the underlying case. After Defendant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal, but before his amended post-conviction motion was filed, Wolpink left the MPDS and was hired by the PAO. After Defendant filed his amended post-conviction motion, he moved to disqualify the entire PAO because Wolpink represented him in his direct appeal. Respondent sustained the motion and disqualified the entire PAO. Relator, Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney Jean Peters-Baker, then sought this writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Wolpink’s conflict is not imputed to the entire PAO under the appearance of impropriety test, and by disqualifying Relator, Respondent infringed upon Relator’s ability to carry out her duties as a public officer. View "State ex rel. Jean Peters-Baker v. Honorable Bryan E. Round" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition barring Respondent, Judge Timothy J. Boyer, from enforcing his order disqualifying the entire City of St. Louis Circuit Attorney’s Office (CAO) in the underlying case, holding that Respondent’s order failed to comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d 416 (Mo. banc 2015), and will cause irreparable harm if relief is not granted.Defendant in the underlying case was charged with several offenses. Officer A.F. resorted to the use of deadly force to apprehend Davis and, consequently, Relator, City of St. Louis Circuit Attorney Kimberly Gardner, initiated an investigation into Officer A.F.’s use of force against Defendant. Prior to Defendant’s preliminary hearing, Officer A.F. moved to disqualify the CAO. Respondent disqualified the CAO from prosecuting Defendant’s case, concluding that there was an appearance of impropriety because the CAO was actively prosecuting Defendant while simultaneously reviewing the conduct of the officer upon whom it was relying to effectuate the prosecution. Relator then sought this writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Respondent failed to recognize the limitations placed on his authority to disqualify counsel and that Respondent’s order unnecessarily interfered with Relator’s duty to represent the interests of the public. View "State ex rel. Gardner v. Honorable Timothy J. Boyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the motion court overruling Appellant’s Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 motion for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, holding that the motion court did not err.After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The circuit court adopted the jury’s recommendations and sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for one murder and to death for the other murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. At issue in this appeal was the motion court’s judgment overruling Appellant’s Rule 29.15 motion after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel because Appellant did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to relief under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of unlawful use of a weapon, third-degree domestic assault, first-degree burglary, and armed criminal action, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s assault and burglary convictions.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in overruling his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for third-degree domestic assault and first-degree burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment committing appellant to the custody of the Department of Mental Health under the Sexually Violent Predator Act. The court held that appellant failed to show how counsel was ineffective under either the "meaningful hearing based on the record" standard for ineffective assistance of counsel now applied in Missouri termination of parental rights cases or under the Strickland v. Washington standard. The court held that appellant's counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to evidence that appellant watched animalistic pornography, played a pedophilic video game, and was sexually attracted to animals. The court held that the evidence was admissible because the State's expert relied on it in assessing appellant's diagnosis and risk of reoffense. View "In re Grado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment committing appellant to the department of mental health as a sexually violent predator. The court held that appellant failed to show how counsel was ineffective under either the "meaningful hearing based on the record" standard for ineffective assistance of counsel now applied in Missouri termination of parental rights cases or under the Strickland v. Washington standard. The court held that the circuit court did not err in allowing testimony concerning appellant's prior murder arrest and in refusing to strike Juror 4. View "In re Braddy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the motion court overruling Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief, holding that Appellant’s postconviction counsel created a presumption of abandonment, and therefore, Appellant was entitled to an abandonment hearing.Appellant’s probation was revoked and his sentence for trafficking drugs in the second degree was executed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a pro se Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. The motion court appointed the public defender’s office to represent Appellant. The motion court denied the motion. On appeal, Appellant argued that he was abandoned because postconviction counsel filed a statement in lieu of an amended motion beyond the sixty-day deadline for filing an amended motion. The Supreme Court held that postconviction counsel’s failure to file either an amended motion or a statement in lieu of an amended motion within the sixty-day deadline in Rule 24.035(g) created the presumption that Appellant’s postconviction counsel failed to comply with the postconviction rules and thereby abandoned Appellant. The Court remanded the case for an abandonment hearing. View "Latham v. State" on Justia Law